Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2120 of 12 October 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electrolytic manganese dioxides originating in the People’s Republic of China

(182) Varta in its submission claimed the type of electricity generation in the respective country, the cost of electricity distribution should be considered to obtain reasonable conclusions.

(183) The Commission notes that the distribution costs are included in the electricity price and will be therefore taken into account. Its claim is therefore dismissed.

(184) In the Second Note, the Commission indicated that it would use the water tariff for industrial use as published by the ‘Acueducto de Bogota’, responsible for water supply, sewage collection and treatment in the capital since no publicly available data were available for the city of Cali. As for electricity, water provision is exempt from VAT according to Article 476(4) of the Colombia tax statute.

(185) According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

(186) The manufacturing overheads incurred by the cooperating exporting producers were expressed as a share of the costs of manufacturing actually incurred by the exporting producers. This percentage was applied to the undistorted costs of manufacturing.

(187) For establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG&A, profit, the Commission relied on the financial data for 2022 for Quimpac as extracted from the official publicly available database of the Colombian government, Sistema Integrado de Informacion Societaria (‘SIIS’) (85).

(188) On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(189) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. The Commission applied the undistorted unit costs to the actual consumption of the individual factors of production of the cooperating exporting producers. These consumption rates provided by the sampled exporting producers were verified during the verification visits. The Commission multiplied the usage factors by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country.

(190) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost were established, the Commission applied the manufacturing overheads, as noted in recital (186).

(191) To the costs of production established as described in the previous recital, the Commission applied SG&A of 20,33 % and profit of 24,72 % of Quimpac de Colombia S.A. as explained in recital (187), both expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’).

(192) On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(193) None of the sampled exporting producers sold via related importers in the Union.

(194) Consequently, for all sampled exporting producers, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

(195) The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers on an ex-works basis.

(196) Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for transport, insurance, handling, loading costs, customs duty, credit costs and bank charges.

(197) For the sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

(199) For the cooperating exporting producers outside the sample, the Commission calculated the weighted average dumping margin, in accordance with Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, that margin was established on the basis of the margins of the sampled exporting producers.

(200) On this basis, the provisional dumping margin of the cooperating exporting producers outside the sample is 44,5 %.

(201) For all other exporting producers in the country concerned, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total imports from the country concerned to the Union in the investigation period, that were established on the basis of Eurostat statistics.

(202) The level of cooperation in this case is low because the imports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted around 65 % of the total exports to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the Commission considered it appropriate to establish the dumping margin for all other companies at the level of the ten transactions with the highest margin of the sampled exporting producers in view of the fact that those represented around 14 % of the total volume exported to the Union by the company in question, which was considered sufficiently representative. Therefore, the country-wide dumping margin applicable to all other non-cooperating exporting producers was set at the level of 101,7 %

(204) According to the information available to the Commission, the like product was manufactured by two producers in the Union during the investigation period. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

(205) Given the limited number of the parties operating on the Union market, the Commission could not disclose the data regarding the two Union producers and the market shares as it is market sensitive and confidential under Article 19 of the basic Regulation. The disclosure of this information could allow parties to calculate back company-specific confidential data. The Commission therefore provided this information in ranges and indexes, which gave sufficient meaningful information to all interested parties to understand the Commission’s analysis and conclusions and provide comments in this regard. The data was also provided in the form of meaningful trends so that all interested parties could defend their interests. The Commission could not disclose the method for creating the ranges as this would allow the parties to retrieve the exact numbers from the ranges.

(206) The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around [25,0–27,0] million kilograms. The Commission established the figure on the basis of the verified questionnaire replies of the two Union producers. As indicated in recital (204), the two Union producers represented 100 % of the total Union production of the like product.

(207) The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of the Union industry’s sales volume on the Union market sourced from the verified questionnaire replies of the two Union producers and the imports into the Union of the product concerned from third countries based on Eurostat statistics.

