Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali

Article 1

• (a) responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged, directly or indirectly, in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali, such as:
• (i) involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against:
• — UN and associated personnel in Mali;
• — international security presences in Mali;
• (ii) obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali;
• (iii) planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge;
• (iv) the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces, which are a violation of applicable international law, in the context of the armed conflict in Mali;
• (v) knowingly facilitating the travel of a listed person in violation of the travel restrictions;

• (b) obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or the handover of power to elected authorities; or

• (c) associated with natural persons referred to in points (a) or (b).

The designated persons referred to in this paragraph are listed in the Annex.

• (a) as a host country of an international intergovernmental organisation;

• (b) as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the United Nations;

• (c) under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or

• (d) pursuant to the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran Pact) concluded by the Holy See (Vatican City State) and Italy.

Article 2

• (a) responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged, directly or indirectly, in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali, such as:
• (i) involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against:
• — UN and associated personnel in Mali;
• — international security presences in Mali;
• (ii) obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali;
• (iii) planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge;
• (iv) the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces, which are a violation of applicable international law, in the context of the armed conflict in Mali;
• (v) knowingly facilitating the travel of a listed person in violation of the travel restrictions.

• (b) obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or the handover of power to elected authorities; or

• (c) associated with natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b),

shall be frozen.

The designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in this paragraph are listed in the Annex.

• (a) necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex, and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

• (b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

• (c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;

• (d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation; or

• (e) to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic or consular mission or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic or consular mission or international organisation.

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph within two weeks of the authorisation.

• (a) the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1 was listed in the Annex, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;

• (b) the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;

• (c) the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in the Annex; and

• (d) recognising the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph within two weeks of the authorisation.

• (a) interest or other earnings on those accounts;

• (b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2; or

• (c) payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in the Union or enforceable in the Member State concerned;

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to the measures provided for in paragraph 1.

• (a) the United Nations (UN), including its programmes, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialised agencies and related organisations;

• (b) international organisations;

• (c) humanitarian organisations having observer status with the UN General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organisations;

• (d) bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the UN Humanitarian Response Plans, UN Refugee Response Plans, other UN appeals or humanitarian clusters coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs;

• (e) organisations and agencies to which the Union has granted the Humanitarian Partnership Certificate or which are certified or recognised by a Member State in accordance with national procedures;

• (f) Member States’ specialised agencies; or

• (g) the employees, grantees, subsidiaries or implementing partners of the entities referred to in points (a) to (f) while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities.

Article 3

The Council, acting by unanimity upon a proposal from a Member State or from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’), shall establish and amend the list in the Annex.

Article 4

Article 5

Article 6

• (a) as regards the Council, for preparing and making amendments to the Annex;

• (b) as regards the High Representative, for preparing amendments to the Annex.

Article 7

No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Decision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, in particular a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

• (a) designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex;

• (b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).

Article 8

Article 9

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

ANNEX

• A. List of natural persons referred to in Article 1(1): Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing

Place of birth: Ségou Date of birth: 2.12.1979 Nationality: Malian Passport number: B0722922 valid until 13.8.2018 Gender: male Position: President of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali), Lieutenant General Malick Diaw is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta’s inner circle. As chief of staff of the third military region of Kati, he was one of the instigators and leaders of the 18 August 2020 coup alongside Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué, Colonel Assimi Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara and Colonel Modibo Koné. Malick Diaw is therefore responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali. Malick Diaw is also a key actor in the context of the political transition of Mali, as President of the National Transition Council (CNT) since December 2020. On 16 October 2024, Malick Diaw was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General ‘3 star’ by the Council of Ministers of Mali. The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the ‘missions’ enshrined in the Transition Charter of 1 October 2020 (‘Transition Charter’) and that should have been completed within 18 months, as illustrated by the CNT’s delay in adopting the draft electoral bill. That delay contributed to delaying the organization of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on 17 June 2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on 24 June 2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter. Malick Diaw presided over the session that approved on 3 July 2025 the revision of the Transition Charter granting Assimi Goïta a five-year renewable mandate without elections. The revision of the Transition Charter consolidates the position of Assimi Goïta and the powers of the junta as it does not provide for an immediate obligation to hold elections. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Malick Diaw) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. Malick Diaw is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. 4.2.2022

