Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/111 of 18 January 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of fatty acid originating in Indonesia

(381) These costs comprised the additional future costs to ensure compliance with the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the EU’s policy to comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Such additional costs were calculated on the basis of the average estimated additional EU Allowances (EUA) which will have to be purchased during the period of the application of the measures (2022 to 2026). The EUAs used in the calculation were net of free allowances receivable and were adjusted to ensure they related solely to the product under investigation. The costs of the EUAs were extrapolated to account for the expected price variation during the lifespan of the measures. The source for these projected prices is a Bloomberg extraction dated 23 June 2022. The average projected mean price for EUAs (including Bloomberg New Energy Finance) for this period is 91,8 EUR per tonne of CO2 emitted.

(382) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price for the like product of the Union industry by applying the above-mentioned target profit margin stated in recital (378) to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period, and then added the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis.

(383) The Commission then determined the underselling margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in Indonesia, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(384) In view of the revisions of the SG&A of WETBV as stated in recital (161) and (162), the Commission revised also the calculation of constructed CIF accordingly.

(386) In their comments following final disclosure Wilmar claimed that its injury margin should not have been adjusted for SG&A and profit in respect of sales via WET B.V. because this comparison was made at a different level of trade with Union prices.

(387) However, the Commission noted that the non-injurious price for the like product of the Union industry included only the cost of production of the sampled Union producers and did not include any SG&A of any sales from related selling entities since all sales by the sampled Union producer were made directly to consumers (see recital (209)). The Commission thus considered that no level of trade imbalance exists. This claim was therefore rejected.

(388) The complainant has provided sufficient evidence in the complaint that there are raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation in Indonesia with regard to the product concerned. According to the evidence in the complaint, CPO and CPKO, accounting for more than 70 % of the cost of production of the product concerned, were subject to an export tax, an export levy and a maximum domestic price setting in Indonesia.

(389) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that it was necessary to assess whether there are distortions with regard to the product under investigation within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, which would render a duty lower than the margin of dumping insufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports of the product under investigation only with regard to the exporter Musim Mas, as the dumping margin for Wilmar was lower than the injury margin.

(390) The Commission first identified the main raw materials used in the production of the product concerned by Musim Mas. As main raw materials were considered those raw materials which are likely to represent at least 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned. The Commission established that Musim Mas used CPO and CPKO for the production of the product concerned. The CPO represented more than 30 % in the total manufacturing cost, while CPKO represented more than 40 %.

(391) The Commission then examined whether any of the main raw materials used in the production of the product concerned was distorted by one of the measures listed in Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation: dual pricing schemes, export taxes, export surtax, export quota, export prohibition, fiscal tax on exports, licensing requirements, minimum export price, value added tax (VAT) refund reduction or withdrawal, restriction on customs clearance point for exporters, qualified exporters list, domestic market obligation, captive mining. For this purpose the Commission relied on the relevant Indonesian legislation.

(392) The investigation revealed that both CPO and CPKO were subject to an export tax and levy. The export tax consists of a progressive tariff schedule on CPO and CPKO (Decree No 166/PMK.010/2020 (44)). In addition, there was also a progressive export levy on CPO and CPKO (Decree No 57/PMK.05/2020 (45) as amended by Decree No 76/PMN.05/2021 (46)).

(393) The Commission established that Musim Mas benefitted from the export tax and levy.

(394) The Commission compared the domestic price of CPO and CPKO to an international benchmark.

(395) Regarding the domestic price for CPO and CPKO, the investigation revealed that the State owned company Kharisma Pemasaran Bersama Nusantara (KPBN) organises daily tenders (47) where the state-owned companies PTPN sell CPO and CPKO. There is one tender per day for CPO and one weekly tender for CPKO and only one standard quality for CPO and CPKO, and therefore only one daily price for CPO and only one weekly price for CPKO respectively. The price is set FOB Dumai or Belawan (two important seaports in Indonesia). The PTPN sets the price and the companies either accept it or they wait until the following day. The contracts between private companies use also the price set by PTPN. The tender price is a public price and all operators in the market know it. The investigation also revealed that the contracts between related parties are also based on the price set by PTPN. Therefore, all the buyers in Indonesia buy CPO and CPKO at the daily price set by PTPN. Furthermore, the investigation revealed that the small differences between the tender price and the actual purchase price of the sampled exporters was mainly due to transport expenses. Therefore, for the domestic price of CPO and CPKO, the Commission used the daily tender prices set by PTPN during the investigation period submitted by one of the sampled exporting producers.

(396) Regarding the international benchmark for CPO and CPKO, the Commission used several benchmarks: (1) FOB Indonesian export prices from Global Trade Atlas (48) (‘GTA’), (2) Malaysian domestic prices (49), (3) FOB Malaysian export prices from GTA (4) CIF Rotterdam spot prices (50) (51).

(397) The comparison revealed that the domestic Indonesian price for CPO was 20 % lower than the FOB Indonesian export prices, 23 % lower than the Malaysian domestic prices, 29 % lower than the FOB Malaysian export prices, 24 % lower than the CIF Rotterdam spot prices (adjusted to FOB).

(398) The comparison revealed that the domestic Indonesian price for CPKO was 18 % lower than the Indonesian export price, 19 % lower than the Malaysian domestic price, 6 % lower than the Malaysian export price, 22 % lower than the CIF Rotterdam spot prices (adjusted to FOB).

(399) Finally, the Commission examined if CPO or CPKO account individually for at least 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned. For the purpose of this calculation, an undistorted price of the raw material as established upon export from Indonesia and retrieved from GTA was used. The Commission established that for Musim Mas CPO represented more than 40 % and CPKO more than 50 % of the total cost of manufacturing.

