Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1395 of 11 August 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in Russia and Turkey

(220) After final disclosure, Severstal claimed that there is no legal basis nor a rationale for the application of Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation by analogy to establish the export price for the purpose of calculating undercutting (and underselling). In Severstal view, this would be in breach with Article 3(1) of the basic Regulation. It also noted that the Commission had already been condemned by the General Court in Hansol Paper (29) for this practice. In particular, Severstal submitted that the General Court, in that case, had ruled that the Commission had committed an error by deciding to apply by analogy Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation in the context of the determination of injury, in particular ‘by deciding to deduct SG&A costs and a profit margin, for the resales of the product concerned’ to independent customers, as it is the prices of the product concerned charged to independent customers that are in ‘competition with the like product of the Union industry and which inflicts injury on that industry’ and not hypothetically constructed CIF prices. According to Severstal, that principle had been confirmed by the General Court in Giant (30) and CRIA (31) and, most recently, by the Court of Justice in Hansol (32). Severstal held that the prices charged by its related traders to their unrelated customers were by definition reliable, that such prices compete with those of the Union industry and that they should therefore be used for the purpose of calculating undercutting (and underselling).

(221) The Commission rejected the claim that using Article 2(9) by analogy to establish the export price for the purpose of calculating undercutting and underselling is in breach of Article 3(1) of the basic Regulation. In fact, contrary to Severstal claim, in its judgement in Hansol (33) the Court of Justice confirmed the legality of the Commission’s methodology, stating that ‘it was open to the Commission, in order to ensure an objective comparison of the prices at the level of the first release for free circulation in the Union of the product concerned, to construct that CIF EU border value by deducting SG&A costs and a profit margin from the price of resale of the product concerned by Schades to independent customers. That application, by analogy, of Article 2(9) of the basic regulation was within the broad discretion which the Commission enjoys when implementing Article 3(2) of that regulation and could not therefore be regarded, in itself, as vitiated by a manifest error of assessment’ (34). Moreover, since in this case the Union industry predominantly sells directly to independent customers, the methodology followed by the Commission did not lead to a manifestly incorrect result (35).

(222) The above showed a weighted average undercutting margin of between 4,2 % and 7,1 % by the imports from Turkey and between 5 % and 20,4 % by the imports from Russia (36). The bulk of CRS is a price sensitive commodity, thus the undercutting margins are significant.

(223) The Turkish association CIB and some exporting producers asked the Commission to ensure that comparable products were considered. The methodology used during the investigation, when comparing types of the product concerned exported into the Union and the like product manufactured within the Union, as explained in recitals (218) and (219) is sufficiently refined as to ensure a proper price comparison for the undercutting calculations.

(224) The Commission further considered other price effects, in particular the existence of significant price depression. During the period considered, the Union industry decreased its prices by 12 %, thus at a higher level than the drop of the cost of production (- 7 % over the same period) (see Table 7). But for the dumped imports, the Union industry would have been able to raise its prices at least at the level to sell without losses. For instance, in 2019, coinciding with the highest increase in dumped imports, the Union industry had to sell at a price close to the price of the dumped imports, but with significant losses. During the investigation period, the Union industry’s sales prices decreased in parallel with the decrease in the costs of production, but to the level of hardly making any profits.

(225) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that the decrease in sales price from 2019 to the investigation period was less than the decrease in cost of production and that the Union industry even managed to make a profit in the investigation period. That would make the finding of price depression caused by the imports concerned doubtful.

(226) The Commission rejected this claim. The fact that the Union industry was able to achieve a 0,4 % profit in the investigation period cannot undermine the Commission’s conclusion of significant price depression caused by the dumped imports. A profitability level just above break-even cannot be considered a healthy profit, which would be achievable in the absence of price pressure from dumped imports. It is clear that such profit levels were the result of the strongly increasing import volumes of CRS from the countries concerned. As explained before, CRS is a commodity sensitive to price competition. Thus, the dumped imports were capable of exercising significant price depression on Union industry sales.

(227) In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(228) As mentioned in recital (6), sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry from the imports of certain corrosion resistant steels from Turkey and Russia.

(229) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire reply of Eurofer relating to all Union producers, cross-checked where necessary with the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the four sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were duly verified (37) and found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(230) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(231) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(233) The Union industry’s production volume was rather stable between 2017 and 2019 but it dropped by 10 % at the end of the period considered, partly due to the pressure exerted by Turkish and Russian imports which increased by almost 330 000 tonnes in the investigation period as compared to 2019 (table 2).

(234) After final disclosure, GOR recalculated the Union industry’s production volume on the basis of the data reported in Tables 5a, 5b, 9 and 12 and, by combining the figures in those tables, it concluded that the Commission had miscalculated the Union industry’s production volumes. However, the source of these tables is not the same; in particular, the volumes reported in Table 9 are from the Union industry’s sample whereas the volumes in the three other tables are from the Union industry as a whole. The claim was therefore rejected.

(235) Over the period considered, the production capacity of the Union industry increased by 10 %. However, this increase is theoretical. Union producers use their hot dipped galvanising lines to produce CRS but also other products that are not subject to this investigation. Over the period considered, the share of these production lines that was allocated to CRS production changed for certain producers. The drop in production combined with an increase of production capacity led to a plunge of the capacity utilization rate.

(236) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that the increase in production capacity, and the impact thereof on the capacity utilisation rate, in particular in 2019 was the consequence of erroneous investment decisions. However, as explained in recital (235), that increase was only theoretical. This fact was taken into account by the Commission in its analysis, by giving a limited relevance of this negative factor in the injurious situation of the Union industry.

(238) The Union industry’s sales volume in the free market was rather stable over the period considered. In terms of sales volumes, at the end of the period considered the Union industry managed to compensate for the impact of the sharp increase of imports from the countries concerned by the extension of the measures against China to circumvented imports (38), which enabled the Union industry to regain some of the sales volumes previously lost due to the Chinese circumvention practices. Coupled with the decrease in consumption, this even resulted in an increase in market share over the period considered.

(239) After disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that the above figures demonstrate that the Union industry did not suffer from a material injury on the account of lost sales or market share.

