Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security (Text with EEA relevance)

When delegating specific duties to a RSO, Contracting Governments, including Administrations, should ensure that the RSO has the competencies needed to undertake the task.

• 4.6 A recognised organisation, as referred to in regulation I/6 and fulfilling the requirements of regulation XI-1/1, may be appointed as a RSO provided it has the appropriate security-related expertise listed in paragraph 4.5.

• 4.7 A port or harbour Authority or port facility operator may be appointed as a RSO provided it has the appropriate security-related expertise listed in paragraph 4.5.

Setting the security level

• 4.8In setting the security level, Contracting Governments should take account of general and specific threat information. Contracting Governments should set the security level applying to ships or port facilities at one of three levels: —Security level 1, normal; the level at which the ship or port facility normally operates; —Security level 2, heightened; the level applying for as long as there is a heightened risk of a security incident; and —Security level 3, exceptional; the level applying for the period of time when there is the probable or imminent risk of a security incident.

• 4.9Setting security level 3 should be an exceptional measure applying only when there is credible information that a security incident is probable or imminent. Security level 3 should only be set for the duration of the identified security threat or actual security incident. While the security levels may change from security level 1, through security level 2 to security level 3, it is also possible that the security levels will change directly from security level 1 to security level 3.

• 4.10At all times the master of a ship has the ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of the ship. Even at security level 3 a master may seek clarification or amendment of instructions issued by those responding to a security incident, or threat thereof, if there are reasons to believe that compliance with any instruction may imperil the safety of the ship.

• 4.11The CSO or the SSO should liaise at the earliest opportunity with the PFSO of the port facility the ship is intended to visit to establish the security level applying for that ship at the port facility. Having established contact with a ship, the PFSO should advise the ship of any subsequent change in the port facility's security level and should provide the ship with any relevant security information.

• 4.12While there may be circumstances when an individual ship may be operating at a higher security level than the port facility it is visiting, there will be no circumstances when a ship can have a lower security level than the port facility it is visiting. If a ship has a higher security level than the port facility it intends to use, the CSO or SSO should advise the PFSO without delay. The PFSO should undertake an assessment of the particular situation in consultation with the CSO or SSO and agree on appropriate security measures with the ship, which may include completion and signing of a Declaration of Security.

• 4.13Contracting Governments should consider how information on changes in security levels should be promulgated rapidly. Administrations may wish to use NAVTEX messages or Notices to Mariners as the method for notifying such changes in security levels to the ship and to CSO and SSO. Or, they may wish to consider other methods of communication that provide equivalent or better speed and coverage. Contracting Governments should establish means of notifying PFSOs of changes in security levels. Contracting Governments should compile and maintain the contact details for a list of those who need to be informed of changes in security levels. Whereas the security level need not be regarded as being particularly sensitive, the underlying threat information may be highly sensitive. Contracting Governments should give careful consideration to the type and detail of the information conveyed and the method by which it is conveyed to SSOs, CSOs and PFSOs.

Contact points and information on port facility security plans

• 4.14Where a port facility has a PFSP, that fact has to be communicated to the Organisation and that information must also be made available to CSOs and SSOs. No further details of the PFSP have to be published other than that it is in place. Contracting Governments should consider establishing either central or regional points of contact, or other means of providing up-to-date information on the locations where PFSPs are in place, together with contact details for the relevant PFSO. The existence of such contact points should be publicised. They could also provide information on the recognised security organisations appointed to act on behalf of the Contracting Government, together with details of the specific responsibility and conditions of authority delegated to such recognised security organisations.

• 4.15In the case of a port that does not have a PFSP (and therefore does not have a PFSO), the central or regional point of contact should be able to identify a suitably qualified person ashore who can arrange for appropriate security measures to be in place, if needed, for the duration of the ship's visit.

• 4.16Contracting Governments should also provide the contact details of Government officers to whom an SSO, a CSO and a PFSO can report security concerns. These Government officers should assess such reports before taking appropriate action. Such reported concerns may have a bearing on the security measures falling under the jurisdiction of another Contracting Government. In that case, the Contracting Governments should consider contacting their counterpart in the other Contracting Government to discuss whether remedial action is appropriate. For this purpose, the contact details of the Government officers should be communicated to the International Maritime Organisation.

• 4.17Contracting Governments should also make the information indicated in paragraphs 4.14 to 4.16 available to other Contracting Governments on request.

Identification documents

• 4.18Contracting Governments are encouraged to issue appropriate identification documents to Government officials entitled to board ships or enter port facilities when performing their official duties and to establish procedures whereby the authenticity of such documents might be verified.

Fixed and floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units on location

• 4.19Contracting Governments should consider establishing appropriate security measures for fixed and floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units on location to allow interaction with ships which are required to comply with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code.

Ships which are not required to comply with part A of this Code

• 4.20Contracting Governments should consider establishing appropriate security measures to enhance the security of ships to which chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code do not apply and to ensure that any security provisions applying to such ships allow interaction with ships to which part A of this Code applies.

Threats to ships and other incidents at sea

• 4.21 Contracting Governments should provide general guidance on the measures considered appropriate to reduce the security risk to ships flying their flag when at sea. They should provide specific advice on the action to be taken in accordance with security levels 1 to 3, if:

• .1there is a change in the security level applying to the ship while it is at sea, e.g. because of the geographical area in which it is operating or relating to the ship itself; and

• .2there is a security incident or threat thereof involving the ship while at sea.

Contracting Governments should establish the best methods and procedures for these purposes. In the case of an imminent attack, the ship should seek to establish direct communication with those responsible in the flag State for responding to security incidents.

• 4.22 Contracting Governments should also establish a point of contact for advice on security for any ship:

• .1entitled to fly their flag; or

• .2operating in their territorial sea or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea.

