Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394 of 11 August 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China, as extended to imports of silicon consigned from the Republic of Korea and from Taiwan, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or Taiwan or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and the Council

(280) The price levels of the Chinese exports to the Union without anti-dumping duties would be a reasonable indicator of future price levels to the Union market. Using the data from the RIP, applying only conventional duties, the undercutting would reach 14,6 % when all imports are considered and 13,9 % when only duty paid imports are taken into account.

(281) The price pressure would not allow the Union industry to maintain a profitable pattern. Instead, the Union industry would further deteriorate should the measures be allowed to lapse. Indeed, in the absence of measures, Chinese dumped imports at injurious prices would likely exert further downward pressure on the sales prices in the Union market. The Union industry would very likely be obliged to decrease its sales prices which would lead to further loss of profitability and, in all likelihood, important losses in the short term.

(282) Alternatively, should the Union industry attempt to increase its sales prices to profitable levels, considering the large overcapacity in China, the dumped imports would likely gain significant market share in the Union to the detriment of the Union industry.

(283) While the volume of imports from China was gradually decreasing over the period considered, the interest of Chinese exporting producers in the Union market is shown by the continued imports during the period considered, despite the measures in force, at prices which undercut the Union industry prices. Moreover, as seen in recital 206 the export prices from China to other countries (i.e. 1 800 USD per tonne) were lower than the average prices of exports to the Union, during the same year (i.e. 1 915 USD per tonne).

(284) In their comments on the disclosure, EUSMET reiterated its comment that the Commission has overestimated the capacity and spare capacity in China.

(285) The Commission noted that EUSMET provided no new evidence in this regards and simply reiterated its previous claims. As clarified in recitals 191 to 195, the Commission’s findings, that there is significant spare capacity in China, that could be used to supply the Union market should measures be allowed to lapse remain unchanged.

(286) EUSMET noted that the analysis on the attractiveness of the Union market was based on export prices of Chinese silicon towards the EU vis-a-vis to other markets. EUSMET requested the disclosure of these data.

(287) As specified in recital 209 the Commission based its analyses on GTA extraction, which is readily available. GTA data are based on data obtained from Chinese customs’ authorities, and has been used simply as a baseline to compare export prices to various destinations.

(288) EUSMET claimed that the Commission failed to demonstrate that, by allowing measure to lapse, Chinese imports would flood the Union market. This was based on the fact that during the silicon shortage between 2021 and 2022 Chinese imports into the Union did not increase.

(289) The Commission considered that the situation after the RIP and in particular the steep increase of demand and the consequent shortage of supply was of a temporary nature. Indeed, these shocks in demand and supply have been linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the increase of electricity prices (part of which occurred even before the Russian aggression against Ukraine). Nevertheless, there are no elements supporting the arguments that these are not temporary, nor did EUSMET demonstrate this in its submissions. Furthermore, the Commission noted that a situation where demand temporarily increases is different from a situation where duties are permanently removed. The exporter’s reaction to former cannot be considered as a blueprint for their reaction to the latter. Moreover, based on the considerations on Chinese spare capacity and attractiveness of the Union market the Commission still considers that the Chinese silicon imports would enter the Union market in significant quantities at dumped prices, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

(290) EUSMET further claimed that the Commission’s assumption that the Chinese imports would increase should measures be repealed was wrong since: (i) the undercutting margin was inflated: (ii) difference between various grades of the product concerned not being reflected in the analysis, (iii) the Union was not the major Chinese market for exports, (iv) the Chinese silicon metal was not the explanatory force behind the Union industry injury.

(291) No new evidence to support these claims was provided in the comments on the disclosure. In the light of the above four elements addressed in the previous recitals on undercutting margin (see recital 234), product differentiation (see recital 65), the Union not being the major export market for the PRC (see recitals 206 to 210) and the causation (see recital 275), the Commission’s analyses on the potential volumes and prices effects of the Chinese imports on the Union market, should measures be repealed, remained unchanged.

(292) EUSMET claimed that the Commission failed to consider the market development post-RIP and in particular the sharp increase of the Union prices of silicon, the global supply shortage, including at Union industry level, that would lead the Union producer making significant profits.