(241) The captive market of the Union industry (composed of CRS kept by the Union industry for downstream use, in particular for organic coated steel production) in the Union decreased by 13 % in the period considered. The fall is attributable to the decrease in demand of organic coated steel downstream products in the second part of the period considered, despite the rebound of the home appliances sector during the last quarter of 2020 (39).The market share of the captive market over the total Union production decreased by 0,8 % percentage points overall during the period considered.

(242) The above figures in respect of production and, less pronounced, sales in the free market show a decreasing trend as from 2017. As already referred to in recital (238), the Union industry’s increase in market share was due to the registration of certain Chinese imports upon initiation of the anti-circumvention investigation concerning such imports (40), which ended the significant imports from China and allowed the Union industry to compensate for part of sales lost to Russian and Turkish imports.

(244) Over the period considered, the level of Union industry employment related to the production of CRS fluctuated and increased by 10 %. However, some fluctuations are theoretical as they are the result of the methodologies used to allocate the resources starting from a product family broader than CRS (namely all hot dipped galvanised products).

(245) The productivity of Union industry decreased by 18 % over the period concerned. This fall is explained by the drop in production volumes and the methodology used to establish the number of employees involved in CRS activities.

(246) All dumping margins were above the de minimis level and most of them significantly higher. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the countries concerned.

(247) Corrosion resistant steels have already been subject to anti-dumping investigations. The Commission found that, during the period 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016, the situation of the Union industry was significantly affected by dumped imports of CRS originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’). Provisional anti-dumping measures on imports from PRC were imposed in August 2017 (41) and definitive measures were confirmed in February 2018 (42).

(248) In August 2020, an anti-circumvention investigation of the anti-dumping measures of imports originating in the PRC extended the measures to slightly modified certain corrosion resistant steels (43).

(249) The recovery of the Union industry from past dumping practices was thus ongoing when the present investigation started.

(251) After the imposition of anti-dumping measures against Chinese imports in 2017, the Union producers could increase their sales prices in the Union by 2 % from 2017 to 2018. However, subsequently, the unit sales price on the free market decreased by 14 % between 2018 and the investigation period, resulting in a decrease of overall 12 % over the period considered.

(252) The unit cost of production increased by 7 % between 2017 and 2018, but decreased after 2018, resulting in an overall decrease of 7 % over the period considered. The prices of some main raw materials decreased significantly in the second half of the period considered.

(253) In its comments to the final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers pointed at the fact that, from 2019 to the investigation period, the drop in cost of production was more pronounced than the continuing fall in the Union industry’s sales prices. However, the Commission observed that during the period considered, the Union industry decreased its prices by 12 % which is more than the drop of the cost of production (-7 % over the same period). Indeed, the Union industry’s low prices including during the investigation period severely influenced the Union industry’s financial results, as Table 10 below shows.

(255) The average labour costs per employee of the sampled Union producers fell by 6 % at the end of period considered.

(257) During the period considered the level of closing stocks decreased by 37 %. The Union producers usually only keep a low level of stock themselves. Therefore, stocks are not considered to be an important injury indicator for this industry. This is also confirmed by analysing the evolution of the closing stocks as a percentage of production. As can be seen above, this indicator remained relatively stable between 2017 and 2019, although it then fell. In the investigation period, temporarily some producers produced less and reduced stocks in an effort to cope with their difficult financial situation in 2019 and 2020 (see Table 9).

(259) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. Overall profitability fell from 6,2 % in 2017 to 0,4 % in the investigation period. This drop coincides with the massive increase of import volumes from the countries concerned (see Table 2) at prices lower than the Union industry’s prices (see Tables 3 and 7).

(260) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers pointed at the positive development of the Union industry’s profitability between 2019 and the investigation period (2020) and the upward trend in 2020 (44). Moreover, these parties underlined that the profitability in the investigation period could not be considered as representative due to the impact of the COVID-19 measures on production volumes at the beginning of 2020 and the drop in the market of automotive CRS, which is outside the product scope in this investigation but produced on the same equipment, in 2020.

(261) The Commission noted that, as mentioned in recital (24) above, the choice of the period considered was appropriate bearing in view of the date the complaint was lodged and the applicable rules and that the Commission’s analysis is not made on a comparison of the base year with the investigation period but on trends throughout the period concerned. Fluctuations within a 12 months’ period are not unusual. Moreover, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and of the evolution of demand in the automotive sector were fully considered in the causation analysis in Sections 5.2.7 and 5.2.4 of this Regulation.

(262) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The net cash flow evolved to a large extent in line with profitability and return on investment. The net cash flow remained rather stable in 2017 and 2018, shrank in 2019 following the losses made by Union producers that year, and then recovered to a level close to the one at the beginning of the period considered.

(263) Investments are the net book value of assets. The net investments showed a continuous increase over the period considered and more than doubled over the period considered. In general, the investments aimed at retaining the existing capacities, at improving quality and at making due replacements of necessary production assets. Some related to health, safety and environmental matters. Significant investments in the second half of the period considered concern one sampled Union producer and the upstream phase of its CRS production.

(264) CIB and several exporting producers claimed after final disclosure that the increase in investments demonstrates that the Union industry is not injured. The claim was rejected. The investments, even if increasing over the period considered, were overall at low levels and, as mentioned, they were generally limited to necessary expenses to keep operations ongoing. The Commission therefore did not consider that its positive development detracts from the injury found in other areas.

(265) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments which reflects the level of depreciation of assets. It decreased continuously and became negative in 2019, when the sampled Union producers made losses globally. It became slightly positive during the investigation period but was far lower than at the beginning of the period considered.

(266) The poor financial performance of the Union industry over the period considered limited its ability to raise capital. The Union industry is capital intensive and requires substantial investments. The return on investment during the period considered was too low to cover for such substantial investments.

(267) The evolution of the micro and macro indicators during the period considered showed that the financial situation for the Union industry deteriorated.