• 4.23 Contracting Governments should offer advice to ships operating in their territorial sea or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea, which could include advice:

• .1to alter or delay their intended passage;

• .2to navigate on a particular course or proceed to a specific location;

• .3on the availability of any personnel or equipment that could be placed on the ship;

• .4to coordinate the passage, arrival into port or departure from port, to allow escort by patrol craft or aircraft (fixed-wing or helicopter).

Contracting Governments should remind ships operating in their territorial sea, or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea, of any temporary restricted areas that they have published.

• 4.24 Contracting Governments should recommend that ships operating in their territorial sea, or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea, implement expeditiously, for the ship's protection and for the protection of other ships in the vicinity, any security measure the Contracting Government may have advised.

• 4.25 The plans prepared by the Contracting Governments for the purposes given in paragraph 4.22 should include information on an appropriate point of contact, available on a 24-hour basis, within the Contracting Government including the Administration. These plans should also include information on the circumstances in which the Administration considers assistance should be sought from nearby coastal States, and a procedure for liaison between PFSOs and SSOs.

Alternative security agreements

• 4.26Contracting Governments, in considering how to implement chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code, may conclude one or more agreements with one or more Contracting Governments. The scope of an agreement is limited to short international voyages on fixed routes between port facilities in the territory of the parties to the agreement. When concluding an agreement, and thereafter, the Contracting Governments should consult other Contracting Governments and Administrations with an interest in the effects of the agreement. Ships flying the flag of a State that is not party to the agreement should only be allowed to operate on the fixed routes covered by the agreement if their Administration agrees that the ship should comply with the provisions of the agreement and requires the ship to do so. In no case can such an agreement compromise the level of security of other ships and port facilities not covered by it, and specifically, all ships covered by such an agreement may not conduct ship-to-ship activities with ships not so covered. Any operational interface undertaken by ships covered by the agreement should be covered by it. The operation of each agreement must be continually monitored and amended when the need arises and in any event should be reviewed every 5 years.

Equivalent arrangements for port facilities

• 4.27For certain specific port facilities with limited or special operations but with more than occasional traffic, it may be appropriate to ensure compliance by security measures equivalent to those prescribed in chapter XI-2 and in part A of this Code. This can, in particular, be the case for terminals such as those attached to factories, or quaysides with no frequent operations.

Manning level

• 4.28In establishing the minimum safe manning of a ship, the Administration should take into account that the minimum safe manning provisions established by regulation V/14 only address the safe navigation of the ship. The Administration should also take into account any additional workload which may result from the implementation of the SSP and ensure that the ship is sufficiently and effectively manned. In doing so, the Administration should verify that ships are able to implement the hours of rest and other measures to address fatigue which have been promulgated by national law, in the context of all shipboard duties assigned to the various shipboard personnel.

Control and compliance measures

General

• 4.29Regulation XI-2/9 describes the control and compliance measures applicable to ships under chapter XI-2. It is divided into three distinct sections; control of ships already in a port, control of ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting Government, and additional provisions applicable to both situations.

• 4.30Regulation XI-2/9.1, Control of ships in port, implements a system for the control of ships while in the port of a foreign country where duly authorised officers of the Contracting Government (“duly authorised officers”) have the right to go on board the ship to verify that the required certificates are in proper order. Then, if there are clear grounds to believe the ship does not comply, control measures such as additional inspections or detention may be taken. This reflects current control systems. Regulation XI-2/9.1 builds on such systems and allows for additional measures (including expulsion of a ship from a port to be taken as a control measure) when duly authorised officers have clear grounds for believing that a ship is in non-compliance with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code. Regulation XI-2/9.3 describes the safeguards that promote fair and proportionate implementation of these additional measures.

• 4.31Regulation XI-2/9.2 applies control measures to ensure compliance to ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting Government and introduces an entirely different concept of control within chapter XI-2, applying to security only. Under this regulation, measures may be implemented prior to the ship entering port, to better ensure security. Just as in regulation XI-2/9.1, this additional control system is based on the concept of clear grounds for believing the ship does not comply with chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, and includes significant safeguards in regulations XI-2/9.2.2 and XI-2/9.2.5 as well as in regulation XI-2/9.3.

• 4.32Clear grounds that the ship is not in compliance means evidence or reliable information that the ship does not correspond with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, taking into account the guidance given in this Part of the Code. Such evidence or reliable information may arise from the duly authorised officer's professional judgement or observations gained while verifying the ship's International Ship Security Certificate or Interim International Ship Security Certificate issued in accordance with part A of this Code (“Certificate”) or from other sources. Even if a valid Certificate is on board the ship, the duly authorised officers may still have clear grounds for believing that the ship is not in compliance based on their professional judgement.

• 4.33Examples of possible clear grounds under regulations XI-2/9.1 and XI-2/9.2 may include, when relevant: .1evidence from a review of the certificate that it is not valid or it has expired; .2evidence or reliable information that serious deficiencies exist in the security equipment, documentation or arrangements required by chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code; .3receipt of a report or complaint which, in the professional judgement of the duly authorised officer, contains reliable information clearly indicating that the ship does not comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code; .4evidence or observation gained by a duly authorised officer using professional judgement that the master or ship's personnel is not familiar with essential shipboard security procedures or cannot carry out drills related to the security of the ship or that such procedures or drills have not been carried out; .5evidence or observation gained by a duly authorised officer using professional judgement that key members of ship's personnel are not able to establish proper communication with any other key members of ship's personnel with security responsibilities on board the ship; .6evidence or reliable information that the ship has embarked persons or loaded stores or goods at a port facility or from another ship where either the port facility or the other ship is in violation of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, and the ship in question has not completed a Declaration of Security, nor taken appropriate, special or additional security measures or has not maintained appropriate ship security procedures; .7evidence or reliable information that the ship has embarked persons or loaded stores or goods at a port facility or from another source (e.g., another ship or helicopter transfer) where either the port facility or the other source is not required to comply with chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, and the ship has not taken appropriate, special or additional security measures or has not maintained appropriate security procedures; and .8the ship holding a subsequent, consecutively issued Interim International Ship Security Certificate as described in section A/19.4, and, in the professional judgement of an officer duly authorised, one of the purposes of the ship or a Company in requesting such a Certificate is to avoid full compliance with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code beyond the period of the initial Interim Certificate as described in section A/19.4.4.