(209) On this basis, the Union consumption fluctuated by decreasing in 2020 (– 4 % compared to 2019), then increasing in 2021 (+ 2 % compared to 2019) and finally decreasing again in the investigation period (– 6 % compared to 2019). The increase in 2021 was mainly due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the intensified consumption of the dry-cell batteries.

(211) The estimated import volumes were cross-checked, where possible, with sales reported by cooperating exporting producers, purchases reported by cooperating users, Union producers, other export statistics provided by the applicant and were in line.

(212) The market share of imports was established on the basis of the import volume and total Union consumption.

(214) Import volumes of EMD from China decreased by 18 % from 2019 to 2020 due to COVID-19 restrictive measures, however they started to increase significantly in 2021 (+ 55 % compared to 2019) and the investigation period (+ 89 % compared to 2019). In absolute value, imports of EMD from China were substantial in the investigation period (12,6 million kg). Chinese imports expanded their market share overall during the period considered by [15–19] percentage points, passing from [12–19] % in 2019 to [30–40] % during the investigation period.

(215) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat dividing the total values of Chinese imports by the total volume of those imports. Price undercutting of the imports was established on the basis of verified questionnaire replies of the sampled exporting producers in China.

(217) Over the period considered, Chinese average import prices rose by 47 %, mainly due to the increase in freight cost.

(219) The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the two Union producers’ theoretical turnover during the investigation period. Two of the sampled exporting producers were found not to undercut, with their average prices on the Union market above the Union industry’s prices, while for the third exporting producer undercutting was found, although below de minimis.

(220) However, despite no undercutting found on a transaction-by-transaction basis for two out of the three sampled exporting producers, the average price of total Chinese imports into the Union market was around [5 %–9 %] lower than the Union industry’s average price, throughout the period considered. This difference was around [8 %–12 %] in 2019, then [2 %–6 %] in 2021 and then more prominent in the second part of this period (2021 and the investigation period), at around [5 %–7 %], which coincided with the massive increase in the Chinese import volumes (above 50 % increase) and their gaining of the Union market shares ([15–19] percentage points in the investigation period).

(221) Furthermore, the Commission established the existence of price suppression. The average import price of total Chinese imports was also lower than the Union industry’s cost of production throughout the whole period considered. The price pressure on the cost of the Union industry was also most prominent in the second part of the period considered, where prices of Chinese imports were around [10 %–15 %] lower than the average COP of the Union industry. As shown in Table 8, the Union industry was selling below the cost of production in the second part of the period considered. Due to the significant price pressure caused by the low-priced dumped imports, the Union industry was prevented from increasing its sales prices to achieve a sustainable profit level and positive financial situation, thus, resulting in very low profits in 2021 and the investigation period, together with severely decreasing cash flow in 2021, which switched to negative in the investigation period. This is reflected in the underselling established for two of the sampled exporting producers as well as for all the other non-sampled companies as described in recitals (296) and (297) below.

(222) In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(223) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the verified questionnaire replies of the two Union producers. The set of data was found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(224) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(225) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(227) The Union industry’s production started to increase in 2020 and jumped in 2021. However, it dropped in the investigation period by around [3–6] million kg in one year due to the loss in sales (which started in 2021). Overall, the production decreased by - 13 % over the period considered.

(228) Production capacity of the Union industry was stable over the period considered, thus production capacity utilisation decreased to [75–80] % in the investigation period, in line with a decrease in production.

(230) The sales volume of the Union industry remained stable from 2019 to 2020. However, they started to decrease in 2021 (– 9 % from 2020 to 2021), despite the peak in consumption in that year. The fall continued in the investigation period. Overall, the sales decreased by – 27 % over the period considered.

(231) Decrease in sales was reflected in the loss of market shares, a decrease from [75–82] % in 2019 to [55–65] % in the investigation period. Overall, a loss of [15–19] percentage points of market share to the favour of the Chinese imports over the period considered.