(268) The increase of production capacity (+ 10 %) is theoretical and derives from the Union industry allocating more capacity to CRS production as a result of a lower demand of other products manufactured in the same lines as CRS. The same occurred to employment (+ 10 %). As to investments (+ 147 %), the bulk results from allocations of investments made in the upstream phase of CRS production. The increase of the Union industry’s market share (+ 3,2 %) over the period considered is attributable to the initiation and outcome of the anti-circumvention investigation against China referred to in recital (202).

(269) The Union industry endeavoured to keep its CRS sales volumes to unrelated customers in the Union (-1 %) in a context of a decreasing consumption in the free market (-6 %). However, the Union industry could only do this and respond to the price pressure exerted by the increasing dumped imports from the countries concerned by lowering its sales prices. During the period considered, the Union industry decreased it prices more than the drop of the cost of production.

(270) Such low prices severely influenced the Union industry’s results, which fell from of profit of 6,2 % in 2017 to losses in 2019 and basically no profit at the end of the period considered. Other financial indicators, such as cash flow and return on investment, followed a similar trend.

(271) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

(272) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the countries concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: imports from other third countries, the export performance of the Union industry, the evolution of demand, captive use, self-inflicted injury, COVID-19 pandemic and hot-rolled coils prices.

(273) Imports from the countries concerned increased by more than five-fold during the period considered, increasing from 196 643 tonnes in 2017 to over 1 million tonnes in the investigation period. Their market share grew from 2,2 % in 2017 to 13,1 % in the investigation period. These increasing imports were made at prices lower than those of the Union industry throughout the period considered, with the gap increasing over time. In particular, in 2019 and the investigation period, the years with the highest increases in the imports from the countries concerned, the Union industry’s prices were depressed by the dumped imports. The price pressure exerted by imports from the countries concerned entailed that, in order to keep the loss in sales volumes limited, the Union industry had to decrease its sales prices more than to account for the drop in cost of production. As a result, profitability shrank from 6,2 % to 0,4 % and the financial indicators deteriorated.

(274) The Turkish association CIB contested any negative impact of imports from the countries concerned on the grounds that such imports did not set prices on the Union market and followed global market trends driven by fluctuating hot-rolled coils prices. The Commission rejected the claim. With an exponential increase in volumes, by roughly 1 million tons in such short period and accounting for a market share of 12,9 % in the investigation period, the very low prices of imports from the countries concerned did negatively affect prices that the Union industry could obtain on the free market.

(275) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers reiterated this comment, pointing at market intelligence it had provided to the Commission, which would show that the price trends over the period considered were the same on the main global markets and for the Union industry in the Union.

(276) The Commission rejected this claim. First, Union sales prices of the Union industry decreased by 12 % over the period considered, whereas prices from the countries concerned decreased by 14 %. With prices of imports already well below Union industry prices in 2017, in as mentioned recital (274), the high volume of imports at very low prices from the countries concerned negatively affected the prices that the Union industry could obtain on the free market. Second, the Commission noted that some of the price trends in the provided data might be partly comparable, but that the eventual price level was not and that prices on each of these main markets are thus established on the basis of the specific dynamics and circumstances applicable to that market. The fact that the Commission had established that the product concerned is a commodity, as the parties concerned mentioned, does not undermine such conclusion.

(277) Several parties claimed that there was no correlation between imports from Russia and Turkey and the injury suffered by the Union industry. The Commission rejected the claim. The Commission acknowledged that in the first part of the period considered the Union industry was able to take advantage of relatively good market circumstances and the anti-dumping measures in place against Chinese imports. However between 2018 and 2019, when the year-on-year increase of imports from Russia and Turkey was the highest, the Union industry became lossmaking. The poor financial situation continued in the investigation period, after a further increase of imports from the countries concerned in absolute and relative terms. There was thus a clear correlation between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(278) After final disclosure CIB and several exporting producers submitted that between 2018 and 2019, when the year-on-year increase of imports from Russia and Turkey was the highest, the Union industry managed to increase its Union sales volumes by a bit over 200 000 tonnes.

(279) The Commission observed, however, that this increase was in absolute terms less than half of the increase of imports from the countries concerned and, in view of the prices prevailing in a market flooded by dumped imports, the financial situation of the Union industry deteriorated strongly as from 2018 and it became lossmaking in 2019.

(280) Several parties stated that Turkish and Russian imports never reached volumes that could be injurious since, inter alia, they were below the level of the residual quota of the steel safeguard quotas in the Union. The Commission rejected the claim. Anti-dumping measures address a different situation than safeguard measures. The steel safeguard measures do not prevent the imposition of anti-dumping measures within the free-of-safeguard duty quotas, which indeed, as mentioned in recital (214), are large enough to allow significant volumes of imports before the safeguard duty applies. In addition, the volume of imports from each of the countries concerned was not negligible within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the basic Regulation, as noted in recitals (213) to (214) above. Therefore, dumped imports from the countries concerned were significant enough to materially cause injury to the Union producers.

(281) Some parties called for the Commission to analyse data for 2021 and stated that the strong recovery of Union producers in that year evidenced that imports from the countries concerned were not the source of any material injury suffered by the Union industry. The Commission dismissed the claim in accordance with Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation, which establishes that information relating to periods subsequent to the investigation period should normally not be taken into account.

(283) During the period considered, the market share of imports from all other countries fluctuated. Overall, there was a decrease from 23,8 % in 2017 to 9,9 % in the investigation period, a trend which was partly influenced by the imposition of trade defence measures against Chinese CRS.

(284) In the investigation period, imports from other third countries amounted to 839 588 tonnes (72 % of which from South Korea, Taiwan and India). The bulk of these imports arrived in the Union at prices higher than import prices from the countries concerned.

(285) As noted in recitals (247) and (248) above, the Union industry was still affected by Chinese dumped imports during a share of the period considered. Some parties stated that there was no evidence that circumventing Chinese imports did not continue to enter the Union market in 2020, for which they requested the disclosure of TARIC data (46). Given the timing of the anti-circumvention proceeding against China and the registration that applied as from the initiation of that investigation, the Commission considered that Chinese imports did not cause the material injury suffered by the Union industry during the investigation period of the present proceeding. Most importantly, imports of CRS from the PRC were virtually inexistent during the investigation period, when the Commission found the Union industry continued to be materially injured.