• 4.34The international law implications of regulation XI-2/9 are particularly relevant, and the regulation should be implemented with regulation XI-2/2.4 in mind, as the potential exists for situations where either measures will be taken which fall outside the scope of chapter XI-2, or where rights of affected ships, outside chapter XI-2, should be considered. Thus, regulation XI-2/9 does not prejudice the Contracting Government from taking measures having a basis in, and consistent with, international law to ensure the safety or security of persons, ships, port facilities and other property in cases where the ship, although in compliance with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code, is still considered to present a security risk.

• 4.35When a Contracting Government imposes control measures on a ship, the Administration should, without delay, be contacted with sufficient information to enable the Administration to fully liaise with the Contracting Government.

Control of ships in port

• 4.36Where the non-compliance is either a defective item of equipment or faulty documentation leading to the ship's detention and the non-compliance cannot be remedied in the port of inspection, the Contracting Government may allow the ship to sail to another port provided that any conditions agreed between the port States and the Administration or master are met.

Ships intending to enter the port of another Contracting Government

• 4.37Regulation XI-2/9.2.1 lists the information Contracting Governments may require from a ship as a condition of entry into port. One item of information listed is confirmation of any special or additional measures taken by the ship during its last 10 calls at a port facility. Examples could include: .1records of the measures taken while visiting a port facility located in the territory of a State which is not a Contracting Government, especially those measures that would normally have been provided by port facilities located in the territories of Contracting Governments; and .2any Declarations of Security that were entered into with port facilities or other ships.

• 4.38Another item of information listed, that may be required as a condition of entry into port, is confirmation that appropriate ship security procedures were maintained during ship-to-ship activity conducted within the period of the last 10 calls at a port facility. It would not normally be required to include records of transfers of pilots or of customs, immigration or security officials nor bunkering, lightering, loading of supplies and unloading of waste by ship within port facilities as these would normally fall within the auspices of the PFSP. Examples of information that might be given include: .1records of the measures taken while engaged in a ship-to-ship activity with a ship flying the flag of a State which is not a Contracting Government, especially those measures that would normally have been provided by ships flying the flag of Contracting Governments; .2records of the measures taken while engaged in a ship-to-ship activity with a ship that is flying the flag of a Contracting Government but is not required to comply with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code, such as a copy of any security certificate issued to that ship under other provisions; and .3in the event that persons or goods rescued at sea are on board, all known information about such persons or goods, including their identities when known and the results of any checks run on behalf of the ship to establish the security status of those rescued. It is not the intention of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code to delay or prevent the delivery of those in distress at sea to a place of safety. It is the sole intention of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code to provide States with enough appropriate information to maintain their security integrity.

• 4.39Examples of other practical security-related information that may be required as a condition of entry into port in order to assist with ensuring the safety and security of persons, port facilities, ships and other property include: .1information contained in the Continuous Synopsis Record; .2location of the ship at the time the report is made; .3expected time of arrival of the ship in port; .4crew list; .5general description of cargo aboard the ship; .6passenger list; and .7information required to be carried under regulation XI-2/5.

• 4.40Regulation XI-2/9.2.5 allows the master of a ship, upon being informed that the coastal or port State will implement control measures under regulation XI-2/9.2, to withdraw the intention for the ship to enter port. If the master withdraws that intention, regulation XI-2/9 no longer applies, and any other steps that are taken must be based on, and consistent with, international law.

Additional provisions

• 4.41In all cases where a ship is denied entry or is expelled from a port, all known facts should be communicated to the authorities of relevant States. This communication should consist of the following, when known: .1name of ship, its flag, the Ship Identification Number, call sign, ship type and cargo; .2reason for denying entry or for expulsion from port or port areas; .3if relevant, the nature of any security non-compliance; .4if relevant, details of any attempts made to rectify any non-compliance, including any conditions imposed on the ship for the voyage; .5past port(s) of call and next declared port of call; .6time of departure and likely estimated time of arrival at those ports; .7any instructions given to the ship, e.g., reporting on its route; .8available information on the security level at which the ship is currently operating; .9information regarding any communications the port State has had with the Administration; .10contact point within the port State making the report for the purpose of obtaining further information; .11crew list; and .12any other relevant information.

• 4.42Relevant States to contact should include those along the ship's intended passage to its next port, particularly if the ship intends to enter the territorial sea of that coastal State. Other relevant States could include previous ports of call, so that further information might be obtained and security issues relating to the previous ports resolved.

• 4.43In exercising control and compliance measures, the duly authorised officers should ensure that any measures or steps imposed are proportionate. Such measures or steps should be reasonable and of the minimum severity and duration necessary to rectify or mitigate the non-compliance.

• 4.44The word “delay” in regulation XI-2/9.3.5.1 also refers to situations where, pursuant to actions taken under this regulation, the ship is unduly denied entry into port or the ship is unduly expelled from port.

Non-Party ships and ships below Convention size

• 4.45With respect to ships flying the flag of a State which is not a Contracting Government to the Convention and not a Party to the 1988 SOLAS Protocol ([^E0008]), Contracting Governments should not give more favourable treatment to such ships. Accordingly, the requirements of regulation XI-2/9 and the guidance provided in this Part of the Code should be applied to those ships.

• 4.46Ships below Convention size are subject to measures by which States maintain security. Such measures should be taken with due regard to the requirements in chapter XI-2 and the guidance provided in this Part of the Code.

5. DECLARATION OF SECURITY

General

5.1   A Declaration of Security (DoS) should be completed when the Contracting Government of the port facility deems it to be necessary or when a ship deems it necessary.

• 5.1.1The need for a DoS may be indicated by the results of the port facility security assessment (PFSA) and the reasons and circumstances in which a DoS is required should be set out in the port facility security plan (PFSP).