(232) Despite the increase in consumption in 2021, the Union industry not only lost sales volumes in the Union, but also the market share.

(234) Employment increased by + 8 % over the period considered. The increase was due to the temporary hiring following the absenteeism, new hires for support for maintenance, R & D functions and environmental operations.

(235) Productivity developed in line with the changes in production and employment, i.e. it decreased by – 20 % over the period considered.

(236) All dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the country concerned.

(237) This is the first anti-dumping investigation regarding the product concerned. Therefore, no data were available to assess the effects of possible past dumping.

(239) The average price of the Union producers decreased in 2020 (to [1,50–1,70] EUR/kg) and stayed at [1,50–1,70] EUR/kg in 2021. It then increased to [2,40–2,60] EUR/kg in the investigation period, following the increase in the cost of production. Overall, the average price increased by + 42 % over the period considered.

(240) Average cost of production started to increase in 2021 (by + 9 % compared to 2019) and peaked in the investigation period, due to the sharp increase in energy (89) and certain raw material pricing (90). Overall, the average cost of production increased by + 64 % over the period considered.

(241) The increase in the average price was less pronounced than the increase in the cost of production over the period considered. The inability of the Union producers to increase their prices in line with increasing cost is the result of the price suppression by the Chinese exporters, which peeked in the last two years of this period. As mentioned in recital (220), and unlike in 2019–2020, where the price pressure exercised by dumped imports was less acute, as of 2021, the Union industry was not able to increase prices in step with increasing cost of production because of the price pressure exerted by the increasing volumes of dumped Chinese imports on the Union market. Consequently, due the existence of price suppression, the Union industry was selling below the cost of production since 2021. Due to the significant price pressure caused by the low-priced dumped imports, the Union industry was prevented from increasing its sales prices to achieve its target profit, resulting in decreasing profitability. This situation severely impacted the Union industry’s financial performance, as analysed later, in Part 4.4.3.4

(243) Average labour cost per employee increased by + 7 % over the period considered.

(245) The level of inventory decreased to [6,5–7,0] million kg in 2020 and to [6,0–6,5] million kg in 2021 following the increasing consumption on the Union market, however they jumped to [8,5–9,0] million kg in the investigation period, following the loss of sales and represented around [30–35] % of the production volume in that period.

(247) The Commission established the profitability of the two Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. The imbalance of the increasing cost and supressed prices translated into the erosion in profitability over the period considered, passing from [7–8] % in 2019 to [1–2] % in 2021 and [2–3] % in the investigation period, i.e. below the target profit of [7–10] %.

(248) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow developed as follows: it picked up from negative to around [5,0–5,5] million positive cash flow in 2020, however it then fell to around [1,5–2,0] million in 2021, turning to a negative again in the investigation period, mainly due to the deteriorated profit.

(249) Due to the poor net cash flow situation, over the same period, the Union industry nearly halved the level of its investments resulting in a drop of 45 %.

(250) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. The Union industry’s return on investments passed from [6–7] % in 2019 to [3–4] % in the investigation period.

(251) The ability of the Union industry to raise capital had been severely affected by the erosion of the profitability as well as of the cash flow incurred over the period considered.

(252) Imports from China increased considerably, both in absolute terms and in terms of market share. Indeed, over the period concerned the imports increased by 89 % in absolute terms and doubled in relation to the Union’s consumption, reaching a market share of [30–40] % in the investigation period.

(253) Moreover, in the investigation period, the sales prices of the Community industry were supressed by those of the dumped imports of the product concerned. Due to the significant price pressure caused by the low-priced dumped imports, the Union industry was prevented from increasing its sales prices to achieve its target profit, resulting in decreasing profitability during the second half of the period considered.