(286) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that the Union industry’s decrease in profitability in 2018 and 2019 was because the profitability that was achieved in 2017 was mainly due to the imposition of anti-dumping duties on Chinese imports of CRS and that the drop in profitability from that 2017 level in 2018 and 2019 was caused by the imports of circumvented Chinese CRS, a claim which was also made by GOT.

(287) First, with regard to the Union industry’s profitability in 2017, the Commission noted that in 2017 the profitability was above the minimum target profit of 6 % which suggested that (i) after a period of unfair competition from China resulting in material injury to the Union industry, the Union industry’s profitability was not, in that year, materially affected by the Chinese dumping in the Union market, most likely as a consequence of the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation against Chinese CRS in December 2016; and (ii) the volume of imports from the countries concerned was not yet as such that it materially affected the profitability level of the Union industry. The absence of unfair trade distortions does however in no way mean that the profitability was inflated, as the parties concerned seemed to suggest, even more as the level was at a modest 6,2 %. With regard to the impact of the circumvented imports from China in 2018 and 2019, the Commission did not ‘simply disregard’ it, as CIB and several exporting producers claimed, but it had acknowledged that the Union industry was still affected by it. However, contrary to the trend of imports from the countries concerned, due to the anti-circumvention investigation, those imports decreased strongly in volume in 2018 and 2019, when they were already at a level below that of imports from the countries concerned. There were virtually no more imports of CRS from China in the investigation period.

(288) The Commission therefore concluded that the impact of imports from other third countries did not attenuate the causal link between dumped imports from Russia and Turkey and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(290) The Union industry increased its export volume by 6 % over the period considered. The additional export sales (of around 40 000 tonnes in the investigation period as compared to the beginning of the period considered) are limited compared to the loss of over 93 000 tonnes of sales in the Union market during the same period. Except for the higher prices in 2018, Union producers enjoyed rather stable export prices over the same period. The products which are exported by the Union industry are generally cheaper CRS and they therefore have significantly lower average prices than the products sold in the Union. The export sales of the Union industry could for a very small part compensate the negative developments both in terms of volumes and prices on the Union market by diluting fixed costs and other costs.

(291) Some exporting producers attributed any loss of market share of Union producers in the CRS Union market to the increased focus of the Union industry on export markets, which, for some parties, were non-profitable. The Commission dismissed the claim. The volumes exported by Union producers were limited as compared to total Union sales volumes, representing around 12 % of their total sales volume. As noted in recital (290), in absolute terms the additional export sales were limited, while prices were rather stable and in line with the product mix.

(292) The Commission concluded that the impact of the export performance of the Union industry on the injury suffered by Union producers was, if any, marginal.

(293) As shown in Section 4.3, free market consumption decreased during the period considered. On that basis, the Commission concluded that the evolution of free market consumption could have contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(294) After final disclosure, GOR claimed that the decrease of consumption was the main reason for the decrease in the Union industry’s production. However, the Commission reiterated that decrease of consumption was not found to attenuate the causal link between dumped imports from Russia and Turkey and the injurious situation of the Union industry in the investigation period, in view of the increase in volumes and market shares of imports from the countries concerned and their effect on the Union industry’s prices. Moreover, whereas consumption decreased by 467 000 tonnes over the period considered, imports from the countries concerned increased by almost the double.

(295) Some parties claimed that the Union industry was performing badly due to problems and lower demand in the automotive sector. The claim was not confirmed by the current investigation. To the contrary, the investigation showed that Union producers were supplying CRS to various industry sectors that are not in the automotive sector. Given that hot dipped galvanised products typically used in the automotive sector fall outside the scope of the investigation if a part of the Union industry was negatively affected by a downturn in the automotive industry, this derived from products that are not a like product and hence not accounted for in the current analysis. The claim was rejected.

(296) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that the lower demand in that sector, which is produced on the same production lines, would have increased the fixed cost and thus have negatively affected the profitability of the Union industry.

(297) The Commission acknowledged that certain Union producers manufacture, on the CRS product lines, also products used in the automotive sector. However, it clarified that the analysis in the current investigation, including the cost analysis, is made only on the product group covered by it. The micro-indicators have been collected at the level of the sampled producers only. The verified production costs of these parties, and in particular their fixed costs, have not been subject to such reallocation. Indeed, this reallocation of production capacity only applied to a small number of non-sampled producers. Therefore, none of the micro-indicators and as mentioned in the disclosure document and also in this regulation, only 2 macro-indicators, namely production capacity (Table 4) and employment (Table 6), were affected by the development in product groups other than CRS.

(298) The claim was therefore rejected.

(299) Union producers use the product under investigation for the production of organic coated steel.

(300) As shown in Table 1 above, captive consumption fell by 13 % over the period considered. The drop took place mainly in the second part of the period considered as a consequence of the negative growth in some steel-using sectors. Nevertheless, captive use remained rather stable in relative terms, i.e., as a percentage of Union production.

(301) The Commission concluded that the evolution of captive consumption on the injury suffered by the Union industry, if any, was marginal.

(302) Some parties pointed at ill-timed investments for the production of hot dipped galvanised products for the automotive sector as a source of the injury suffered by Union producers. As discussed in recital (295), the claim concerns investments on a product that is not covered by this investigation. The Commission thus dismissed the claim.

(303) Some parties pointed at ill-timed investments leading to a production capacity much higher than consumption in the Union as a source of the injury suffered by Union producers. The Commission dismissed the claim. As noted in recital (263), Union producers did not invest in order to increase CRS production capacities as such. Also, recital (235) notes that the production capacity increases for CRS were theoretical and therefore were not considered an indication of material injury in this particular case. This claim was reiterated after final disclosure, however without any new evidence or reasoning and therefore was rejected.

(304) Some parties pointed at self-inflicted injury within the Union industry because SSCs related to Union producers import of the product under investigation. The claim was unsubstantiated and, thus, rejected. It is noted that many Union producers do not have related steel service centres with importing functions. The bulk of Union producers in the sample do not have related steel service centres of the kind. Imports by steel service centres related to Union producers, if any, were not found to attenuate the causal link between dumped imports from Russia and Turkey and the injurious situation of the Union industry in the investigation period, in view of the increase in volumes of imports from the countries concerned, their effect on the Union Industry’s prices and the impact of other factors analysed in this section.