• 5.1.2The need for a DoS may be indicated by an Administration for ships entitled to fly its flag or as a result of a ship security assessment (SSA) and should be set out in the ship security plan (SSP).

5.2   It is likely that a DoS will be requested at higher security levels, when a ship has a higher security level than the port facility, or another ship with which it interfaces, and for ship/port interface or ship-to-ship activities that pose a higher risk to persons, property or the environment for reasons specific to that ship, including its cargo or passengers or the circumstances at the port facility or a combination of these factors.

• 5.2.1In the case that a ship or an Administration, on behalf of ships entitled to fly its flag, requests completion of a DoS, the port facility security officer (PFSO) or ship security officer (SSO) should acknowledge the request and discuss appropriate security measures.

• 5.3 A PFSO may also initiate a DoS prior to ship/port interfaces that are identified in the approved PFSA as being of particular concern. Examples may include embarking or disembarking passengers and the transfer, loading or unloading of dangerous goods or hazardous substances. The PFSA may also identify facilities at or near highly populated areas or economically significant operations that warrant a DoS.

• 5.4 The main purpose of a DoS is to ensure agreement is reached between the ship and the port facility or with other ships with which it interfaces as to the respective security measures each will undertake in accordance with the provisions of their respective approved security plans.

• 5.4.1The agreed DoS should be signed and dated by both the port facility and the ship(s), as applicable, to indicate compliance with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code and should include its duration, the relevant security level or levels and the relevant contact details.

• 5.4.2A change in the security level may require that a new or revised DoS be completed.

• 5.5 The DoS should be completed in English, French or Spanish or in a language common to both the port facility and the ship or the ships, as applicable.

• 5.6 A model DoS is included in appendix 1 to this Part of the Code. This model is for a DoS between a ship and a port facility. If the DoS is to cover two ships this model should be appropriately adjusted.

6. OBLIGATIONS OF THE COMPANY

General

• 6.1 Regulation XI-2/5 requires the Company to provide the master of the ship with information to meet the requirements of the Company under the provisions of this regulation. This information should include items such as:

• .1parties responsible for appointing shipboard personnel, such as ship management companies, manning agents, contractors, concessionaries (for example, retail sales outlets, casinos, etc.);

• .2parties responsible for deciding the employment of the ship, including time or bareboat charterer(s) or any other entity acting in such capacity; and

• .3in cases when the ship is employed under the terms of a charter party, the contact details of those parties, including time or voyage charterers.

• 6.2 In accordance with regulation XI-2/5, the Company is obliged to update and keep this information current as and when changes occur.

• 6.3 This information should be in English, French or Spanish language.

• 6.4 With respect to ships constructed before 1 July 2004, this information should reflect the actual condition on that date.

• 6.5 With respect to ships constructed on or after 1 July 2004 and for ships constructed before 1 July 2004 which were out of service on 1 July 2004, the information should be provided as from the date of entry of the ship into service and should reflect the actual condition on that date.

• 6.6 After 1 July 2004, when a ship is withdrawn from service, the information should be provided as from the date of re-entry of the ship into service and should reflect the actual condition on that date.

• 6.7 Previously provided information that does not relate to the actual condition on that date need not be retained on board.

• 6.8 When the responsibility for the operation of the ship is assumed by another Company, the information relating to the Company which operated the ship is not required to be left on board.

In addition, other relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.

7. SHIP SECURITY

Relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.

8. SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT

Security assessment

• 8.1The company security officer (CSO) is responsible for ensuring that a ship security assessment (SSA) is carried out for each of the ships in the Company's fleet which is required to comply with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code for which the CSO is responsible. While the CSO need not necessarily personally undertake all the duties associated with the post, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that they are properly performed remains with the individual CSO.

• 8.2Prior to commencing the SSA, the CSO should ensure that advantage is taken of information available on the assessment of threat for the ports at which the ship will call or at which passengers embark or disembark and about the port facilities and their protective measures. The CSO should study previous reports on similar security needs. Where feasible, the CSO should meet with appropriate persons on the ship and in the port facilities to discuss the purpose and methodology of the assessment. The CSO should follow any specific guidance offered by the Contracting Governments.

• 8.3A SSA should address the following elements on board or within the ship: .1physical security; .2structural integrity; .3personnel protection systems; .4procedural policies; .5radio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and networks; and .6other areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to persons, property, or operations on board the ship or within a port facility.

• 8.4Those involved in conducting a SSA should be able to draw upon expert assistance in relation to: .1knowledge of current security threats and patterns; .2recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices; .3recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; .4techniques used to circumvent security measures; .5methods used to cause a security incident; .6effects of explosives on ship's structures and equipment; .7ship security; .8ship/port interface business practices; .9contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response; .10physical security; .11radio and telecommunications systems, including computer systems and networks; .12marine engineering; and .13ship and port operations.

• 8.5The CSO should obtain and record the information required to conduct an assessment, including: .1the general layout of the ship; .2the location of areas which should have restricted access, such as navigation bridge, machinery spaces of category A and other control stations as defined in chapter II-2, etc.; .3the location and function of each actual or potential access point to the ship; .4changes in the tide which may have an impact on the vulnerability or security of the ship; .5the cargo spaces and stowage arrangements; .6the locations where the ship's stores and essential maintenance equipment is stored; .7the locations where unaccompanied baggage is stored; .8the emergency and stand-by equipment available to maintain essential services; .9the number of ship's personnel, any existing security duties and any existing training requirement practises of the Company; .10existing security and safety equipment for the protection of passengers and ship's personnel; .11escape and evacuation routes and assembly stations which have to be maintained to ensure the orderly and safe emergency evacuation of the ship; .12existing agreements with private security companies providing ship/water-side security services; and .13existing security measures and procedures in effect, including inspection and, control procedures, identification systems, surveillance and monitoring equipment, personnel identification documents and communication, alarms, lighting, access control and other appropriate systems.