(400) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the prices of CPO and CPKO were subject to distortions and significantly lower as compared to prices in the representative international markets, within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

(401) In accordance with Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was in the Union interest to determine the amount of definitive duties in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with regard to Musim Mas only. Wilmar’s anti-dumping duty would in any event be set at the dumping margin because the underselling was established at a higher level. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all pertinent information to this investigation, including the spare capacities in the exporting country, competition for raw materials and the effect on supply chains for Union companies.

(402) The GOI submitted that during the investigation period, the total production capacity in Indonesia of the product under investigation was around 3 600 000 tonnes, while the actual production was around 2 600 000 tonnes. It stated that both estimates were based on a report by the Indonesian Oleochemical Manufacturers Association (APOLIN).

(403) The Commission notes that the original estimates have been amended by GOI by a margin of up to +/– 30 % to protect confidentiality, and that the resulting estimate of 1 000 000 tonnes of spare capacity is significantly lower than its true value. Similarly, the resulting estimate of 72 % of capacity utilisation is significantly higher than its true value. The Commission further notes that even based on an estimate of 1 000 000 tonnes, the spare capacity in Indonesia is higher than, and therefore could substitute, the entire Union production, which amounted to around 872 000 tonnes during the investigation period. It is also four times higher than the volume of imports from Indonesia, which amounted to around 228 000 tonnes.

(404) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that Indonesian producers have significant spare capacity and that, if used, this spare capacity had the potential to increase the global supply of the product under investigation, depress prices and consequently undermine the effectiveness of the measure if not set at the level of dumping.

(405) The main raw material used for the production of the product under investigation is either tallow, or a vegetable oil, such as CPO and CPKO.

(406) As established in recitals (397) and (398), the prices of CPO and CPKO in Indonesia were significantly lower than the prices of CPO and CPKO in representative international markets. This creates an unfair advantage to the exporting producers in Indonesia as compared to the Union industry. The Commission therefore concluded that, while CPO and CPKO was available to the Union industry, given the distortions it was available at a higher price than for producers in Indonesia. The Union industry was therefore at a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis Indonesian exporting producers.

(407) As shown in Table 4 above, the Union industry had a spare capacity of almost 250 000 tonnes during the investigation period. This spare capacity was higher than the volume of imports from Indonesia during the same period. It follows that the Union industry is able to replace imports from Indonesia with its own production, and even to cover almost the entire Union demand of the product under investigation.

(408) Moreover, the investigation has shown that Union users could source the product under investigation from third countries such as Malaysia. The total volume of imports from third countries remained stable over the period considered, while their market share increased by 6 %. In the absence of dumped imports from Indonesia, imports from third countries would increase, as the sales prices in the Union market would be more attractive.

(409) Wilmar claimed that the fact that Union producers such as AAK requested the exclusion of certain fatty acids from the product scope of the investigation indicates that certain Union producers (of downstream products) were in great need of access to all sources of imports.

(410) The Commission notes that the ability of the Union industry to cover the Union demand concerns a broad range of fatty acids. In particular with respect to AAK’s exclusion requests, as explained in recitals (108) to (118), the types and quantities of fatty acid required can be either produced by Union producers once a level playing field has been restored in the Union market, or sourced from countries other than Indonesia.

(411) Therefore, users would have sufficient access to the product under investigation even in case the imports from Indonesia decrease. Consequently, disruptions of the value chains of Union users are not expected.

(412) In their comments following final disclosure several interested parties commented on the effect of measures on supply chains in the Union.

(413) These comments are discussed at Section 7.9.2 of this Regulation. On the basis of these comments and the ensuing analysis the Commission is satisfied that any supply issues will be temporary and manageable in the light of the other available sources of supply, such as Malaysia.

(414) Having assessed all pertinent information to this investigation, the Commission concluded that it is in the Union interest to determine the amount of definitive duties in relation to Musim Mas in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

(415) In view of the analysis set out above, the Commission concluded that, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, it is in the interest of the Union to set the level of the definitive duties on the basis of the level of dumping, subject to the further considerations in the context of Article 21 set out in Section 7.6 below.

(416) In their comments following final disclosure, the Musim Mas group argued that the GOI’s policies on CPO and CPKO were under investigation in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation mentioned in recital (3) and therefore by applying Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation in the current anti-dumping investigation and applying anti-subsidy duties on the same policies would result in double remedies being applied for the same set of GOI’s policies.

(417) The Commission will address the issue of double remedy, if any, in the framework of the anti-subsidy investigation.

(418) Having assessed the Union interest pursuant to Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation, the Commission then examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users and other relevant economic operators. No unrelated importers cooperated in the investigation.

(419) The Commission sent questionnaires to known interested parties. It received questionnaire replies from four users belonging to two groups of companies, that is, the Greven group and the Schill + Seilacher group.

(420) There are 15 companies producing fatty acid in the Union employing around 900 staff. The producers are widely spread throughout the Union. The sampled Union industry representing over 60 % of total production, cooperated with the investigation.

(421) Further to the withdrawal of the complaint covered in Section 1.10, the Commission decided to continue the investigation and carried out its injury and causation analysis with regard to the Union industry as a whole regardless of the support and/or cooperation of single Union producers, as explained in more detail at recitals (64), (66), (68) and (69). The analysis in Sections 4 and 5 of this Regulation confirmed that the Union industry suffered material injury and that it was caused by dumped imports of the product concerned by Indonesian exporting producers. The Commission further noted that it enjoys a wide margin of discretion on the decision to continue or terminate a proceeding further to a withdrawal.

(422) In the letter to withdraw the complaint, the complainant stated that the reason for its withdrawal was ‘due to the influence from stakeholders’ (52). This confirms that the complainant did not question the analysis and conclusion on the existence of material injury caused by dumped Indonesian imports, but that the only reason for the withdrawal was the influence from stakeholders. A reason linked to stakeholders exerting influence on the complainant would not support a finding that it would be in the Union interest to terminate the proceeding solely for this reason, when the Commission has already concluded that there is significant injurious dumping. In this regard, the Commission further noted that the withdrawal of the complaint took place at a very late stage in the proceeding, where there had been full disclosure of the findings to the parties demonstrating the existence of material injury suffered by the Union industry caused by the Indonesian dumped imports. The comments received by parties further to the disclosure did not alter this conclusion, thereby supporting the consideration that in any event it would not be in the Union interest to terminate proceedings without imposing measures, even if the complaint was withdrawn by the complainant.