(305) Some parties attributed injury to COVID-mandated shutdowns in the Union which would have increased fixed costs of the Union steelmakers in view of lower production volumes. The claim, which was reiterated after final disclosure, was dismissed. COVID-mandated shutdowns in the 14 Member States where Union producers are located varied in terms of periods and scope. Indeed, there were Union steel producers barely affected by shutdowns, which served essential businesses during the pandemic and which overall output in 2020 did not vary significantly as compared to 2019 (47).

(306) Those parties considered that the reason why the Union industry lost market shares was the lower volumes available for sale as a result of lower capacity utilisation rates and reduced production due to COVID-19 pandemic plant shutdowns or idled capacities. The Commission disagreed. In a context of falling consumption (see Table 1), dumped imports gained more market shares than the Union industry, which, overall, was in a position to serve the market further.

(307) Several parties stated that Turkish and Russian imports filled in a gap in the Union market resulting from COVID-19 mandated production shutdowns in the Union, causing shortages. The Commission rejected the claim. The Commission noted that most of the increase of imports from the countries concerned, in terms of volumes as well as market shares, took place in 2018 and 2019, i.e. before the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the impact of COVID-19 mandated production shutdowns was overall limited as explained in recital (305) and varied amongst Union producers. In any case, COVID-19 related shutdowns could never justify dumping practices by the countries concerned. These comments were reiterated after final disclosure, however without any new evidence or reasoning and therefore were rejected.

(308) CIB and several exporting producers also submitted that the quarterly analysis it had made of prices and costs in the complaint (see recital (260)) would demonstrate that, in particular in the first quarter of 2020, the Union industry was severely lossmaking. This would corroborate the claim that mandatory plant shutdowns in the Union were the cause of the poor profitability in the investigation period (rather than the dumped imports).

(309) The Commission noted that the findings of these parties’ own analysis of these specific complaint data already showed a dramatic deterioration of profit between the third and fourth quarter of 2019 (from 1,22 % to -1,96 %), i.e. before the COVID-19 pandemic, and also a very pronounced improvement of the Union industry’s profitability in the second quarter of 2020 to a level (-0,45 %) comparable to that supposedly achieved in the third quarter of 2020 – whereas the parties highlighted that the shutdowns started from March 2020 (48). It considered that both the strong decrease of profitability in the last quarter of 2019, i.e. prior to any mandatory plant shutdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the strong profitability improvement in the second quarter of 2020 are at odds with the claim that this analysis would corroborate the claim on the impact of the mandatory shutdowns. The claim was therefore not found to be convincingly substantiated.

(310) GOR stated that certain COVID-related findings summarised in a study were the cause of the deterioration of the Union industry in the investigation period (49). Those findings relate to the slow recovery of the euro area as compared to China, the impact of short-term supply shortages on manufacturing industries and the differences amongst sector as regards rebounding after COVID-19. The claim is dismissed on the grounds explained in recital (306) and the nature of the study, which focuses on sectors unrelated to CRS.

(311) Some parties stated that Union producers suffered from a ‘cost-price squeeze’ due to the price fluctuations of hot-rolled coils, which became more expensive in the second part of 2020 according to market intelligence. Most Union producers are vertically integrated and the price of hot-rolled coils in the free market had no impact on their cost of production of CRS. The Commission dismissed the claim.

(312) After final disclosure, GOR claimed that the increase in market shares achieved by the Republic of Korea and Taiwan showed that the Union industry was not sufficiently competitive.

(313) The Commission noted that an increased presence of imports is not indicative of the competitive state of a domestic industry. It also noted that the absolute volume of imports from these two countries and, even more so, their increase over the period considered was limited in comparison with that of the countries concerned. The claim was therefore rejected.

(314) In light of the above considerations, the Commission established a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from Russia and Turkey. The increase of dumped imports from the countries concerned coincided with a deterioration of the Union industry’s situation. Low priced imports from Turkey and Russia increased exponentially and prevented the Union industry from increasing sales prices and volumes following the anti-circumvention investigation concerning Chinese imports. In terms of prices, the dumped imports from the countries concerned continuously undercut those of the Union industry sales prices in the Union market, and in any event created substantial price pressure preventing the Union industry from setting prices at sustainable levels necessary to achieve reasonable profit margins.

(315) The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. It found that factors such as the development of captive use and certain investments did not contribute to the injury suffered. The effect of factors such as imports from other third countries, exports by Union producers, the evolution of demand, COVID-19 pandemic and hot-rolled coils prices was limited overall.

(316) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

(317) To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

(318) The injury would be removed if the Union industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic regulation.

(319) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(320) The complainant stated that the target profit should be at least the same as in the previous (China) CRS case (7,4 %). A Union producer proposed 15 %. Some parties claimed that the level of profit put forth by the complainant was too high.

(321) The Commission found that in 2017 the Union industry was able to achieve a 6,2 % profit on average. Although anti-dumping measures had not been imposed on imports of CRS from the PRC yet, the volume of Chinese dumped imports had already decreased in 2017 as a result of the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation in December 2016. In addition, in that year the level of imports from Russia and Turkey was still relatively low (see Table 2).

(322) The Commission also assessed the years prior to the period considered but those were not found appropriate because of the influx of dumped imports from China affecting the Union industry. The Commission took note of the target profit used in the previous (China) CRS case, which however dates from 2008.

(323) Therefore, the Commission decided to use the average weighted profit of 6,2 % achieved in 2017 was the most appropriate basis for the target profit calculation in the present case.

(324) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, two Union producers provided evidence that their level of investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition. Based on the companies’ documentary evidence, which could be reconciled with the companies’ reporting tools and accounting systems, the Commission accepted the claims. To reflect this in the target profit, the Commission calculated the difference between investments, R & D and innovation (‘IRI’) expenses under normal conditions of competition as provided by the Union Industry and verified by the Commission with actual IRI expenses over the period considered. Such differences, expressed as a percentage of turnover, were 0,02 % and 0,35 %. Such percentages were added to the basic profit of 6,2 %, leading to a final target profit ranging between 6,20 % and 6,55 %.