• 8.6The SSA should examine each identified point of access, including open weather decks, and evaluate its potential for use by individuals who might seek to breach security. This includes points of access available to individuals having legitimate access as well as those who seek to obtain unauthorised entry.

• 8.7The SSA should consider the continuing relevance of the existing security measures and guidance, procedures and operations, under both routine and emergency conditions, and should determine security guidance including: .1the restricted areas; .2the response procedures to fire or other emergency conditions; .3the level of supervision of the ship's personnel, passengers, visitors, vendors, repair technicians, dock workers, etc.; .4the frequency and effectiveness of security patrols; .5the access control systems, including identification systems; .6the security communications systems and procedures; .7the security doors, barriers and lighting; and .8the security and surveillance equipment and systems, if any.

• 8.8The SSA should consider the persons, activities, services and operations that it is important to protect. This includes: .1the ship's personnel; .2passengers, visitors, vendors, repair technicians, port facility personnel, etc.; .3the capacity to maintain safe navigation and emergency response; .4the cargo, particularly dangerous goods or hazardous substances; .5the ship's stores; .6the ship security communication equipment and systems, if any; and .7the ship's security surveillance equipment and systems, if any.

• 8.9The SSA should consider all possible threats, which may include the following types of security incidents: .1damage to, or destruction of, the ship or of a port facility, e.g. by explosive devices, arson, sabotage or vandalism; .2hijacking or seizure of the ship or of persons on board; .3tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship's stores; .4unauthorised access or use, including presence of stowaways; .5smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction; .6use of the ship to carry those intending to cause a security incident and/or their equipment; .7use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction; .8attacks from seaward whilst at berth or at anchor; and .9attacks whilst at sea.

• 8.10The SSA should take into account all possible vulnerabilities, which may include: .1conflicts between safety and security measures; .2conflicts between shipboard duties and security assignments; .3watchkeeping duties, number of ship's personnel, particularly with implications on crew fatigue, alertness and performance; .4any identified security training deficiencies; and .5any security equipment and systems, including communication systems.

• 8.11The CSO and ship security officer (SSO) should always have regard to the effect that security measures may have on ship's personnel who will remain on the ship for long periods. When developing security measures, particular consideration should be given to the convenience, comfort and personal privacy of the ship's personnel and their ability to maintain their effectiveness over long periods.

• 8.12Upon completion of the SSA, a report shall be prepared, consisting of a summary of how the assessment was conducted, a description of each vulnerability found during the assessment and a description of countermeasures that could be used to address each vulnerability. The report shall be protected from unauthorised access or disclosure.

• 8.13If the SSA has not been carried out by the Company, the report of the SSA should be reviewed and accepted by the CSO.

On-scene security survey

• 8.14The on-scene security survey is an integral part of any SSA. The on-scene security survey should examine and evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations for: .1ensuring the performance of all ship security duties; .2monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorised persons have access; .3controlling access to the ship, including any identification systems; .4monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship; .5controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects (accompanied and unaccompanied baggage and ship's personnel personal effects); .6supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of ship's stores; and .7ensuring that ship security communication, information, and equipment are readily available.

9. SHIP SECURITY PLAN

General

• 9.1The company security officer (CSO) has the responsibility of ensuring that a ship security plan (SSP) is prepared and submitted for approval. The content of each individual SSP should vary depending on the particular ship it covers. The ship security assessment (SSA) will have identified the particular features of the ship and the potential threats and vulnerabilities. The preparation of the SSP will require these features to be addressed in detail. Administrations may prepare advice on the preparation and content of a SSP.

• 9.2All SSPs should: .1detail the organisational structure of security for the ship; .2detail the ship's relationships with the Company, port facilities, other ships and relevant authorities with security responsibility; .3detail the communication systems to allow effective continuous communication within the ship and between the ship and others, including port facilities; .4detail the basic security measures for security level 1, both operational and physical, that will always be in place; .5detail the additional security measures that will allow the ship to progress without delay to security level 2 and, when necessary, to security level 3; .6provide for regular review, or audit, of the SSP and for its amendment in response to experience or changing circumstances; and .7detail reporting procedures to the appropriate Contracting Government's contact points.

• 9.3Preparation of an effective SSP should rest on a thorough assessment of all issues that relate to the security of the ship, including, in particular, a thorough appreciation of the physical and operational characteristics, including the voyage pattern, of the individual ship.

• 9.4All SSPs should be approved by, or on behalf of, the Administration. If an Administration uses a recognised security organisation (RSO) to review or approve the SSP, that RSO should not be associated with any other RSO that prepared, or assisted in the preparation of, the plan.

• 9.5CSOs and SSOs should develop procedures to: .1assess the continuing effectiveness of the SSP; and .2prepare amendments of the plan subsequent to its approval.

• 9.6The security measures included in the SSP should be in place when the initial verification for compliance with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code will be carried out. Otherwise the process of issue to the ship of the required International Ship Security Certificate cannot be carried out. If there is any subsequent failure of security equipment or systems, or suspension of a security measure for whatever reason, equivalent temporary security measures should be adopted, notified to, and agreed by the Administration.

Organisation and performance of ship security duties

• 9.7In addition to the guidance given in paragraph 9.2, the SSP should establish the following, which relate to all security levels: .1the duties and responsibilities of all shipboard personnel with a security role; .2the procedures or safeguards necessary to allow such continuous communications to be maintained at all times; .3the procedures needed to assess the continuing effectiveness of security procedures and any security and surveillance equipment and systems, including procedures for identifying and responding to equipment or systems failure or malfunction; .4the procedures and practices to protect security-sensitive information held in paper or electronic format; .5the type and maintenance requirements of security and surveillance equipment and systems, if any; .6the procedures to ensure the timely submission, and assessment, of reports relating to possible breaches of security or security concerns; and .7procedures to establish, maintain and update an inventory of any dangerous goods or hazardous substances carried on board, including their location.