(423) Given the finding of material injury to the Union industry described in recitals (255) to (259), imposing measures would allow the Union industry to improve its profitability towards sustainable levels, increase investment, and thus maintain a competitive position in their core market. The Union industry would also be able to regain lost market share by increasing sales volumes in the Union market.

(424) The absence of measures is likely to have further significant negative effects on the Union industry in terms of lower sales and production volumes, further price depression leading to further financial deterioration of its economic situation in terms of profitability and investment jeopardizing its future and employment.

(425) In their comments following final disclosure the Musim Mas group claimed that the Union industry, using tallow as a feedstock, would not benefit from measures, and that it would be Malaysian exporting producers which would ultimately benefit.

(426) However, bearing in mind the Commission comments in respect of tallow as a non-causation factor, the higher prices of Malaysian imports throughout the period considered, and the ability of the Union industry to increase profitability and investment and therefore to increase production and sales volume should measures be adopted, this comment was rejected.

(427) The imposition of measures on Indonesian fatty acid is therefore clearly in the interest of the Union industry.

(428) No cooperation was received from unrelated importers/traders, as stated in recital (38).

(429) Therefore, the Commission did not have information to precisely establish the impact that the imposition of measures would have on the activities of the unrelated importers/traders. The absence of cooperation suggests that importers do not consider that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would significantly affect their business. Whilst a reduction in imports and resale of goods affected by measures may be observed in a first step, any such negative effect on turnover could eventually compensated by increased resale of products purchased from other sources such as Malaysia.

(430) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the impact of measures would not be disproportionate for importers/traders.

(431) The product under investigation is purchased by several industries in the Union market to produce products such as food, feed, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics (daily hygiene products and luxury beauty items), home and personal care, and industrial detergent products.

(432) Four users belonging to two groups of companies, representing around 4 to 7 % of total Union consumption, cooperated in the investigation and provided replies to the users’ questionnaire.

(433) One group used fatty acid to produce metallic and alkaline soaps, as well as esters which are used as additives in the plastic, lubricant and textile industry. The other group produces chemicals for technical textiles, leather chemicals, cosmetics and fine chemicals.

(434) The investigation found that these users together purchase [6-9] % of total imports from Indonesia, [4-7] % of total Union industry sales and [2-4] % of total imports from other countries during the investigation period. The Commission, therefore, had limited information to assess the overall impact of the imposition of the anti-dumping measures on user’s activities.

(435) Based on the data provided by the cooperating users, during the IP, they purchased around [23-26] % of their needs in fatty acid from Indonesia, [68-72] % from Union producers and [2-5] % from other sources. Whilst one group of users was importing negligible quantities, the other imported more than one quarter of their fatty acid needs from Indonesia in that period.

(436) Depending on the user, sales of products incorporating fatty acids ranged between 29 % to more than 95 % of total turnover. Overall, the proportion of fatty acid from all origins in the total manufacturing costs of the cooperating users ranged from 6 % to 52 %.

(437) The total profitability margins of the four users ranged between single digit to double digits profit margins.

(438) As regard the effect of the measures on the cooperating users, and in view of the limited substitutability of the product, the Commission considered that their profits may be somewhat affected by the imposition of measures. In view of their profit margins, the effect would not be disproportionate, as, at least part of the increase in price, could be passed on to the downstream supply chain.

(439) Given the inadequate profitability of the Union industry and price depression on the market, it can reasonably be assumed that prices will increase after measures are imposed. Nevertheless, the impact measures may have on certain users should be balanced against the risk of a discontinuation of Union industry activity as the current situation is not sustainable. Not imposing measures will lead to less reliable and stable sources of supply and inevitably to price increases on the Union market.

(440) P&G did not fully cooperate in the investigation but stated that it was against the imposition of measures. It considered that the imposition of measures would jeopardize its access to a reliable source of supply of fatty acid. P&G claimed that imposing anti-dumping measures would have two key consequences. First, measures were likely to lead to increased production costs in the consumer goods industry and these costs would eventually be passed on to the consumers. Second, imposing measures was likely to disrupt the supply chains from Indonesia at a time when demand for fatty acid was strong and Union producers running at full capacity. The Greven group also claimed that demand for fatty acid in the Union market could not be met without the imports of fatty acid from Indonesia.

(441) The Commission noted that P&G did not submit a reply to the user questionnaire and did not provide detailed information on its purchases of fatty acid and their weight in terms of cost in the finished goods. Therefore, the Commission was not able to assess the impact of the imposition of measures on P&G’s activity.

(442) In addition, the Commission found that the production capacity of the Union industry was sufficient to meet almost the entire consumption in the EU market. Currently, the Union industry has around 20 % of spare capacity and, if conditions of fair competition are restored, Union producers could increase production to meet the demand in the Union. In addition, there is spare capacity for fatty acid production in Malaysia. Therefore, the Commission concluded that imposing anti-dumping measures could not lead to shortage of supply of fatty acid on the Union market.

(443) After final disclosure, comments on Union interests were received from the Greven group, the Schill + Seilacher group, P&G, Unilever, Henkel, Quaker Houghton, Evonik, NYCO, Kapachim, Omya, Stéarinerie Dubois, Wilmar, the Musim Mas group, Ecogreen and CUTFA. Many of these parties were users which had not fully cooperated in the investigation and had not previously submitted comments. The investigation therefore benefitted from a broader range of comments after the final disclosure, although the information was not submitted in the questionnaire reply format as required at the initiation of the investigation, and it was not possible to verify the veracity of all the comments made.