(325) In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). Based on the evidence available (based on the companies’ accounting systems, their reporting tools and forecasts), the Commission established an additional cost in a range between 3,05 and 38,78 euros per tonne.

(326) These costs comprised the additional future costs to ensure compliance with the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the EU’s policy to comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Such additional costs were calculated on the basis of the estimated EU Allowances (EUAs) which will have to be purchased during the period of the application of the measures (2022 to 2026). The additional costs also took account of indirect CO2 costs stemming from an increase in electricity prices over the period 2022 to 2026 linked to the EU ETS and the forecasted prices of EUAs.

(327) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price for the like product of the Union industry by applying the target profit margin (see recital (324)) to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis.

(328) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers claimed that the production costs used as a basis to calculate a non-injurious price would be inflated due to reallocation of production lines for certain producers as referred to in recital (235). This claim was unsubstantiated. In any event, as mentioned in recital (295), the cost data used in this investigation, including for calculating a non-injurious Union industry price, only concern the costs associated with the production of the like product and the micro-indicators have been collected and used at the level of the sampled producers only. The Commission confirmed that the reallocation referred to in recitals (235) and (244) concerns a small number of non-sampled producers and it therefore only affects the macro-indicators in question as duly explained. The claim is therefore rejected.

(329) The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the Russian exporting producers and the sampled cooperating exporting producers in Turkey, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(330) After final disclosure, Severstal contested the adjustments for SG&A and profit made to the sales prices of its related traders in the Union by analogy to Article 2(9), for the same reasons as mentioned in recital (220).

(331) As noted in recital (221), the Court of Justice has confirmed the legality of using Article 2(9) by analogy to establish the export price for the purpose of calculating undercutting and underselling (50). Therefore, this claim was dismissed.

(332) The injury elimination level for ‘other cooperating companies’ and for ‘all other companies’ is defined in the same manner as the dumping margin for these companies (see recitals (138) and (182)).

(334) The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

(335) The Union industry is composed of 20 producers in 14 Member States and employs 9 237 people. The majority of Union producers supported the complaint. No producer opposed the initiation of the investigation.

(336) As concluded in Sections 4.5.4 and 5.3, the situation of the whole Union industry deteriorated as a result of dumped imports from Russia and Turkey.

(337) Anti-dumping measures against imports from Russia and Turkey are expected to restore fair trade conditions on the Union market and enable the Union industry to reach sustainable profit levels for such a capital-intensive industry. As a result, Union producers are expected to recover from the injurious situation, further invest and fulfil their commitments, including social and environmental ones.

(338) The non-imposition of measures would entail heavy losses within the Union industry, endanger its viability and possibly trigger the closure of production facilities and dismissals. The absence of measures might lead to dependency on supplies from third countries.

(339) The exporting producer Tezcan stated that steel imports are already controlled via steel safeguard measures and will also be controlled by the CBAM (51) monitoring starting in 2023. Other parties, including GOT, echoed the protective measures Union producers benefit from already. All these claims are dismissed: the current anti-dumping investigation addresses a distinct issue not yet covered by any existing measure.

(340) The Commission therefore concluded that the imposition of measures was in the interest of the Union industry.

(341) No importers cooperated with the investigation.

(342) The Turkish association CIB pointed at shortages of supply that could negatively affect importers in the Union. The Commission found the claim unjustified because, apart from the abundant Union production, importers and supply chains can avail themselves from imports from numerous countries. In addition, the imposition of anti-dumping measures does not mean that imports from the countries concerned are banned. The level of the measures should not prevent Turkish and Russian steelmakers from selling their CRS in the Union and to the Union importers at fair prices. The claim was dismissed.

(343) CIB also submitted that measures would negatively affect importers in the Union because importers were still struggling to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. It did not present any evidence to support the claim and therefore it was dismissed. The lack of cooperation of importers did not allow the Commission to analyse whether importers were performing badly or unable to pass on price increases, if any.

(344) No users cooperated with the investigation.

(345) The European Association of Automobile Manufacturers made a submission requesting car manufacturers in the Union to be exempted from any measures that would negatively affect their competitiveness. The Commission found that the product covered by this investigation is virtually not used by the car industry and therefore any impact that measures would have in that sector could only be immaterial.

(346) Parties representing the interests of exporting producers pointed at shortages of supply that could negatively affect users in the Union. The parties alleged that Union producers were struggling with the restart of their operations and unable to supply a growing demand from customers, particularly as regards thin materials, narrow materials, galvalume materials and coils lighter than 10 tonnes, which Union producers would traditionally be unwilling to supply. The claim was unsubstantiated and dismissed on the grounds explained in recital (342) above.

(347) The Turkish association CIB called for no measures on the grounds that in the 2007 investigation on synthetic staple fibres of polyesters (52) the Commission found measures not to be in the Union interest, inter alia, because of the low profits of users and their difficulties to pass on price increases and supply problems. The claim was dismissed. The part of the claim relating to supply problems is dismissed on the grounds explained in recital (342) above.

(348) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that using alternative sources of supply, which as mentioned in that recital are widely available, would entail increased CRS purchase prices for users. The Commission recalled that the objective of anti-dumping measures is to eliminate unfairly priced imports from the Union market in order to re-establish a level playing field for all market participants. The same parties also questioned the availability of the alternative sources mentioned in recital (342) on the account of US importers being the highest bidders at a global level. The Commission noted that in the investigation period imports from countries other than the countries concerned had a market share of 9,9 %, in spite of the unfair competition in the Union market from the countries concerned which had a market share of 12,9 %. On that basis, the claim was rejected.

(349) As mentioned, users did not reply to the users’ questionnaire and therefore, no information regarding profitability of users could be collected from them. In Annex U-1 to the complaint, the complainants provided a calculation demonstrating that, for a construction application, CRS represented a negligible part of the cost of the final product. According to Eurofer, the same would be true for other downstream segments (53).