• 9.8The remainder of section 9 addresses specifically the security measures that could be taken at each security level covering: .1access to the ship by ship's personnel, passengers, visitors, etc.; .2restricted areas on the ship; .3handling of cargo; .4delivery of ship's stores; .5handling unaccompanied baggage; and .6monitoring the security of the ship.

Access to the ship

• 9.9The SSP should establish the security measures covering all means of access to the ship identified in the SSA. This should include any: .1access ladders; .2access gangways; .3access ramps; .4access doors, sidescuttles, windows and ports; .5mooring lines and anchor chains; and .6cranes and hoisting gear.

• 9.10For each of these the SSP should identify the appropriate locations where access restrictions or prohibitions should be applied for each of the security levels. For each security level the SSP should establish the type of restriction or prohibition to be applied and the means of enforcing them.

• 9.11The SSP should establish for each security level the means of identification required to allow access to the ship and for individuals to remain on the ship without challenge. This may involve developing an appropriate identification system allowing for permanent and temporary identifications, for ship's personnel and visitors respectively. Any ship identification system should, when it is practicable to do so, be coordinated with that applying to the port facility. Passengers should be able to prove their identity by boarding passes, tickets, etc., but should not be permitted access to restricted areas unless supervised. The SSP should establish provisions to ensure that the identification systems are regularly updated, and that abuse of procedures should be subject to disciplinary action.

• 9.12Those unwilling or unable to establish their identity and/or to confirm the purpose of their visit when requested to do so should be denied access to the ship and their attempt to obtain access should be reported, as appropriate, to the SSO, the CSO, the port facility security officer (PFSO) and to the national or local authorities with security responsibilities.

• 9.13The SSP should establish the frequency of application of any access controls, particularly if they are to be applied on a random, or occasional, basis.

Security level 1

• 9.14At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to control access to the ship, where the following may be applied: .1checking the identity of all persons seeking to board the ship and confirming their reasons for doing so by checking, for example, joining instructions, passenger tickets, boarding passes, work orders, etc.; .2in liaison with the port facility, the ship should ensure that designated secure areas are established in which inspections and searching of persons, baggage (including carry-on items), personal effects, vehicles and their contents can take place; .3in liaison with the port facility, the ship should ensure that vehicles destined to be loaded on board car carriers, ro-ro and other passenger ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency required in the SSP; .4segregating checked persons and their personal effects from unchecked persons and their personal effects; .5segregating embarking from disembarking passengers; .6identifying access points that should be secured or attended to prevent unauthorised access; .7securing, by locking or other means, access to unattended spaces adjoining areas to which passengers and visitors have access; and .8providing security briefings to all ship personnel on possible threats, the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities and the need for vigilance.

• 9.15At security level 1, all those seeking to board a ship should be liable to search. The frequency of such searches, including random searches, should be specified in the approved SSP and should be specifically approved by the Administration. Such searches may best be undertaken by the port facility in close cooperation with the ship and in close proximity to it. Unless there are clear security grounds for doing so, members of the ship's personnel should not be required to search their colleagues or their personal effects. Any such search shall be undertaken in a manner which fully takes into account the human rights of the individual and preserves their basic human dignity.

Security level 2

• 9.16At security level 2, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied to protect against a heightened risk of a security incident to ensure higher vigilance and tighter control, which may include: .1assigning additional personnel to patrol deck areas during silent hours to deter unauthorised access; .2limiting the number of access points to the ship, identifying those to be closed and the means of adequately securing them; .3deterring waterside access to the ship, including, for example, in liaison with the port facility, provision of boat patrols; .4establishing a restricted area on the shore side of the ship, in close cooperation with the port facility; .5increasing the frequency and detail of searches of persons, personal effects, and vehicles being embarked or loaded onto the ship; .6escorting visitors on the ship; .7providing additional specific security briefings to all ship personnel on any identified threats, re-emphasising the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects, or activities and stressing the need for increased vigilance; and .8carrying out a full or partial search of the ship.

Security level 3

• 9.17At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close cooperation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1limiting access to a single, controlled, access point; .2granting access only to those responding to the security incident or threat thereof; .3directing persons on board; .4suspension of embarkation or disembarkation; .5suspension of cargo handling operations, deliveries, etc.; .6evacuation of the ship; .7movement of the ship; and .8preparing for a full or partial search of the ship.

Restricted areas on the ship

• 9.18The SSP should identify the restricted areas to be established on the ship, specify their extent, times of application, the security measures to be taken to control access to them and those to be taken to control activities within them. The purposes of restricted areas are to: .1prevent unauthorised access; .2protect passengers, ship's personnel, and personnel from port facilities or other agencies authorised to be on board the ship; .3protect security-sensitive areas within the ship; and .4protect cargo and ship's stores from tampering.

• 9.19The SSP should ensure that there are clearly established policies and practices to control access to all restricted areas.

• 9.20The SSP should provide that all restricted areas should be clearly marked, indicating that access to the area is restricted and that unauthorised presence within the area constitutes a breach of security.

• 9.21Restricted areas may include: .1navigation bridge, machinery spaces of category A and other control stations as defined in chapter II-2; .2spaces containing security and surveillance equipment and systems and their controls and lighting system controls; .3ventilation and air-conditioning systems and other similar spaces; .4spaces with access to potable water tanks, pumps, or manifolds; .5spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances; .6spaces containing cargo pumps and their controls; .7cargo spaces and spaces containing ship's stores; .8crew accommodation; and .9any other areas as determined by the CSO, through the SSA, to which access must be restricted to maintain the security of the ship.

Security level 1

• 9.22At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied to restricted areas, which may include: .1locking or securing access points; .2using surveillance equipment to monitor the areas; .3using guards or patrols; and .4using automatic intrusion-detection devices to alert the ship's personnel of unauthorised access.