(254) More specifically, while over the period considered the Union consumption peaked in 2021, the Union industry was not able to benefit from the increasing demand: the sales volume of the Union industry decreased by 8 % and the market share decreased by 11 % over that year from 2019. Even more dramatic deterioration of these indicators happened in the investigation period (27 % decrease in the sales volume and 22 % decrease in market shares). Such development was a result of the massive increase in Chinese imports at even more suppressed prices than during the first half of the period considered (please see recital (241)). In addition, the Union industry was even less capable to maintain its sales volumes at even more suppressed prices since, at the time, it experienced a significant increase in its cost of production (which increased by 9 % in 2021 and by 64 % in the investigation period from 2019).

(255) As a result, already decreased sales volumes at the suppressed prices resulted in an erosion of the profitability, return on investments and cash flow. Thus, deteriorated financial performance indicators, together with decreased production, increased closing stocks (to around [30–40] % of the Union’s production) and lagging investments to maintain this production, made the Union industry inviable.

(256) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

(257) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: imports from other third countries, export performance of the Union producers and other factors, like productivity, COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine.

(258) As established in recital (214), the imports increased significantly during the second half of the period considered, by 89 % in terms of volume and doubled in their market share. The unit selling price of the imports from China was below the unit selling price of the Union industry by around [5 %–9 %] over the period considered.

(259) The effects of dumped imports are clearly illustrated by the decision of several major users representing [67 %–73 %] of total Union consumption, to switch their purchases from the Union industry to the Chinese product. The share of EMD sourced from the Union producers decreased from around [65–75] % to around [55–65] %, for the benefit of EMD sourced from China from 2021 to the investigation period.

(260) As a consequence of the significant increase of the dumped imports from China and the price suppression exerted by the Chinese imports during the second half of the period considered, the Union industry was unable to increase their sales prices enough to fully cover the strongly increased production costs. Therefore, the low-priced imports from China thus caused price suppression.

(261) As a result, the Union industry’s financial performance indicators deteriorated. The gain in market share of the Chinese imports was at the expense of the Union industry, which lost sales volume and market share in the second half of the period considered.

(262) It is therefore provisionally concluded that the pressure exerted by the dumped imports, which dramatically increased their volume and market share during the second half of the period considered, which were made at dumped prices and which were constantly below the Union industry’s cost of production, played a determining role in the fall of the Union industry’s sales, increased stocks and, consequently, in deterioration of its profitability, cash flow and return on investment.

(263) In view of the above considerations, the Commission provisionally established that the material injury suffered by the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports from China within the meaning of Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation. Such injury had both volume and price effects.

(265) During the investigation period, import volumes of EMD from the other third countries (Colombia, USA, Japan and India) remained at the same level as at the beginning of the period considered, at [1,5–2,5] million kg, representing [4–8] % of the Union market share.

(266) It is worth noting that, out of the four countries above, Colombia was the only other major importing country (91). Colombia has decreased its import volumes and market share by [0,3–0,9] percentage points in the investigation period. Therefore, even if it imported at a lower price level than the Chinese and Union industry’s price levels, their decreasing import volumes and low market share had diminishing effect on the prices of the remaining players on the Union market. Thus, the loss of market share of the Union industry clearly benefited only the Chinese exporting producers.

(268) The Union industry tried to absorb some of the lost sales volumes on the Union market by means of increased exports. In 2021 export sales jumped to [4,0–4,5] million kg (representing [10–15] % of the Union production), then decreased to [1,0–1,5] million kg in the investigation period (representing [2,5–7,5] % of the Union production). Nonetheless, export sales prices in 2021 and the investigation period were lower than prices in the Union.

(269) Interested parties claimed that the lower price of the Union industry’s exports was partially causing the alleged injury. However, only the profitability of the sales in the Union was considered as the injury indicator and not the profitability of the export sales of the Union industry. Also, export sales represented only a small part of the Union production ([2,5–7,5] % in the investigation period). Thus, the export performance of the Union producers could not have caused the material injury suffered.