(293) The Commission considered that both the price development as well as the global shortage of silicon after the RIP were temporary trends, mostly linked to the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical events in 2021 and 2022. The evidence provided by EUSMET, including the forecast on the increase of silicon demand and prices, do not indicate that the global supply shortage or that the sharp price increase will be of a permanent nature.

(294) On this basis, the Commission concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from China at injurious prices and material injury would be likely to recur.

(295) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

(296) Three Union producers accounting for 100 % of Union production cooperated in this investigation. As stated in recital 265, the Union industry suffers material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation despite the measures in force.

(297) The measures in force have largely contained the imports volumes from China, which still occurred at injurious prices that undercut the Union prices and that therefore further contributed to the precarious condition of the Union industry.

(298) Indeed, if measures were repealed, the import volumes from China would likely surge and, given the spare capacity in China as well as the attractiveness of the Union market, the economic situation of the Union industry would be even further compromised, leading to further reduction of production, sales and employment in the Union.

(299) Any further deterioration of the Union industry’s economic situation would entail the risk of a scaling-down of production or even definitive closure of production sites in the Union. Therefore, it can be concluded that the continuation of the measures against China would be in the interest of the Union industry.

(300) Interest of unrelated importers

(301) No importer came forward following the publication of the notice of initiation and during the investigation.

(302) Therefore, there were no indications that the maintenance of the measures would have a negative impact on the importers outweighing the positive impact of the measures.

(303) The Commission received replies from three users, two from the chemical sectors (Wacker and Evonik, forming the consortium EUSMET) and one from the aluminium sector (Raffmetal). Moreover, the Commission received comments from the European Aluminium Association, representing the whole value chain of the aluminium industry in Europe.

(304) The European Aluminium Association along with Raffmetal support the continuation of the existing measures. These users emphasised that silicon is an essential material in the aluminium production. If on the one hand the anti-dumping measures have an adverse impact on the users’ cost of production, on the other hand the measures preserve the production of silicon in the Union. As a consequence, the users benefit from a reliable and geographically close supply of silicon.

(305) EUSMET claimed that the anti-dumping measures should not be maintained. For these users, silicon is of significant importance and it accounts for a large share of their raw materials cost. These users are importing from China and the anti-dumping duties increase their cost of production for silicon-based products. Moreover, they claimed that the effect of the measures on the chemical users would be potentially more significant than in the aluminium industries.

(306) However, the information supplied by the two cooperating users producing chemical products shows that they import significant amounts under IPP, thereby being to certain extent exempted from the anti-dumping duty. The effect of the measures on part of the imports from these users was therefore considered to be limited.

(307) EUSMET further pointed to the good financial situation of the Union producers, especially after the RIP.

(308) The Commission notes that the apparent improvement of the financial situation of the Union producers coincides with the recent global growth of the silicon demand. Such short-term market development, occurring in any event after the RIP, cannot be considered indicative of the Union industry’s financial situation, given in particular the conclusions in recitals 211, 212 and 294. Therefore, since the Union industry is not in a stable economic situation and since it would be subject to future negative impact of dumped imports from China should the measures be allowed to lapse, the argument was rejected.

(309) EUSMET claimed that the demand for silicon has increased while the supply has declined, in the EU, in the last years. EUSMET expressed concern about the security of supply and in particular the inability of the Union industry to fully supply the Union demand. This would lead to a situation of unavailability of the like product to satisfy the demand, which is growing fast, especially after the RIP. EUSMET also pointed out to the fierce competition in their downstream products markets, where the higher silicon costs put EUSMET at a competitive disadvantage compared to other world producers.

(310) The investigation, however, showed that a variety of sources of silicon exists. First, the Union industry has spare capacity that can be reactivated to meet a growing future demand. Indeed, as shown in Table 2, even if the Union industry reduced their production and production capacity to some degree in reaction to the declining silicon consumption, a significant free capacity (i.e. around 26 % in the RIP) is still available in the Union should the demand surge again. The investigation showed that the furnaces that have been shut down could be reactivated in as short as two weeks to two months, depending of the inactivity time.