(350) After final disclosure, CIB and several exporting producers submitted that this information was inadequate but they failed to provide a meaningful alternative cost impact assessment for users. It also submitted, as did GOR, that after the investigation period prices of CRS would have surged and that these most recent increase in prices would ‘necessarily’ heavily impact users.

(351) The Commission recalled that in the Union interest analysis, the relevant impact assessment for the users should be the assessment of the impact, if any, of the anti-dumping duty on them – not the impact of price hikes, if any, for other reasons. Users did not cooperate with the investigation and therefore the Commission was not in a position to analyse the impact of developments after the investigation period on the situation of users. On that basis, the claim was rejected.

(352) Some parties stated that Union steelmakers were consistently trying to keep their oligopoly in the Union market and remove international competition. They noted that Union producers served already a significant share of the free market, while such a percentage did not include captive volumes, and feared a monopoly.

(353) The Commission found the oligopoly claim unjustified, since, as stated in recital (335), there are 20 known producers belonging to more than 10 different groups and significant imports from third countries. In the absence of evidence of uncompetitive practices, the market share the Union industry currently holds is irrelevant to support these claims of oligopoly, let alone a monopoly. The Commission refers to its recent Staff Working Document (54), where it noted that ‘[i]n the recent consolidation wave, merger control enforcement contributed to keeping vibrant competition in the European steel markets to the benefit of the many downstream industries that use steel, rely on affordable materials to compete globally and employ millions of Europeans. By prohibiting anti-competitive mergers (e.g. Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp) or approving mergers subject to conditions, such as structural divestitures (e.g. ArcelorMittal/Ilva), merger enforcement ensured that European steel customers are not left with less choice, higher prices, or less innovation.’. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(354) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of CRS originating in Russia and Turkey.

(355) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned. Anti-dumping duties should be set in accordance with the lesser duty rule.

(356) The Commission noted that after the initiation of the investigation, due to the military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the EU imposed successive packages of sanctions against Russia which also affected steel products and/or the steel companies producing and exporting the product under investigation after the investigation period. The latest package of sanctions covering the product under investigation and/or the exporting producers contains an import ban of CRS. This ban entered into force on 16 March 2022 (55). Given that these sanctions are linked to the military aggression and the underlying geopolitical situation, their scope, modulation, and/or duration are unpredictable. Furthermore, anti-dumping measures have a lifetime of five years. Considering the abovementioned uncertainties and the fact that the Council may further amend the precise scope and duration of sanctions at any moment, the Commission found that they cannot have a bearing in its conclusions in this proceeding.

(358) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(359) A company, among these specifically mentioned in this Regulation, may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (56). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(360) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(361) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(362) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(363) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(364) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (57), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(365) By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 (58), the Commission imposed a safeguard measure with respect to certain steel products for a period of three years. By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 (59), the safeguard measure was prolonged until 30 June 2024. The product concerned is one of the product categories covered by the safeguard measure. Consequently, once the tariff quotas established under the safeguard measure are exceeded, both the above-quota tariff duty and the anti-dumping duty would become payable on the same imports. As such cumulation of anti-dumping measures with safeguard measures may lead to an effect on trade greater than desirable, the Commission decided to prevent the concurrent application of the anti-dumping duty with the above-quota tariff duty for the product concerned for the duration of the imposition of the safeguard duty.

(366) This means that where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to the product concerned and exceeds the level of the anti-dumping duties pursuant to this Regulation, only the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected. During the period of concurrent application of the safeguard and anti-dumping duties, the collection of the duties imposed pursuant to this Regulation shall be suspended. Where the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 becomes applicable to the product concerned and is set at a level lower than the level of the anti-dumping duties in this Regulation, the above-quota tariff duty referred to in Article 1(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/159 shall be collected in addition to the difference between that duty and the higher anti-dumping duties imposed pursuant to this Regulation. The part of the amount of anti-dumping duties not collected shall be suspended.

(367) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The following products are excluded:

(i) of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel;

(ii) not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced).

Article 2

Article 3

Article 1 (2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from Turkey and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

(a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in Turkey during the period of investigation (1 January 2020 to 31 December 2020);

(b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation; and

(c) it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation.

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 11 August 2022.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) OJ C 245, 24.6.2021, p. 21.

(3) Note to the file t21.005164 of 6 July 2021.

(4) Note to the file t21.007177 of 21 October 2021.

(5) The three initially sampled Union producers were instructed to complete the questionnaire upon confirmation of the provisional sample on 6 July 2021, whereas the Union producer which was added to the sample (see recital (7)) was instructed to do so on 21 October 2021.

(6) Questionnaires for Union producers, exporting producers, importers and users were available at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/case_details.cfm?id=2531

(7) Judgement of the General Court of 25 January 2017 in Case T-512/09 RENV, Rusal Armenal ZAO v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2017:26, para. 130.

(8) In the non-confidential file t21.005520, the complainant provided a list of 9 Union producers and web catalogue pages showing that those producers can produce CRS with a thickness below 0,40 mm.

(9) In the non-confidential file t21.005520, the complainant provided examples, supported by the applicable EU standards, that AluZinc CRS and CRS with other coatings can be used alternatively in construction.

(10) In the non-confidential file t22.003396, the complainant provided examples, supported by the applicable EU standards, that AluZinc CRS and CRS with other coatings can be used interchangeably in certain metal framing, roofing and cladding products.

(11) Appellate Body report, DS493 – Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate (Russia), para 6.97.

(12) Panel report, DS473 –EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 7.232.

(13) PJSC MMK and Subsidiaries. Consolidated Financial Statements For the Year Ended 31 December 2012, 2013 and 2014. Available at https://mmk.ru/en/investor/results-and-reports/financial-results/ (last viewed 25 October 2021).

(14) The disclosure of ‘Making of an interested-party transaction by the Issuer’. Available at https://mmk.ru/en/about/corporate-governance/disclosure-of-information/essential-facts/). As at 4 April 2022, this location on the company’s website was not available. The documents continue to be publicly available at the online portal of the Corporate Information Disclosure Centre of LLC Interfax, https://e-disclosure.ru/portal/company.aspx?id=9&attempt=1 (last viewed 4 April 2022).