Security level 2

• 9.23At security level 2, the frequency and intensity of the monitoring of, and control of access to, restricted areas should be increased to ensure that only authorised persons have access. The SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied, which may include: .1establishing restricted areas adjacent to access points; .2continuously monitoring surveillance equipment; and .3dedicating additional personnel to guard and patrol restricted areas.

Security level 3

• 9.24At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close cooperation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1setting up of additional restricted areas on the ship in proximity to the security incident, or the believed location of the security threat, to which access is denied; and .2searching of restricted areas as part of a search of the ship.

Handling of cargo

• 9.25The security measures relating to cargo handling should: .1prevent tampering; and .2prevent cargo that is not meant for carriage from being accepted and stored on board the ship.

• 9.26The security measures, some of which may have to be applied in liaison with the port facility, should include inventory control procedures at access points to the ship. Once on board the ship, cargo should be capable of being identified as having been approved for loading onto the ship. In addition, security measures should be developed to ensure that cargo, once on board, is not tampered with.

Security level 1

• 9.27At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied during cargo handling, which may include: .1routine checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces prior to, and during, cargo handling operations; .2checks to ensure that cargo being loaded matches the cargo documentation; .3ensuring, in liaison with the port facility, that vehicles to be loaded on board car-carriers, ro-ro and passenger ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency required in the SSP; and .4checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering.

• 9.28Checking of cargo may be accomplished by the following means: .1visual and physical examination; and .2using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs.

• 9.29When there are regular or repeated cargo movements, the CSO or SSO may, in consultation with the port facility, agree arrangements with shippers or others responsible for such cargo covering off-site checking, sealing, scheduling, supporting documentation, etc. Such arrangements should be communicated to and agreed with the PFSO concerned.

Security level 2

• 9.30At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied during cargo handling, which may include: .1detailed checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces; .2intensified checks to ensure that only the intended cargo is loaded; .3intensified searching of vehicles to be loaded on car carriers, ro-ro and passenger ships; and .4increased frequency and detail in checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering.

• 9.31Detailed checking of cargo may be accomplished by the following means: .1increasing the frequency and detail of visual and physical examination; .2increasing the frequency of the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs; and .3coordinating enhanced security measures with the shipper or other responsible party in accordance with an established agreement and procedures.

Security level 3

• 9.32At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close cooperation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1suspending the loading or unloading of cargo; and .2verifying the inventory of dangerous goods and hazardous substances carried on board, if any, and their location.

Delivery of ship's stores

• 9.33The security measures relating to the delivery of ship's stores should: .1ensure checking of ship's stores and package integrity; .2prevent ship's stores from being accepted without inspection; .3prevent tampering; and .4prevent ship's stores from being accepted unless ordered.

• 9.34For ships regularly using the port facility, it may be appropriate to establish procedures involving the ship, its suppliers and the port facility covering notification and timing of deliveries and their documentation. There should always be some way of confirming that stores presented for delivery are accompanied by evidence that they have been ordered by the ship.

Security level 1

• 9.35At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied during delivery of ship's stores, which may include: .1checking to ensure stores match the order prior to being loaded on board; and .2ensuring immediate secure stowage of ship's stores.

Security level 2

• 9.36At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied during delivery of ship's stores by exercising checks prior to receiving stores on board and intensifying inspections.

Security level 3

• 9.37At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close cooperation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1subjecting ship's stores to more extensive checking; .2preparation for restriction or suspension of handling of ship's stores; and .3refusal to accept ship's stores on board the ship.

Handling unaccompanied baggage

• 9.38The SSP should establish the security measures to be applied to ensure that unaccompanied baggage (i.e. any baggage, including personal effects, which is not with the passenger or member of ship's personnel at the point of inspection or search) is identified and subjected to appropriate screening, including searching, before it is accepted on board the ship. It is not envisaged that such baggage will be subjected to screening by both the ship and the port facility, and in cases where both are suitably equipped, the responsibility for screening should rest with the port facility. Close cooperation with the port facility is essential and steps should be taken to ensure that unaccompanied baggage is handled securely after screening.

Security level 1

• 9.39At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied when handling unaccompanied baggage to ensure that unaccompanied baggage is screened or searched up to and including 100 percent, which may include use of x-ray screening.

Security level 2

• 9.40At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied when handling unaccompanied baggage, which should include 100 percent x-ray screening of all unaccompanied baggage.

Security level 3

• 9.41At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close cooperation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1subjecting such baggage to more extensive screening, for example x-raying it from at least two different angles; .2preparation for restriction or suspension of handling of unaccompanied baggage; and .3refusal to accept unaccompanied baggage on board the ship.

Monitoring the security of the ship

• 9.42The ship should have the capability to monitor the ship, the restricted areas on board and areas surrounding the ship. Such monitoring capabilities may include use of: .1lighting; .2watchkeepers, security guards and deck watches, including patrols; and .3automatic intrusion-detection devices and surveillance equipment.

• 9.43When used, automatic intrusion-detection devices should activate an audible and/or visual alarm at a location that is continuously attended or monitored.

• 9.44The SSP should establish the procedures and equipment needed at each security level and the means of ensuring that monitoring equipment will be able to perform continually, including consideration of the possible effects of weather conditions or of power disruptions.

Security level 1

• 9.45At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied, which may be a combination of lighting, watchkeepers, security guards or use of security and surveillance equipment to allow ship's security personnel to observe the ship in general, and barriers and restricted areas in particular.

• 9.46The ship's deck and access points to the ship should be illuminated during hours of darkness and periods of low visibility while conducting ship/port interface activities or at a port facility or anchorage when necessary. While under way, when necessary, ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent with safe navigation, having regard to the provisions of the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea in force. The following should be considered when establishing the appropriate level and location of lighting: .1the ship's personnel should be able to detect activities beyond the ship, on both the shore side and the water side; .2coverage should include the area on and around the ship; .3coverage should facilitate personnel identification at access points; and .4coverage may be provided through coordination with the port facility.