(444) CUTFA pointed out that the measures would only have a limited impact on users because cost increases would be able to be passed on to their customers. Even if this was not the case, profits were of a magnitude to be absorbed, so that the impact of the measures would not be disproportionate.

(445) The broader range of comments from users appeared to indicate that users could be distinguished into two main categories.

(446) The first category, being large multinational groups such as P&G, Unilever, Henkel, Quaker Houghton and Evonik, which manufactured a large number of finished goods using the product under investigation as a key raw material mainly in their home care, laundry, beauty and personal care products. However, as described above, due to the lack of full cooperation from these parties, it was not possible to ascertain the quantity of fatty acid used in their production, or the importance of fatty acid in the production cost of, even, the most important products using fatty acid. In addition, the data of P&G, Unilever and Henkel available from public sources (53) showed that in recent years group turnover and profits had increased substantially especially in respect of home care products, which is the largest market for fatty acids.

(447) P&G explained that they had not submitted a questionnaire response because P&G, like other fatty acid users, are fragmented across many production sites.

(448) However, P&G did not even complete the questionnaire section covering the purchases of fatty acid through their central purchasing unit. The fragmented nature of the user industry does not prevent, at least some of them, from submitting a questionnaire response. Moreover, the publicly available consolidated annual accounts for P&G also show that its European operations had a very large turnover in 2021 (16,7 billion USD (54)). Its worldwide profitability was 23 % (55). Henkel’s turnover in 2021 for Western and Eastern Europe was 9,1 billion EUR and profitability in these regions was 18,9 % (56). This information supported the Commission’s view that the large buyers of fatty acids in the biggest user industries (home care, laundry, beauty and personal care) would not be disproportionally affected by the measures proposed.

(449) Henkel stated that the lack of cooperation from users did not mean that the measures, at the levels proposed in the final disclosure, would not have a serious impact on their activities.

(450) As further set out below, the Commission reviewed its original determinations and conclusions concerning the impact on users, in light of the additional comments received in response to the final disclosure, including comments from new interested parties.

(451) Henkel, Kapachim, Omya, and Wilmar also pointed out that the interest of users should be seen in the context of recent developments preceding the disclosure such as increasing raw material and energy prices, inflation and supply chain issues.

(452) The Commission noted that these issues are post-investigation period developments. It has not been substantiated what impact these developments could have on the user industry. For instance, whether extra costs have been passed on to customers and what impact has there been on the profitability of products containing fatty acids. In any case it is not clear whether such developments were of a lasting nature. These claims could not therefore be accepted.

(453) In its confidential submission Unilever focussed on a certain product which would be affected by measures, claiming that prices would increase considerably, and that it might have to import this product, with a consequential impact on its Union production and employment. It also claimed that consumer prices for this product would increase as a result. Furthermore, Unilever pointed out that the vast majority of sales of this product were exported outside the Union.

(454) The Commission was not able to verify these claims as Unilever, like most users, did not complete a user’s questionnaire reply. The Commission was therefore unable to ascertain the importance of this product in Unilever’s Union operations in terms of profitability and turnover. The Commission was also unable to ascertain the importance of fatty acid in Unilever’s costs for this product, or other products. It was also unable to assess clearly what impact duties would have overall on Unilever’s Union market profitability. Furthermore, the publicly available consolidated annual accounts for Unilever shows that its European operations had a turnover of 11,3 billion EUR (57) and a profitability of 1,8 billion EUR (58) or over 16 %. Therefore, the Commission had not been given any information to demonstrate that the impact of the measures on fatty acid from Indonesia would be disproportionate on Unilever’s sales of this product, or more generally on its Union operations. The claim regarding increases in consumer prices and importation of this product was clearly not substantiated bearing in mind the overall profitability of its Union operations. Furthermore, the Commission noted that processing arrangements under customs control would be available to Unilever to mitigate the impact of measures.

(455) The second category of users tended to be smaller companies and groups, such as those which fully cooperated with the investigation (Greven group and Schill + Seilacher group) and used fatty acids to manufacture downstream products such as esters, amines, lubricants, soaps etc.

(456) In addition, following final disclosure, NYCO, Kapachim, Omya, Ecogreen affiliates and Stéarinerie Dubois came forward with submissions. In general, the companies in this category purchased smaller quantities of the product under investigation. However, these users did not submit questionnaire replies to permit a substantiation of the points they raised. In contrast, the information submitted by the fully cooperating companies, showed that these fully cooperating companies, were likely to be more affected by measures, because fatty acid represented a larger proportion of their total costs, and sales of the respective downstream products had limited profitability. Furthermore, the impact of measures on all users would be mitigated by the fact that users did not exclusively sell products which contained fatty acids. Also, most fatty acid purchased was sourced from either the Union industry or third country suppliers. This means that price increases for these purchases would be expected to be lower than those sourced from Indonesian exporting producers. Furthermore, the finished goods made using fatty acid were often exported outside the Union, meaning that processing arrangements under customs control could be available to reduce the impact of measures.

(457) Ecogreen claimed that the weighted average duties applicable to Ecogreen would harm its two related companies in the Union. Ecogreen also maintained that all of its sales to the Union were intended for captive use and therefore these exports could not cause injury to the Union industry.

(458) The Commission noted that as Ecogreen affiliate, DHW and E&S, did not fill in a user’s questionnaire, Ecogreen’s claims concerning injury could not be verified. According to Ecogreen’s submission, one of its subsidiaries in the Union buys certain types of fatty acid from the Union industry. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that there is competition between Ecogreen’s products and the Union industry’s products at least on certain segments of the market as mentioned at recital (108). Therefore, the claim concerning Ecogreen affiliates and captive use cannot be accepted.

(459) Therefore, from the information on file, the Commission concluded that the measures proposed would not impact users disproportionately.