(311) Moreover, silicon can be sourced from other countries, such as Norway, Malaysia, Brazil, Bosnia and Herzegovina. As set out in recital 236 two thirds of the silicon purchased in the Union is imported from Norway, Brazil, Malaysia, and a number of other countries. The Commission noted further that the measures in force did not stop Chinese imports of silicon from entering the Union market.

(312) In conclusion, the combination between other sources of supplies and the spare capacity in the Union represent a diversified variety of options for the Union users of silicon. The argument therefore could not be accepted.

(313) EUSMET claimed that the measures should be terminated also in view of the fact that silicon has been classified as a critical raw material (‘CRM’) by the Commission (59) based on its economic importance and supply risk. EUSMET claimed that maintaining the measures would limit the amount of silicon and the variety of sources available on the market.

(314) The Commission concurs on the critical nature of silicon in the industrial ecosystem in the Union. Nevertheless, the presence of imports at dumped price in the market would significantly endanger the Union industry and jeopardise the reliability of supply of silicon in the Union in the long period. For this reason, the claim was rejected.

(315) In their comments on the disclosure, EUSMET disagreed with the Commission’s conclusions that the special grade silicon, needed by some users to produce products whose demand will increase in the future, is available in sufficient quantities in other markets than the PRC. Moreover, EUSMET claimed that the majority of IPP imports relate to this special grade silicon imported by one of its members.

(316) The Commission noted that the duties on imports from the PRC are not prohibitive and if the users need a special grade of silicon, this remains available for importation under fair competition conditions.

(317) Moreover, as already clarified in recital 272, based on Eurostat volumes, the majority of IPP imports relate to other imports than those from the EUSMET member who imports the special grade silicon, even assuming that this member only purchases the special grade silicon under IPP.

(318) EUSMET submitted that the IPP is only relevant to the extent that goods are exported and cannot be used under several of the EU FTA’s, including the EU-Japan FTA. Thus, the access to IPP does not reduce the competitive disadvantage suffered by EUSMET members.

(319) The Commission mentioned in recital 306 that certain volumes imported by EUSMET members are under IPP only to underline that part of their imports were not subject to the duties and that the latter had therefore a limited impact during the RIP. The Commission is aware that EUSMET members cannot only import via IPP and that the residual imports under regular regime made by EUSMET members are subject to the duties and have an impact on the importers. However, it is a fact that if a company is in position to import silicon under IPP, this limits the impact of the duties for the users concerned, even if it does not limit that impact for the entire volume so imported.

(320) EUSMET noted that the spare capacity of the EU industry is insufficient to supply the growing silicon demand in the Union. Moreover, EUSMET highlighted that due to the development of electricity prices in the Union, Union producers will not be in position to increase their capacity utilisation.

(321) The spare capacity in the Union was considered to be significant (26 % on average, representing about 10 % of the current Union consumption). In addition, the imports of silicon from other sources, including China, are available. EUSMET also did not demonstrate that the potential electricity prices increase would not be accompanied by the silicon sales price, which would enable to increase the Union producer’s capacity utilisation. As the electricity is a major cost component in the production, there is likely to be a corelation between those two, therefore this claim is rejected.

(322) EUSMET claimed that first, the Commission did not consider the increase in demand for the period after the RIP. In particular, the Commission did not consider that the demand of the special silicon grade not produced in the Union and mostly originating from the PRC will increase. Second, the Commission allegedly did not consider the silicon shortage right after the RIP. Third, the Commission did not consider the increased competition faced by users in the Union from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (‘the UK’) and the PRC. Fourth, the Commission did not consider the effects of sanctions on Russian exports.

(323) The Commission did considered the situation after the RIP and, as concluded in recital 293, found it to be of a temporary nature.

(324) Furthermore, the commission agrees with EUSMET that Union users need diversity and security of supply to ensure continued production. However, such diversity and security will not be possible if the Union producers would be driven out of business due to the injurious imports of silicon from China at dumped prices.

(325) Concerning the increased competition from the UK, the Commission notes that EUSMET did not provide sufficient information necessary to measure the impact of the increased competition from the UK so this claim is dismissed.