(270) The deterioration of the Union producers’ productivity also coincided with the abrupt increase in Chinese imports in 2021 and the investigation period, while with the productivity levels of 2019–2020 the Union producers were able to achieve satisfactory profits.

(271) Interested parties argued that factors other than the imports of Chinese EMD had injurious effects to the Union industry, such as COVID-19 restrictions (2020 to mid-2022) affecting raw material supply chains and production levels, huge energy price increases affecting the cost of production resulting from the Union-wide energy crisis (2021 to 2022). They also claimed that the Union producers could not meet the increased demand due to the lack in capacity and/or inadequate product quality. Thus, the EMD demand had to be supplied from outside sources.

(272) Stable sales quantities of the Union industry in 2020 was showing that these named factors were not affecting the Union industry’s ability to maintain its sales and increase its market share in that year (while the product quality claims are discussed under the Union interest Part 7.3). Furthermore, sales quantities of the Union industry plummeted in the investigation period, despite the end of the COVID-19 restrictions, due to the increased import volumes at injurious prices from China. Regarding costs, the Union producers could sell at profitable prices in 2019, before the surge in imports from China took place. However, as determined in recitals (241), (247)–(251) above, due to price suppression exercised by the imports from China in the second half of the period considered, the Union industry could no longer sufficiently increase its prices in order to cater in for the increased cost of production. Capital intensive EMD industry, having high fixed costs, was not able to sustain its viability at the time when it was massively losing its sales in 2021–2022 for the benefit of Chinese imports. The claims of the parties were therefore dismissed.

(273) As concerns alleged lack in capacity, as can be seen from Table 5 above, Union industry still had [5–10] % spare capacities in 2021, and even [20–25] % in 2022, all while losing sales volumes in both of those years (see Table 6 above), while imports from China were, at the same time, gaining market share (see Table 3 above). The Commission therefore dismissed those claims as unfounded.

(274) The parties also claimed that the decrease in sales of the Union producer in Spain was caused by the acquisition of one Union user, where the new owner was not willing to use the original suppliers, but rather supply from China. However, the investigation confirmed that the user mentioned remained a client of the Union producer in Spain throughout the whole period considered. The acquisition of the user by the new owner did not break the ties to its original supplier. The claim of the parties was therefore dismissed.

(275) One user claimed that the investigation period, covering full year 2022, was a non-regular year, when the demand for alkaline dry cell batteries dramatically increased because of COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine. Thus, the EMD demand had to be supplied from external sources. The demand should be back to its normal level in 2023 and the share of supplies from the Union industry should recover.

(276) As explained in recital (209), there was an increase in demand in 2021 and a decrease in the investigation period. However, the sales of the Union industry started to drop significantly in 2021 despite the peak in demand, where the Union industry lost [2,5–3,5] million kg in volume in a year from 2020, while Chinese imports gained 4,8 million kg over the same period. The users could have maintained their share of supplies from the Union industry, as its production level increased over the same period. The users have however switched to the Chinese imports, due to the lower price, which has decreased over the same period. Chinese imports could expand their market share during the period considered by [15–19] percentage points, thus taking over this share from the Union industry. The claim of the party was therefore dismissed.

(277) The above analysis shows that there was a dramatic increase in the volume and market share of the imports originating in China during the second half of the period considered. In terms of prices, the Chinese imports continuously suppressed those of the Union industry sales prices on the Union market and prevented the Union industry to increase its prices to sustainable levels necessary to achieve reasonable profit margins.

(278) Possible other factors were also examined, but none of them could attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry. The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports.

(279) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury. The injury is clear in particular in the evolution of production, capacity utilisation, sales volume in the Union market, market share, stock levels, productivity, profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments.

(280) As mentioned in recital (5), the Commission amended the Notice of initiation of 16 February 2023 to examine the alleged raw material distortions. The Commission will conclude its analysis on raw material distortions within the meaning of Articles 7(2a) and 7(2b) of the basic Regulation at the definitive stage of the present proceedings.