(460) The Greven group, Henkel, Unilever, Kapachim, Evonik, Ecogreen, Quaker Houghton, Omya, NYCO, Stéarinerie Dubois, the Musim Mas group and Wilmar made claims relating to disruption of the Union market and supply issues resulting from the imposition of measures. In particular, these interested parties considered that the proposed level of measures was too high and would disproportionately affect the Union downstream industries’ interest. Also, these companies claimed that imports from Indonesia would cease, or be restricted, to such an extent that there would be a general shortage on the Union market, which would also cause price rises. Other users made more specific claims relating to certain types of fatty acid which they claimed these could not be adequately supplied from the Union industry. AAK, Unilever, and the Greven group supplied email correspondence with Union producers to support their claim concerning supply issues on the market which would be aggravated by the measures.

(461) Unilever, Henkel and Ecogreen claimed that imports to the Union of short chain fatty acids such as C8-C10 would be affected by the measures. NYCO claimed that C8-C10 acids were more and more difficult to find on the Union market because producers increased their captive use. As a result of this shortage, prices increased sharply since September 2021. Moreover, NYCO claimed that the shortage of short chain fatty acids such as C8-C10 would have an impact on industries which NYCO supplies with specialty lubricants, such as the aeronautic and defence industries.

(462) Kapachim, Evonik, NYCO also submitted that they would be put at a disadvantage with manufacturers of the same products located outside the Union. Other companies claimed that they might have to relocate outside the Union.

(463) Stéarinerie Dubois claimed that the limited substitutability of many product types imported from Indonesia would heavily affect their profitability as their production costs would increase. Stéarinerie Dubois also argued that Union producers listed in the complaint did not necessarily produce the same fatty acid in sufficient quantities of the type it required. They also pointed out that for two fatty acid types that their company was using in its production, no Union producer could match the company’s specifications in colour, which was an important factor for their customers in the pharmaceutical industry. Stéarinerie Dubois stated that, as there was no Union market for fatty acids compliant with the REACH legislation and being Kosher and Halal, there was no injury caused to the Union industry by imports of these products.

(464) CUTFA pointed out that the Union industry, together with imports from both Indonesia and third countries, would ensure adequate supply of the Union market in the event of measures. This view was supplemented by a bar chart showing the main sources of supply. CUTFA also pointed out that imports from Indonesia would not cease but would continue on a level playing field basis.

(465) The Commission acknowledged that fatty acid supply to the various Union user industry sectors is essential because fatty acids cannot be adequately replaced with other products. Therefore, the Commission reviewed the issue of market disruption and supply issues in light of the comments received.

(466) Firstly, as pointed out in recital (220) the spare capacity figures quoted at recital (407) were calculated based on a sustainable, rather than a theoretical, capacity of the Union industry taking into account normal downtime, such as maintenance, and taking into account production of other products. This means that around 250 000 of spare capacity existed in the Union in the IP. The verification of the Union industry questionnaire replies ensured a consistent and accurate approach to the capacity figures. Capacities were reduced, where appropriate, and verified figures were disclosed to the companies involved.

(467) Secondly, it was clear that investments in the Union industry had been restricted over the period considered. Investments of the sampled companies continued, but were limited to maintaining existing plant and equipment, rather than increasing capacity and removing production bottlenecks. The imposition of measures would relieve the price pressure on the industry, and enable them to set prices at a level whereby profitability would be at reasonable levels. Production and sales could be increased to supply the market due to better market conditions. The industry would also be able to raise capital to increase capacity.

(468) Supply issues during the period considered, as evidenced by email correspondence, are to be expected if an industry has suffered material injury affecting its sales prices leading to low profitability and an inability to raise capital for investment. However, the imposition of measures will create better market conditions for the Union industry and it will be able to increase production and improve the quantity and range of the fatty acid it supplies to the market.

(469) Thirdly, it is not expected that the measures imposed by this Regulation will prohibit imports from Indonesia. It is recalled that the purpose of the anti-dumping measures is not to stop the imports but to restore the level playing field on the market. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim that there would be a general shortage on the Union market, which would cause disproportionate price rises.

(470) The Commission observed that the claim regarding a sharp price increase for C8-C10 concerned the global market, rather than only the Union market. Therefore, the effects of anti-dumping measures on the global competitiveness of Union users of C8-C10 would not be different from the effects on users of other types of fatty acid. Moreover, the Commission recalled that market developments after the end of the investigation period are normally not taken into account in its assessment. Regarding NYCO’s point relating to the aeronautic and defence industries, these claims of disruption were not substantiated and therefore they were rejected.

(471) Furthermore, the Commission noted that Indonesian and Union industry products were highly substitutable. Just because certain Union producers were unable to supply certain product types, at certain times under the market conditions applicable in the period considered, did not mean that supply problems will persist following the imposition of measures. Furthermore, the Commission considered that the impact of the measures on the costs and profitability of this user was not substantiated because, in the absence of a questionnaire response, the Commission could not assess how important fatty acid costs were for the company as a percentage of total costs or turnover. Therefore, the claims were rejected.

(472) The likely impacts vis-à-vis competitors outside the Union and risk of relocation was not substantiated. In addition, factors which could mitigate the impact of duties on users are discussed in recital (455).

(473) Wilmar suggested the cost on the Union market of fatty acid as a raw material would increase by around 32,9 % (59).

(474) However, such estimates exaggerate of the likely cost increases for users. This is because Indonesian imports represented around 20 % of consumption and much lower increases in costs are likely to occur for those users which are supplied by the Union industry or imports from other sources. Furthermore, imports from third countries such as Malaysia will inevitably increase over the life of measures due to better market conditions and less Indonesian price pressure.

(475) Wilmar also pointed out that reduced vegetable oil imports, especially from Ukraine, would limit the Union industry’s ability to source raw materials.