(326) Concerning the effects of the sanctions on Russia, the Commission noted that this would further reduce the potential sources of silicon on the Union market. Nevertheless, based on the RIP data, Russia only represented 2 % of the total imports of silicon in the Union. Given the magnitude of Russian imports and the availability of other sources at global level, the Commission considered that the impact on the users of silicon not will not be substantial in the long period.

(327) EUSMET finally underlined that silicon metal producers in different countries of the world do not want to increase sales to EUSMET members because of the fear of AD measures.

(328) This claim was not supported by any factual evidence or fact that the suppliers outside the Union will refuse to supply. Indeed, the Commission noted a continuation of imports from third countries and in some cases even an increase of these, during the period considered.

(329) On balance, the positive effect of the measures on the Union industry and users in the aluminium industry therefore outweighs the limited negative impact of the measures in force on the other users.

(330) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of the Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of silicon originating in China.

(331) Based on the conclusions on continuation of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on silicon from China should be maintained.

(332) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(333) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be considered by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(334) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(335) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in the People’s Republic of China and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(336) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (60). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(337) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measure s be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. Only one interested party – EUSMET provided comments.

(338) In their comments on the disclosure, EUSMET requested that, should measures be confirmed, the measures be limited to a period of two years, given the changed market circumstances concerning both demand and supply and Union’s high import dependence on specific silicon grades.

(339) However, the Commission noted that there is nothing in the RIP data that would support such conclusion. Moreover, as discussed in recitals 289 and 293, the post-RIP developments appear to be of a temporary nature. In any event, if there are special circumstances warranting that the situation is reassessed in the future, an interim reviews can be requested in accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation.

(340) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (61), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(341) The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 did not deliver an opinion on the measures provided for in this Regulation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 11 August 2022.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1077 of 1 July 2016 imposing a definitive antidumping duty on imports of silicon originating in the People's Republic of China following an expiry review under Article 11(2) and a partial interim review under Article 11(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 179, 5.7.2016, p. 1).

(3) Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51).

(4) Council Regulation (EC) No 42/2007 of 15 January 2007 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 398/2004 on imports of silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of silicon consigned from the Republic of Korea whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or not (OJ L 13, 19.1.2007, p. 1).

(5) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 311/2013 of 3 April 2013 extending the definitive antidumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 467/2010 on imports of silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of silicon consigned from Taiwan, whether declared as originating in Taiwan or not (OJ L 95, 5.4.2013, p. 1).

(6) OJ C 331, 7.10.2020, p. 13.

(7) OJ C 258, 2.7.2021, p. 8.

(8) Commission staff working document SWD(2017) 483 final/2, 20. 12. 2017, available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156474.pdf

(9) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2535

(10) OJ L 179, 5.7.2016, p. 1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2200/90 of 27 July 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 198, 28.7.1990, p. 57).

(11) OJ L 179, 5.7.2016, p. 1.

(12) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/909 of 30 June 2020 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia and the People’s Republic of China, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (OJ L 208, 1.7.2020, p. 2).

(13) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1811 of 14 October 2021 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 366, 15.10.2021, p. 17).

(14) Regulation (EU) 2020/909, recitals 54-60 and 111-115; Regulation (EU) 2021/1811, recitals 58-63 and 85.

(15) Regulation (EU) 2020/909, recitals 61-64; Regulation (EU) 2021/1811, recital 44.

(16) Regulation (EU) 2020/909, recitals 66-69; Regulation (EU) 2021/1811, recitals 46-48. While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the Chinese company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of silicon and the suppliers of their inputs.

(17) Regulation (EU) 2020/909, recitals 70-80; Regulation (EU) 2021/1811, recitals 49-58.

(18) Regulation (EU) 2020/909, recitals 81-86; Regulation (EU) 2021/1811, recital 59.

(19) Regulation (EU) 2020/909, recitals 87-90; Regulation (EU) 2021/1811, recital 60.

(20) Regulation (EU) 2020/909, recitals 91-110; Regulation (EU) 2021/1811, recital 61.

(21) Commission staff working document SWD(2017) 483 final/2, 20.12.2017, available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156474.pdf

(22) See the Xiamen ITG Group annual report 2021, page 261 http://static.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/new/2022-04-21/600755_20220421_2_cFJgASUK.pdf (accessed on 12 July 2022).