(281) Thus, to determine the level of the provisional measures, at this stage the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry. This analysis and provisional conclusions are without prejudice to the assessment and findings on the existence of raw material distortions and the consequent impact on the level of measures that will be carried out for the definitive stage of the investigation.

(282) The injury would be removed if the Union Industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

(283) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the country concerned, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(284) As a first step, the Commission established a basic profit covering full costs under normal conditions of competition. The Commission took the profits achieved by the two Union producers before the increase of imports from China during the period considered, namely the actual profit earned in 2020, when the dumped imports had the lowest impact. In 2020, the Chinese imports represented the smallest of the market share ([10–20] %) during the period considered, while the other financial indicators of the Union industry were most positive in that year (the highest cash flow and the highest return on investments achieved). Such profit margin was established at [6–8] %.

(285) One of the Union producers indicated a 15 % profit achievable in the absence of dumped imports. This estimate was based on the profitability of the company achieved in 1997–2001 (before the imposition of anti-dumping duties on EDM imports from South Africa (92)) and the average profitability of the chemical industry in 2017–2022 provided by CSI Market data (93).

(286) The Commission considered that the average profitability of the chemical industry is not appropriate since CSI market data contains industry figures at an aggregated level, i.e. industry sector which was much wider than the product under investigation, while only a limited number of chemicals producers in the world were involved in the EMD production process. It also considered at this stage that the profits achieved by the EMD producer in the Union in 1997–2001 was not appropriate, since the company did not demonstrate that these profits are still representative for the industry, more than 20 years later. In any case, the profits in question did not represent an average profit of the Union industry as a whole.

(287) The other Union producer provided its profit achieved in 2016–2018, before the period considered, however, when combining the profits of the two Union producers, the levels achieved in 2016–2018 were lower than during the period considered.

(288) The Commission therefore remained with its initial estimation of a basic profit at [6–8] %.

(289) Each of the two Union producers provided evidence that its level of investments, research and development (‘R&D’) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition. The Commission verified this information, based on investment plans, refused and postponed projects, purchase orders that were eventually not carried out, demonstrating that that these investments were genuinely planned. Indeed, the claims of both Union producers were found to be warranted. To reflect this in the target profit, the Commission calculated the difference between investments, R & D and innovation (‘IRI’) expenses under normal conditions of competition as provided by the Union industry and verified by the Commission with actual IRI expenses over the period considered. Such difference, expressed as a percentage of turnover, was [1–2] %.

(290) This percentage was added to the basic profit of [6–8] % mentioned in the recital (284), leading to a target profit of [7–10] %.

(291) On this basis, the non-injurious price was found to be [2,60–2,80] EUR/kg, resulting from applying the above-mentioned profit margin of [7–10] % to the cost of production during the investigation period of the two Union producers.

(292) In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). Based on the evidence available, the Commission established an additional cost of [0,02–0,09] EUR/kg. This cost was added to the non-injurious price mentioned in recital (291).

(293) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price of [2,70–2,90] EUR/kg for the like product of the Union industry by applying the above-mentioned target profit margin (see recital (290)) to the cost of production of the two Union producers during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis.

(295) The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value. It showed a weighted average underselling margin of between 0 % and 15,8 %.

(296) The volume of non-underselling imports from the Guiliu group amounted to around [10–15] % of the imports from China, around [17–25] % of sampled imports and around [3–7] % of the Union’s market share in the investigation period. To establish whether the findings with regard to this group could be extended to all non-sampled imports, the Commission compared the prices of the Guiliu Group to prices from the other two sampled exporting producers, non-sampled cooperating exporting producers and the average price of all Chinese imports (excluding Guiliu group) from Eurostat. The Guiliu group’s average export price was [19–25] % higher than the average export price of the other Chinese exporters that submitted sampling replies. The total export volume of those companies accounted for 51 % of all imports from China into the Union. The group’s CIF export price was [11–17] % higher than the average CIF price of all imports from China and [6–10] % higher than those of the other two sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the Commission considered that it could not extend the findings of absence of underselling regarding the Guiliu group to the non-sampled exporting producers.