(476) The Commission noted that these allegations were post-investigation period developments. It has not been substantiated what impact these developments could have on the Union market, or whether such developments were of a lasting nature as Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation states that information relating to a period subsequent to the investigation period shall, normally, not be taken into account. Therefore, the claims were rejected.

(477) The Commission, therefore, could not accept the arguments that there will be a general lack of supply of fatty acid to users in the Union. In respect of supply problems involving specific products, any market disruption is likely to be temporary whilst producers and their customers adjust to the new market situation.

(478) Bearing in mind the comments made by interested parties and based on the information on file, it is clear that for the largest consuming sectors of fatty acid (home care, beauty, laundry and personal care) there would not be a large impact following the imposition of measures, because such sectors would be able to absorb any cost increases that could not be passed on to customers.

(479) For the remaining sectors there is some evidence that costs increases may occur and will have an impact on the profitability. However, only two groups decided to fully cooperate with the investigation in order to substantiate their claims.

(480) For all users several issues will mitigate the impact of any cost increases, such as processing under customs control for imports of fatty acid, which will be used to manufacture exported products. Not all products manufactured by the users use fatty acid. In addition, around 80 % of fatty acid consumed on the Union market is not sourced from Indonesia, and will therefore not be subject to the direct impact of measures.

(481) Anti-dumping measures are designed to increase Union import prices (duty paid) for the country concerned. Import prices from third countries and Union industry prices are likely to increase too. However, in order that the Union industry can survive, it needs to operate on a fairer basis with Indonesian exporting producers on the Union market. The Union market needs time to adjust to the new conditions and in that period there may be some negative impact on particular market players and user sectors. As mentioned above increased investment was expected by the Union producers to increase capacity. Some of this investment would enable Union industry companies to supply a wider range of fatty acids, or to increase production of specific products. Just because a Union producer was unable to supply the market with specific products under the current conditions of unfair competition does not mean that the Union producers do not have the capability to adapt to the new market conditions created by the measures.

(482) The Commission maintains that such cost increases are required to enable the Union industry to compete fairly and at price levels which do not jeopardise their viability. It is clear that profitability as shown in Table 10 is not sustainable, and it is in the interest of all users, that production of a wide range of fatty acids in the Union continues. The expected cost increases for users are not considered disproportionate.

(483) Therefore, taking into account the views of all interested parties that came forward, the Commission concluded that users would not be disproportionally affected by the imposition of the measures.

(484) Suppliers of raw materials in the Union consist mainly of tallow and vegetable oil producers. Although these raw material suppliers did not cooperate in this investigation, it is clear that the imposition of measures would also benefit suppliers in the long-term because the Union industry consumes significant quantities of tallow and vegetable oils produced in the Union.

(485) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons demonstrating that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of fatty acid originating in Indonesia.

(486) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, definitive measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

(487) As per the assessment above, definitive anti-dumping duties are set at the level of the dumping margin for Wilmar.

(488) Regarding Musim Mas, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury. Having found distortions on raw materials with regard to the product concerned in the sense of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, namely in the form of export taxes and levies for CPO and CPKO, the Commission concluded that it would be in the Union interest, as provided for in Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation, to set the amount of the duty at the level of the dumping margin, as a duty lower than the margin of dumping would not be sufficient to address the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(489) The definitive duty for the other cooperating non-sampled companies in Indonesia is based on the weighted average dumping margin as established above for the two sampled companies.

(490) Given the high level of cooperation (exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted the totality of the total imports during the IP), the level of the countrywide duty level was based on the highest dumping margin of the two sampled cooperating exporters.

(492) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(493) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(494) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(495) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(496) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(497) Several interested parties argued that the measures were too high or not set at an appropriate level and that the Commission should reduce them

(498) However, these measures have been set according to the methodology outlined in this Regulation and in accordance with the basic Regulation. The calculations involved in the setting of the dumping and injury margins have been disclosed to the appropriate interested parties. Therefore, these claims must be rejected because the arbitrary setting of duties is not foreseen by the basic Regulation.

(499) In their comments following final disclosure, Ecogreen requested a duty-free quota as a constructive remedy to be explored by the Commission, stating various legal bases for this claim.

(500) Firstly, elaborating on Article 8 of the basic Regulation, Ecogreen offered to enter into discussions for a price undertaking with a quota element. In this respect, it recalled that quotas were part of the undertakings accepted in the Solar Panels case (60) and claimed that, according to the WTO Panel in EC – Bed Linen (61), the Commission had an obligation to consider constructive remedies in proceedings involving developing countries Members.

(501) The Commission noted that, as mentioned in Article 8(1) of the basic Regulation, it is up to Ecogreen to submit a price undertaking offer which may be accepted by the Commission. Such an offer should be made within the statutory deadline mentioned in Article 8.2 of the basic Regulation. Ecogreen’s offer should have reached the Commission no later than 5 days prior to the deadline for comments on final disclosure. The request suggesting a price undertaking was only made on 12 September 2022, much later than the legal deadline mentioned above, and no concrete proposal was formulated. Therefore, no offer for a price undertaking that could be taken into account according to the basic Regulation was provided and no analogy with the Solar Panels and the EC – Bed Linen cases could thus rightfully be invoked. Hence, this claim was rejected.

(502) Secondly, Ecogreen requested a duty-free quota by analogy to the imposition of quotas to preserve trade flows deemed to be unharmful in the context of safeguards measures, another trade defence instrument.

(503) In this respect, the Commission limited itself to observe that this investigation was regulated by the basic Regulation, which did not foresee duty free quotas. Thus, this claim was rejected.

(504) Thirdly, Ecogreen claimed a tariff quota as a constructive remedy under Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2283 (62), as last amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/972 (63), which it allegedly allowed the Commission to open and grant tariff quotas for agricultural and industrial goods.