Place of birth: Bamako Date of birth: 2.3.1975 Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport AA0193660 valid until 15.2.2023 Gender: male Position: Minister for Reconciliation, Lieutenant General Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta’s inner circle and was one of the main actors responsible for the 18 August 2020 coup, alongside Colonel Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara, Colonel Modibo Koné and Colonel Malick Diaw. On 19 August 2020, he announced that the army had taken power, and he then became spokesperson for the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (Comité national pour le salut du peuple, CNSP). On 16 October 2024, Ismaël Wagué was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General ‘3 star’ by the Council of Ministers of Mali. Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali. As Minister for Reconciliation in the Transition Government since October 2020, Ismaël Wagué was in charge of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Through his statement in October 2021 and his perpetual disagreements with the members of the Permanent Strategic Framework (Cadre Stratégique Permanent, CSP), he contributed to the blocking of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (Comité de suivi de l’accord, CSA), which led to the suspension of CSA meeting from October 2021 to September 2022. That situation obstructed the implementation of that Agreement, which was one of the ‘missions’ of the political transition of Mali, as provided for in Article 2 of the Transition Charter. On 25 January 2024, the Transition Government denounced the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and declared its immediate termination. Since that date, there has been a significant increase in the authoritarian constraints imposed by the Transition Government. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ismaël Wagué) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, and is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. 4.2.2022

Place of birth: Tondibi, Gao region, Mali Date of birth: 5.2.1971 Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali Gender: male Position: former Minister of Refoundation Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is a member of the strategic committee of M5-RFP (Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita. As Minister of Refoundation from June 2021 to November 2024, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga was entrusted with planning the National Consultations for Refoundation (Assises nationales de la Refondation, ANR) announced by Prime Minister Choguel Maïga. Even after being replaced in his role in the government, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga has expressed himself politically and in solidarity with the Malian government, showing that he still maintains close ties with it. Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022. As announced by Choguel Maïga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections. On 25 January 2024, the Transition Government denounced the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and declared its immediate termination. Since that date, there has been a significant increase in the authoritarian constraints imposed by the Transition Government. ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. As a former Minister, co-founder of Espoir Mali Koura and co-founder of M5-RFP (Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques), Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga continues to be an influential and vocal supporter of the Malian junta. Given his public statements, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities. 4.2.2022

Иван Александрович МАСЛОВ Date of birth: 11.7.1982 or 3.1.1980 Place of birth: Arkhangelsk / Chuguevka village, Chuguev district, Primorsky territory Nationality: Russian Gender: male Function: former Head of the Wagner Group in Mali Address: Unknown, registered in the town of Shatki, in the Nizhni Novgorod region according to ‘All eyes on Wagner’ Ivan Aleksandrovitch Maslov was the head of the Wagner Group in Mali, whose presence in the country has expanded since late 2021. The Wagner Group has withdrawn from Mali in June 2025 to be replaced by Africa Corps, the latter reportedly reintegrating most of Wagner’s Russian personnel. Wagner’s presence in Mali has posed a threat to the peace, security and stability of the country. In particular, Wagner mercenaries have been involved in acts of violence and multiple human rights abuses in Mali, including extrajudicial killings, such as the ‘Moura massacre’ at the end of March 2022. As the former local head of the Wagner Group, Ivan Maslov is therefore responsible for the actions of Wagner Group that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, in particular involvement in acts of violence and human rights abuses. 25.2.2023

• B. List of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 2(1): Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing

Place of birth: Ségou Date of birth: 2.12.1979 Nationality: Malian Passport number: B0722922 valid until 13.8.2018 Gender: male Position: President of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali), Lieutenant General Malick Diaw is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta’s inner circle. As chief of staff of the third military region of Kati, he was one of the instigators and leaders of the 18 August 2020 coup alongside Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué, Colonel Assimi Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara and Colonel Modibo Koné. Malick Diaw is therefore responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali. Malick Diaw is also a key actor in the context of the political transition of Mali, as President of the National Transition Council (CNT) since December 2020. On 16 October 2024, Malick Diaw was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General ‘3 star’ by the Council of Ministers of Mali. The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the ‘missions’ enshrined in the Transition Charter of 1 October 2020 (‘Transition Charter’) and that should have been completed within 18 months, as illustrated by the CNT’s delay in adopting the draft electoral bill. That delay contributed to delaying the organization of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on 17 June 2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on 24 June 2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter. Malick Diaw presided over the session that approved on 3 July 2025 the revision of the Transition Charter granting Assimi Goïta a five-year renewable mandate without elections. The revision of the Transition Charter consolidates the position of Assimi Goïta and the powers of the junta as it does not provide for an immediate obligation to hold elections. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Malick Diaw) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. Malick Diaw is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. 4.2.2022

Place of birth: Bamako Date of birth: 2.3.1975 Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport AA0193660 valid until 15.2.2023 Gender: male Position: Minister for Reconciliation, Lieutenant General Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta’s inner circle and was one of the main actors responsible for the 18 August 2020 coup, alongside Colonel Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara, Colonel Modibo Koné and Colonel Malick Diaw. On 19 August 2020, he announced that the army had taken power, and he then became spokesperson for the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (Comité national pour le salut du peuple, CNSP). On 16 October 2024, Ismaël Wagué was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General ‘3 star’ by the Council of Ministers of Mali. Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali. As Minister for Reconciliation in the Transition Government since October 2020, Ismaël Wagué was in charge of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Through his statement in October 2021 and his perpetual disagreements with the members of the Permanent Strategic Framework (Cadre Stratégique Permanent, CSP), he contributed to the blocking of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (Comité de suivi de l’accord, CSA), which led to the suspension of CSA meeting from October 2021 to September 2022. That situation obstructed the implementation of that Agreement, which was one of the ‘missions’ of the political transition of Mali, as provided for in Article 2 of the Transition Charter. On 25 January 2024, the Transition Government denounced the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and declared its immediate termination. Since that date, there has been a significant increase in the authoritarian constraints imposed by the Transition Government. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ismaël Wagué) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, and is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. 4.2.2022

Place of birth: Tondibi, Gao region, Mali Date of birth: 5.2.1971 Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali Gender: male Position: former Minister of Refoundation Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is a member of the strategic committee of M5-RFP (Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita. As Minister of Refoundation from June 2021 to November 2024, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga was entrusted with planning the National Consultations for Refoundation (Assises nationales de la Refondation, ANR) announced by Prime Minister Choguel Maïga. Even after being replaced in his role in the government, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga has expressed himself politically and in solidarity with the Malian government, showing that he still maintains close ties with it. Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022. As announced by Choguel Maïga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections. On 25 January 2024, the Transition Government denounced the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and declared its immediate termination. Since that date, there has been a significant increase in the authoritarian constraints imposed by the Transition Government. ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions. As a former Minister, co-founder of Espoir Mali Koura and co-founder of M5-RFP (Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques), Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga continues to be an influential and vocal supporter of the Malian junta. Given his public statements, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities. 4.2.2022

Иван Александрович МАСЛОВ Date of birth: 11.7.1982 or 3.1.1980 Place of birth: Arkhangelsk / Chuguevka village, Chuguev district, Primorsky territory Nationality: Russian Gender: male Function: former Head of the Wagner Group in Mali Address: Unknown, registered in the town of Shatki, in the Nizhni Novgorod region according to ‘All eyes on Wagner’ Ivan Aleksandrovitch Maslov was the head of the Wagner Group in Mali, whose presence in the country has expanded since late 2021. The Wagner Group has withdrawn from Mali in June 2025 to be replaced by Africa Corps, the latter reportedly reintegrating most of Wagner’s Russian personnel. Wagner’s presence in Mali has posed a threat to the peace, security and stability of the country. In particular, Wagner mercenaries have been involved in acts of violence and multiple human rights abuses in Mali, including extrajudicial killings, such as the ‘Moura massacre’ at the end of March 2022. As the former local head of the Wagner Group, Ivan Maslov is therefore responsible for the actions of Wagner Group that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, in particular involvement in acts of violence and human rights abuses. 25.2.2023

[^E0001]: Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).