(299) Having decided to apply at this stage Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt provisional measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

(300) As explained in recital (5) above and as announced in the amended Notice of Initiation, the investigation also examines the Union’s interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the provisional findings contained in this Regulation including those on Union interest, are without prejudice to the conclusions of the investigation on the raw material distortions as well as on the Union interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation, which will be reflected in the definitive stage of the proceeding.

(301) It is recalled that the Union industry consists of two EMD producers, whose sales and profitability deteriorated significantly during the second half of the period considered, with a consequent negative impact on its market share, inventory level, investments, return on investment and cash flow.

(302) If measures are not imposed it is likely that, as a result of the price pressure from the dumped imports, the weak profitability and other financial indicators will force the Union industry to cease production of EMD. However, following the imposition of anti-dumping measures, it is expected that the sales volumes and prices of the Union industry on the Union market will rise, thus improving profitability and other financial indicators of this industry and preventing closure.

(303) It is therefore clear that anti-dumping measures would be in the interests of the Union industry.

(304) As noted in recital (11), no unrelated importers provided the requested information. The Commission therefore concluded that it is unlikely that the importers would be affected by the measures.

(305) On this basis, it has been provisionally concluded that the imposition of anti-dumping measures is not likely to have a negative effect on the situation of importers in the Union.

(306) The main use of EMD is for the production of carbon-zinc and alkaline dry cell batteries, representing above 90 % of its use and divided among the three major (but not the only) battery producers in the Union. As mentioned above, questionnaires were sent to all known users in the Union. Replies were received from two alkaline dry cell battery producers, Varta and Duracell, representing [67–73] % of the Union consumption of EMD. The two replies were verified at the premises of the users.

(307) Both cooperating users claimed that the imposition of anti-dumping measures on imports from China would increase their costs, which might not be passed on to their customers, since the competition for alkaline dry cell batteries is highly price-driven. Even if their branded products are connected to a strong brands recognition, the increased prices for their products often carry the risk of customers to turn to cheaper products. They added that the Union users are already experiencing an increased competition on the Union market caused by rising imports of finished battery products of comparable quality from the competitors outside the Union (mostly China) and the increasing raw material and energy costs. Thus, the measures would further decrease already shrinking profitability of the Union users.

(308) The anti-dumping measures on imports from China would also reduce competition for EMD on the Union market (as well as in the third countries’ export markets), since the availability of the EMD will be limited to the two Union producers (measures would solidify the duopoly with the subsequent risk of price increases), while the Union producers of EMD cannot satisfy the demand of these users in sufficient volumes, especially for the high-quality (94) EMD. Besides, no sufficient investments have been taken by the Union industry in the last years to increase its capacity. They added that the supplies of EMD from the other third countries are limited, serving their own or nearby markets and could not substitute for the potential loss or reduction of supplies from China.

(309) The investigation found that both users were profitable in the investigation period, they had maintained the same level of their overall sales volume of dry-cell consumer batteries from 2021 to the investigation period and even increased it by [1 %–4 %] in the Union, possibly thanks to the strong public image of their brands. However, the share of EMD sourced from the Union producers has decreased from around [65–75] % to [55–65] % from 2021 to the investigation period, for the benefit of EMD sourced from China.

(310) Based on the information received, the cost of EMD for producing the dry-cell consumer batteries represented around [15–19] % of the manufacturing cost in the investigation period. The cost of EMD increased by [45–55] % for these users from 2021 to the investigation period and they could transfer some of this increase to the consumers, since the sales prices of batteries in the Union increased by more than 3 % and outside the Union by more than 10 % from 2021 to the investigation period.