(505) The Commission noted that Regulation (EU) 2021/2283, as last amended by Regulation (EU) 2022/972, applied to agricultural and industrial products listed in the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2021/2283, where the product under investigation is not mentioned under any of its TARIC codes. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(506) Finally, Ecogreen pointed out that the Union Customs Code provided for the possibility of processing a certain quantity of imports under customs control (inward processing). Ecogreen requested the Commission to explore ways on how to implement such an arrangement.

(507) The Commission highlighted that such provisions are not within its competences and within the scope of the present investigation, which is governed by the basic Regulation. Thus, this claim was rejected.

(508) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 (64), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(509) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure.

(510) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

— single fatty acid (also referred to as ‘pure cut’), and

— blends containing a combination of two or more carbon chain lengths,

excluding fatty acid certified by a voluntary scheme (65) for the production of sustainable biofuels, bioliquids and biomass fuels recognized by the European Commission pursuant to Article 30(4) or a national certification scheme established pursuant to Article 30(6) of Directive (EU) 2018/2001, currently falling within CN codes ex 2915 70 40, ex 2915 70 50, ex 2915 90 30, ex 2915 90 70, ex 2916 15 00, ex 3823 11 00, ex 3823 12 00, ex 3823 19 10 and ex 3823 19 90 (TARIC codes: 2915704095, 2915705010, 2915903095, 2915907095, 2916150010, 3823110020, 3823110070, 3823120020, 3823120070, 3823191030, 3823191070, 3823199070 and 3823199095) and originating in Indonesia.

Article 2

Where a new exporting producer from Indonesia provides sufficient evidence to the Commission, the Annex may be amended by adding that new exporting producer to the list of cooperating companies not included in the sample and thus subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate, namely 26,6 %. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

(a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in Indonesia during the period of investigation (1 October 2020 to 30 September 2021);

(b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation; and

(c) it has either actually exported the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in Indonesia or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 18 January 2023.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of fatty acid originating in Indonesia (OJ C 482, 30.11.2021, p. 5).

(3) Notice of initiation of an anti-subsidy proceeding concerning imports of fatty acid originating in Indonesia (OJ C 195, 13.5.2022, p. 11).

(4) The wording ‘sampled exporting producers’ should read ‘non-sampled exporting producers requesting individual examination’, as explained in recital (44).

(5) https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/case_details.cfm?id=2564

(6) Panel Report, Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes, WT/DS331/R, adopted 24 July 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1207, para. 7.347. In line with WTO case-law, also EU Courts adopted the same stance in respect with the parallel provision enshrined in Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation, notably in the judgment of 10 March 2009, Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP v Council, T-249/06, EU:T:2009:62, para. 139.

(7) Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), WT/DS397/AB/R, adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995, para. 425.

(8) Idem, paras. 430 and 454.

(9) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1146 of 4 July 2019 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of hot-rolled steel sheet piles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 181, 5.7.2019, p. 89) and Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/266 of 14 February 2019 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of solar glass originating in Malaysia (OJ L 44, 15.2.2019, p. 31).

(10) Commission Decision 2007/430/EC of 19 June 2007 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of synthetic staple fibres of polyesters (PSF) originating in Malaysia and Taiwan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the provisional duties imposed (OJ L 160, 21.6.2007, p. 30) (‘ PSF Decision’).

(11) Judgment of 11 July 2013, Philips Lighting Poland and Philips Lighting v Council, T-469/07, EU:T:2013:370, para. 87. In this case, the application was not withdrawn. Rather, some Union producers that supported the application when they were contacted before initiation (‘standing exercise’) later on decided to change position and to express opposition to measures in the course of the investigation itself. As a result, the level of opposition to the case became higher than the level of support in terms of Union production. The Commission eventually decided that it was entitled to continue the investigation and impose measures in such circumstances by analogy with the withdrawal of the complaint pursuant to Article 9(1) of the basic Regulation.

(12) The list of voluntary schemes and national certification schemes recognized by the Commission is available at: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/bioenergy/voluntary-schemes_en

(13) Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast) (OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82), available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ ?uri=CELEX%3A02018L2001-20220607&qid=1657211934884

(14) REACH Legislation. The consolidated version of the Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) incorporates all of the amendments and corrigenda to REACH until the date marked in the first page of the regulation.

(15) A process that allows through a catalyst to use directly fatty acids (instead of using oils) and methanol to manufacture biodiesel.

(16) See Directive (EU) 2018/2001.

(17) See Directive (EU) 2018/2001.

(18) See Directive (EU) 2018/2001.

(19) See Directive (EU) 2018/2001.

(20) See Directive (EU) 2018/2001.

(21) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1881/2006 of 19 December 2006 setting maximum levels for certain contaminants in foodstuffs (OJ L 364, 20.12.2006, p. 5).

(22) The Taric code for oleic acid does not differentiate by grade, while there are imports of oleic acid in the Union from Indonesia.

(23) Decision 2007/430/EC, recital 40.

(24) https://www.ioioleo.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IOI_BASIC_OLEO.pdf

(25) Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 laying down health rules as regards animal by –products and derived products not intended for human consumption and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 (Animal by-products Regulation) (OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 1).

(26) Complaint, par. 41.

(27) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1336, of 25 September 2020 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain polyvinyl alcohols originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 315, 29.9.2020, p. 1), recital (352).

(28) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1688 of 8 October 2019 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America (OJ L 258, 9.10.2019, p. 21).

(29) Judgment of 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Limited and others v Council of the European Communities, joined cases C-273/85 and C-107/86, EU:C:1988:466, para 16.

(30) Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5 – China), WT/DS397/AB/RW and Add.1, adopted 12 February 2016, DSR 2016:I, p. 7, paras. 5.260-5.282.

(31) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1194/2013 of 19 November 2013 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of biodiesel originating in Argentina and Indonesia (OJ L 315, 26.11.2013, p. 2).

(32) Judgment of 15 September 2016, Musim Mas v Council, T-80/14, EU:T:2016:504, para. 94.