Security level 2

• 9.47At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied to enhance the monitoring and surveillance capabilities, which may include: .1increasing the frequency and detail of security patrols; .2increasing the coverage and intensity of lighting or the use of security and surveillance equipment; .3assigning additional personnel as security look-outs; and .4ensuring coordination with water-side boat patrols, and foot or vehicle patrols on the shore side, when provided.

• 9.48Additional lighting may be necessary to protect against a heightened risk of a security incident. When necessary, the additional lighting requirements may be accomplished by coordinating with the port facility to provide additional shoreside lighting.

Security level 3

• 9.49At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close cooperation with those responding and the port facility, which may include: .1switching on of all lighting on, or illuminating the vicinity of, the ship; .2switching on of all on-board surveillance equipment capable of recording activities on, or in the vicinity of, the ship; .3maximising the length of time such surveillance equipment can continue to record; .4preparation for underwater inspection of the hull of the ship; and .5initiation of measures, including the slow revolution of the ship's propellers, if practicable, to deter underwater access to the hull of the ship.

Differing security levels

• 9.50The SSP should establish details of the procedures and security measures the ship could adopt if the ship is at a higher security level than that applying to a port facility.

Activities not covered by the Code

• 9.51The SSP should establish details of the procedures and security measures the ship should apply when: .1it is at a port of a State which is not a Contracting Government; .2it is interfacing with a ship to which this Code does not apply; .3it is interfacing with fixed or floating platforms or a mobile drilling unit on location; or .4it is interfacing with a port or port facility which is not required to comply with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code.

Declarations of Security

• 9.52The SSP should detail how requests for Declarations of Security from a port facility will be handled and the circumstances under which the ship itself should request a DoS.

Audit and review

• 9.53The SSP should establish how the CSO and the SSO intend to audit the continued effectiveness of the SSP and the procedure to be followed to review, update or amend the SSP.

10. RECORDS

General

• 10.1Records should be available to duly authorised officers of Contracting Governments to verify that the provisions of ship security plans are being implemented.

• 10.2Records may be kept in any format but should be protected from unauthorised access or disclosure.

11. COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER

Relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.

12. SHIP SECURITY OFFICER

Relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.

13. TRAINING, DRILLS AND EXERCISES ON SHIP SECURITY

Training

• 13.1The company security officer (CSO) and appropriate shore-based Company personnel, and the ship security officer (SSO), should have knowledge of, and receive training, in some or all of the following, as appropriate: .1security administration; .2relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations; .3relevant Government legislation and regulations; .4responsibilities and functions of other security organisations; .5methodology of ship security assessment; .6methods of ship security surveys and inspections; .7ship and port operations and conditions; .8ship and port facility security measures; .9emergency preparedness and response and contingency planning; .10instruction techniques for security training and education, including security measures and procedures; .11handling sensitive security-related information and security-related communications; .12knowledge of current security threats and patterns; .13recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices; .14recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; .15techniques used to circumvent security measures; .16security equipment and systems and their operational limitations; .17methods of conducting audits, inspection, control and monitoring; .18methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections; .19security drills and exercises, including drills and exercises with port facilities; and .20assessment of security drills and exercises.

• 13.2In addition, the SSO should have adequate knowledge of, and receive training in, some or all of the following, as appropriate: .1the layout of the ship; .2the ship security plan and related procedures (including scenario-based training on how to respond); .3crowd management and control techniques; .4operations of security equipment and systems; and .5testing, calibration and at-sea maintenance of security equipment and systems.

• 13.3Shipboard personnel having specific security duties should have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties, including, as appropriate: .1knowledge of current security threats and patterns; .2recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices; .3recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; .4techniques used to circumvent security measures; .5crowd management and control techniques; .6security-related communications; .7knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans; .8operations of security equipment and systems; .9testing, calibration and at-sea maintenance of security equipment and systems; .10inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; and .11methods of physical searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and ship's stores.

• 13.4All other shipboard personnel should have sufficient knowledge of and be familiar with relevant provisions of the ship security plan (SSP), including: .1the meaning and the consequential requirements of the different security levels; .2knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans; .3recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices; .4recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; and .5techniques used to circumvent security measures.

Drills and exercises

• 13.5The objective of drills and exercises is to ensure that shipboard personnel are proficient in all assigned security duties at all security levels and the identification of any security-related deficiencies which need to be addressed.

• 13.6To ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the ship security plan, drills should be conducted at least once every three months. In addition, in cases where more than 25 percent of the ship's personnel has been changed, at any one time, with personnel that has not previously participated in any drill on that ship within the last 3 months, a drill should be conducted within one week of the change. These drills should test individual elements of the plan such as those security threats listed in paragraph 8.9.

• 13.713.7 Various types of exercises, which may include participation of company security officers, port facility security officers, relevant authorities of Contracting Governments as well as ship security officers, if available, should be carried out at least once each calendar year with no more than 18 months between the exercises. These exercises should test communications, coordination, resource availability, and response. These exercises may be: .1full-scale or live; .2tabletop simulation or seminar; or .3combined with other exercises held, such as search and rescue or emergency response exercises.

• 13.8Company participation in an exercise with another Contracting Government should be recognised by the Administration.

14. PORT FACILITY SECURITY

Relevant guidance is provided under sections 15, 16 and 18.

15. PORT FACILITY SECURITY ASSESSMENT

General

• 15.1The port facility security assessment (PFSA) may be conducted by a recognised security organisation (RSO). However, approval of a completed PFSA should only be given by the relevant Contracting Government.

• 15.2If a Contracting Government uses a RSO to review or verify compliance of the PFSA, the RSO should not be associated with any other RSO that prepared or assisted in the preparation of that assessment.

• 15.3A PFSA should address the following elements within a port facility: .1physical security; .2structural integrity; .3personnel protection systems; .4procedural policies; .5radio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and networks; .6relevant transportation infrastructure; .7utilities; and .8other areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to persons, property, or operations within the port facility.