(23) http://www.itg.com.cn/en/company/about (accessed on 12 July 2022).

(24) www.ixin.com/company/472df966-2141-41bc-8209-66d37f0c2d88 (accessed on 27 April 2022), www.shpcoic.org.cn/Site/Home/_InfoShow?Info_ID=6720&Infoitem_ID=60 (accessed on 27 April 2022).

(25) www.itgholding.com.cn/en/company/organization (accessed on 27 April 2022).

(26) www.puyuan.com (accessed on 27 April 2022).

(27) www.itgholding.com.cn/cn/News/Detail/4244 (accessed on 27 April 2022).

(28) www.puyuan.com/puyuan/djdt11/971216/index.html (accessed on 27 April 2022).

(29) www.siliconchina.org/about/rules/index.html (accessed on 27 April 2022).

(30) ibid, Article 3.

(31) ibid, Article 21.

(32) See the 14th Five Year Plan on the Development of Strategic and Emerging Industries of the Fujian province (in which ITG Xiamen Group headquarters are located): http://www.qg.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfg/sjfgwj/202112/P020211207803152129885.pdf (accessed 28 April 2022). See further for example the Catalogue of Four Essentials for ten key industries, a policy document released in 2016 in the context of the Made in China 2025 strategy; available at: http://www.cm2025.org/show-14-126-1.html (accessed 28 April 2022).

(33) Report, Chapter 10, p. 221-230.

(34) Opinions on further deepening the reform of the electric power system, issued 15 March 2015 by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council (ZhongFa [2015] no. 9 https://chinaenergyportal.org/en/opinions-of-the-cpc-central-committee-and-the-state-council-on-further-deepening-the-reform-of-the-electric-power-system-zhongfa-2015-no-9/ (accessed on 8 April 2022).

(35) https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/202012/t20201202_1252094.html (accessed on 8 April 2022).

(36) Notably: ‘Local government departments shall, in coordination with the National Energy Administration’s seconded entity, report to the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Energy Administration in a timely manner on the signing of medium- and long-term contracts as well as on relevant issues, and ensure the connection of medium- and long-term contracts signature with the spot power.’

(37) http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2021-01/06/content_5577440.htm (accessed on 8 April 2022).

(38) Report – Chapter 10.

(39) Report – Chapter 12, p. 269.

(40) Available at the NEA website: www.nea.gov.cn/2021-05/18/c_139953498.htm (accessed on 13 April 2022).

(41) NDRC Notice No 902 (2020) https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/202012/t20201207_1252389.html?code=&state=123 (accessed on 13 April 2022).

(42) Notice 338 (2021); available at: www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/202104/t20210429_1278643.html (accessed on 13 April 2022).

(43) See Nasdaq website article (original by Reuters Beijing Newsroom). China grants one-year trial extensions at 15 coal mines to boost output. 4 August 2021; available at: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/china-grants-one-year-trial-extensions-at-15-coal-mines-to-boost-output-2021-08-04 (accessed on 13 April 2022).

(44) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income

(45) If there is no production of the like product in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the like product may be considered.

(46) ‘No longer used or practised; outmoded, out of date.’ (Oxford English Dictionary).

(47) https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php (accessed on 26 April 2022).

(48) https://bit.ly/3vJD5On (accessed on 26 April 2022).

(49) https://www.tnb.com.my/commercial-industrial/pricing-tariffs1 (accessed on 26 April 2022).

(50) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33).

(51) https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php

(52) https://www.tnb.com.my/commercial-industrial/pricing-tariffs1

(53) http://www.pmbtechnology.com/investors-relation

(54) Saved as file t22.003563, TRON files 171 to 176.

(55) OJ L 179, 5.7.2016, p. 1, recital 66.

(56) OJ L 179, 5.7.2016, p. 1, recital 218.

(57) Ranges given for confidentiality reasons.

(58) Australia, Canada, and the United States of America have anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures in force against imports of silicon from China.

(59) See the second CRM list (COM(2014) 297 final of 26 May 2014), the third list (COM(2017) 490 final) and also the last list (COM(2020) 474 final) which was published in September 2020.

(60) European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

(61) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).