(33) Judgment of 15 September 2016, Pelita Agung Agrindustri v Council, T-121/14, EU:T:2016:500, para. 74.

(34) Judgment of 15 September 2016, Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia and Wilmar Nabati Indonesia v Council, T-139/14, EU:T:2016:499, para. 101.

(35) Panel Report, EU – Biodiesel (Indonesia), WT/DS480/R and Add.1, adopted 28 February 2018, DSR 2018:II, p. 605, paras. 8.1(a) to (d).

(36) https://www.lmc.co.uk/oleochemicals/

(37) IHS Markit chemical economics handbook, published June 2021: ‘Mainland China, Western Europe, and North America are the major consuming markets. The historical growth in the consumption of fatty acids has approximated GDP growth in the regions of their consumption’ (https://ihsmarkit.com/products/natural-fatty-acids-chemical-economics-handbook.html).

(38) Industry ARC Fatty Acid Market Forecast (2021-2026): ‘Furthermore, because of the covid-19 epidemic, the production, consumption, imports, and exports of Fatty Acid were also hindered. These multiple consequences of the covid-19 pandemic stretched the troubles for the Fatty Acid market in 2020. However, the demand for Fatty Acid is set to improve by the year-end of 2021, owing to the boosting personal and home care sectors.’ (http://www.industryarc.com/Report/15848/fatty-acid-market.html).

(39) OFI Magazine, Strong demand forecast for oleochemicals, 9 July 2021, https://www.ofimagazine.com/news/strong-demand-forecast-for-oleochemicals

(40) Gross operating surplus (GOS), or profits, is defined as value added minus personnel costs. It is the surplus generated by operating activities after the labour factor input has been compensated for. GOS in chemicals accounts for 11 % of turnover, https://www.francechimie.fr/media/52b/the-european-chemical-industry-facts-and-figures-2020.pdf

(41) CSIMarket, Chemical Manufacturing Industry Profitability, https://csimarket.com/Industry/industry_Profitability_Ratios.php?ind=101&hist=4

(42) The sampled Union producers represent around 60 % of Union production and sales.

(43) The Commission also notes that the low price of raw materials is due to economic distortions in Indonesia’s market. See recitals (392) to (400).

(44) https://www.ssas.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/166-PMK.010-2020.pdf (only Indonesian, last accessed on 10 July 2022).

(45) https://jdih.kemenkeu.go.id/FullText/2020/57~PMK.05~2020Per.pdf (only Indonesian, last accessed on 10 July 2022).

(46) https://jdih.kemenkeu.go.id/download/30a94928-f217-48ee-934e-c2be549f350f/76~PMK.05~2021Per.pdf (only Indonesian, last accessed on 10 July 2022).

(47) https://kpbn.co.id/home.html?lang=1

(48) https://www.gtis.com/gta/

(49) Malaysian Palm Oil Board https://bepi.mpob.gov.my/admin2/price_local_daily_view_cpo_msia.php?more=Y&jenis=1Y&tahun=2020 and https://bepi.mpob.gov.my/index.php/en/?option=com_content&view=article&id=1033&Itemid=136

(50) CRUDE PALM OIL – CIF ROTTERDAM Spot Historische Prijzen - Investing.com https://nl.investing.com/commodities/crude-palm-oil-cif-rotterdam-futures-historical-data

(51) https://gapki.id/en/news/19196/october-1-2020-commodity-price-position-at-the-closing-of-physical-exchange-market

(52) The letter is available in the open file under No t22.004777.

(53) See the 2021 annual report of P&G, the 2021 annual report of Henkel and the 2021 annual report of Unilever: https://assets.ctfassets.net/oggad6svuzkv/4Jv0tM2D5D4uo9fpGkFINt/51f922cfc331f8cd887e86f5dca2a59f/2021_annual_report.pdf

https://www.henkel.com/resource/blob/1616958/8a9ca447fca79ec3ad39d8e5192a1fb6/data/2021-annual-report.pdf

https://www.unilever.com/files/92ui5egz/production/e582e46a7f7170fd10be32cf65113b738f19f0c2.pdf

(54) See page 39 of the 2021 annual report of P&G:

https://assets.ctfassets.net/oggad6svuzkv/4Jv0tM2D5D4uo9fpGkFINt/51f922cfc331f8cd887e86f5dca2a59f/2021_annual_report.pdf

(55) See page 19 of the 2021 annual report of P&G.

(56) See page 92 of the 2021 annual report of Henkel:

https://www.henkel.com/resource/blob/1616958/8a9ca447fca79ec3ad39d8e5192a1fb6/data/2021-annual-report.pdf

(57) See page 122 of the 2021 annual report of Unilever:

https://www.unilever.com/files/92ui5egz/production/e582e46a7f7170fd10be32cf65113b738f19f0c2.pdf

(58) See page 122 of the 2021 annual report of Unilever.

(59) 32,9 % was the anti-dumping duty rate applicable to all other cooperating companies in the final disclosure document.

(60) Commission Decision 2013/423/EU of 2 August 2013 accepting an undertaking offered in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells and wafers) originating in or consigned from the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 209, 3.8.2013, p. 26).

(61) Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen, WT/DS141/R, adopted 12 March 2001, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS141/AB/R, DSR 2001:VI, p. 2077, para. 6.233.

(62) Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2283 of 20 December 2021 opening and providing for the management of autonomous tariff quotas of the Union for certain agricultural and industrial products, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1388/2013 (OJ L 458, 22.12.2021, p. 33).

(63) Council Regulation (EU) 2022/972 of 17 June 2022 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2283 opening and providing for the management of autonomous tariff quotas of the Union for certain agricultural and industrial products (OJ L 167, 24.6.2022, p. 10).

(64) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

(65) The list of voluntary schemes recognized by the Commission is available at: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/bioenergy/voluntary-schemes_en

(66) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558).