(15) Annexes to MMK’s annual report 2017. Available at https://mmk.ru/en/investor/results-and-reports/annual-reports/ (last viewed 4 April 2022).

(16) Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (Korea), WT/DS539/R, para. 7.36. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, para. 4.421.

(17) Introduction, point (5) of the questionnaire for the exporting producers in Russia (p. 7). Available at https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-history?caseId=2531 (last viewed 10 June 2022).

(18) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1795 of 5 October 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine and terminating the investigation on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Serbia (OJ L 258, 6.10.2017, p. 24), recital (569).

(19) Although the company did not provide information as to whether each respective resales transaction was a pure resale or a resale after a processing operation, by simple comparison of PCNs and quantities sold by NLMK to NSSC and resold by NSSC to unrelated customers, it can be observed that only approximately 1/3 of the quantity resold by NSSC represented unprocessed goods purchased from NLMK in the IP. The other 2/3 were sold either from stock or after a processing operation, which changed the product type.

(20) Recital 71 of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1328 of 29 July 2016 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain cold rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation (OJ L 210, 4.8.2016, p. 1).

(21) Judgment of 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Limited and others v Council of the European Communities, C-273/85 and C-107/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:466, para. 16.

(22) Judgement of the Court of First Instance of 17 December 2008, HEG Ltd, Graphite India Ltd v Council of the European Union, Case T-462/04, EU:T:2008:586, para 64.

(23) t21.005086.

(24) The files supplementing Annex I-1 to the complaint are attached to the Note to the file t21.006245 dated 8 September 2021 (for inspection by interested parties).

(25) Note to the file t22.001059 dated 4 February 2022 (for inspection by interested parties).

(26) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1948 of 25 November 2019 initiating an investigation concerning possible circumvention of anti-dumping measures imposed by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186 on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in the People’s Republic of China, and making such imports subject to registration (OJ L 304, 26.11.2019, p. 10).

(27) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1156 of 4 August 2020 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186 on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of slightly modified certain corrosion resistant steels (OJ L 255, 5.8.2020, p. 36). The methodology to establish the figures in Table 1 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1156 is described in detail under that table. It draws from Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186, Eurostat, and industry estimations.

(28) The sampled Union producers mostly sold the like product directly to independent costumers in the EU. Around 5 % of those EU sales were made through related selling entities and those sales were made at prices similar to those of direct sales to independent customers.

(29) Judgement of the General Court of 2 April 2020, Hansol Paper Co. Ltd. v Commission, Case T-383/17, EU:T:2020:139, paras. 200-203.

(30) Judgement of the General Court of 27 April 2022, Giant Electric Vehicle Kunshan Co. Ltd. v Commission, Case T-242/19, EU:T:2022:259.

(31) Judgement of the General Court of 4 May 2022, China Rubber Industry Association (CRIA) and China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC) v Commission, Cases T-30/19 and T-72/19, EU:T:2022:266, paras. 128-131.

(32) Judgement of the Court of 12 May 2022, Commission v Hansol Paper, Case C-260/20 P, EU:C:2022:370, para. 101.

(33) Judgement of the Court of 12 May 2022, Commission v Hansol Paper, Case C-260/20 P, EU:C:2022:370.

(34) Judgement of the Court of 12 May 2022, Commission v Hansol Paper, Case C-260/20 P, EU:C:2022:370, para. 105.

(35) Judgement of the Court of 12 May 2022, Commission v Hansol Paper, Case C-260/20 P, EU:C:2022:370, para. 99.

(36) Since the Union producers sell predominantly to independent customers in the EU directly, the Commission considered the resulting undercutting margins sufficiently representative.

(37) The questionnaire reply provided by Eurofer was remotely cross-checked.

(38) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1156.

(39) See the analysis of EU-steel using sectors in Eurofer’s ‘Economic and steel market outlook 2021-2022, second quarter 2021 report’ from May 2021 available at https://www.eurofer.eu/publications/economic-market-outlook/economic-and-steel-market-outlook-2021-2022-second-quarter/

(40) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1948.

(41) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1444 of 9 August 2017 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in the People’s Republic of China (C/2017/5512) (OJ L 207, 10.8.2017, p. 1).

(42) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186 of 7 February 2018 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 34, 8.2.2018, p. 16).

(43) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1156.

(44) On the basis of data in the complaint, CIB calculated quarterly costs and prices of the EU industry and resulting profits on a quarterly basis as from Q3 2019 until the last quarter of the investigation period (t21.007886 and t22.003104).

(45) Based on volumes from Surveillance 2 database only for 2020.

(46) On 4 February 2022, the Commission provided information on aggregated import volumes and values per exporting country basis for the calendar year 2020 for the product under investigation via the note to the file t22.001509.

(47) For an example, see the non-confidential files in t21.005684 (Marcegaglia Carbon Steel Spa).

(48) CIB submission t21.006224, table under point 34.

(49) The findings can be found in the study ‘Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on EU industries’, requested by the European Parliament’s committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) and available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/662903/IPOL_STU(2021)662903_EN.pdf

(50) See also judgment of 22 September 2021, T-753/16, PAO Severstal, EU:T:2021:612, para. 272.

(51) A Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (‘CBAM’) seeks to impose new obligations on foreign producers exporting certain products (including steel) to the EU as of 2023.

(52) Commission Decision 2007/430/EC of 19 June 2007 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of synthetic staple fibres of polyesters (PSF) originating in Malaysia and Taiwan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the provisional duties imposed (OJ L 160, 21.6.2007, p. 30).

(53) See Eurofer’s submission in t21.007474, inter alia.

(54) Commission’s Staff Working Document ‘Towards Competitive and Clean European Steel’, SWD(2021) 353 final, 5.5.2021, p. 4-5.

(55) Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1) as amended by Regulation (EU) 2022/428 (OJ L 87 I , 15.3.2022, p. 13). Please refer to https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20220413 for the consolidated version of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, containing all amendments relating to the package of sanctions.

(56) European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Wetstraat 170 Rue de la Loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

(57) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

(58) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ L 31, 1.2.2019, p. 27).

(59) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 of 24 June 2021 amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 to prolong the safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products (OJ L 225 I, 25.6.2021, p. 1.