(311) It was estimated that the imposition of the provisional measures at the proposed level would increase the manufacturing cost of the battery for these users by maximum 1 %. Considering the level of increase in manufacturing costs in the previous years and the possibility of transferring part of this cost increase to the consumers, the effect of the proposed anti-dumping duty would be limited for these users, as they would still remain profitable even when taking into account the provisional anti-dumping duties.

(312) In terms of the high quality EMD supply from the Union producers, it is noted that the quality requirements of the EMD for the dry cell battery production are set by the battery producers. Overall, both cooperating users have only a limited number of EMD suppliers (in the Union and China) corresponding to their quality requirements for any grade of EMD. The investigation confirmed that the high quality EMD was supplied by one of the Union producers to one of the cooperating users and the quality testing process was ongoing with the second cooperating user since 2022. The second Union producer re-started the quality testing process with both cooperating users in 2022–2023. Based on these facts it can be concluded that the Union industry is willing and capable to supply the high quality EMD for the Union market, depending on the demand and the requirements of the users.

(313) In addition, considering the limited number of the EMD suppliers overall, it must be noted that the disappearance of the Union industry of EMD would probably have a negative effect on the two cooperating users’ situation and competition on the Union market, since the Union users would be completely dependent on third country manufacturers, while the share of EMD sourced from the Union producers still represented a significant part, that is in total of around [55–65] % in the investigation period (and which includes the high quality EMD of around [25–35] %).

(314) Furthermore, restoring a level playing field in the Union market of the EMD industry is in line with the objectives of the Critical Raw Materials initiative of the Union (95), aiming to secure a sustainable supply of critical raw materials. Manganese is listed among these critical materials, while both, the EMD and the dry-cell battery producers, have their share in the manganese downstream value chain.

(315) No other type of users cooperated with the investigation expressing their concerns. However, Guizhou Manganese Mineral Group also claimed that the Union producers are not able to supply for the use of the new battery technologies (e.g. batteries for electric vehicles), where EMD is used (96). However, these technologies are not yet developed to a point where EMD is utilised in a large scale production. It is also not yet used by the battery industry in the Union supplying electric vehicles. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(316) In addition, Guizhou Manganese Mineral Group also claimed that the two Union producers supply mainly carbon-zinc and alkaline grade EMD, and that it is difficult for them to compete and match the supply of different quality and quantity requirements of the user in the industries other than production of the dry cell batteries. The investigation confirmed that all grades of EMD have the same production process (97). It also confirmed that there was production (98) of the different EMD grades (other than carbon-zinc and alkaline) for the other industries than production of the alkaline dry cell batteries in the Union during the period considered. These other industries did not have quality specifications for EMD, meaning that they had a wide range of acceptable quality, which the Union industry could supply, when requested.

(317) Autlan claimed that the Union producers’ production, sales and profitability, among other factors, depend not only on the pressure exerted by the imports of EMD from China, but also the situation of the users in the Union affected by the imports of manganese dioxide alkaline and non-alkaline dry cell batteries from China.

(318) The Commission noted that the party did not provide information on the effect of the increased imports of such batteries to the downstream users during the period considered, like actual loss of their sales, production, profitability and other indicators that could be linked to the increase of these Chinese imports of manganese dioxide alkaline and non-alkaline dry cell batteries, other than presumption of lost sales by the downstream users to Chinese imports and the decrease in these battery price from October 2022 to April 2023 (a period not related to the investigation period). On the contrary, as explained in recital (309), the cooperating dry cell battery producers in the Union had maintained the same level of their overall sales volume from 2021 to the investigation period and even increased it by [1 %–4 %] in the Union. The increase in Chinese imports of manganese dioxide alkaline and non-alkaline dry cell batteries did not seem to have an effect on the downstream Union battery producers during the investigation period and therefore the Union EMD producers could not be affected by users’ situation in this period. The claim of the party was therefore rejected.

(319) In the light of the above, it is provisionally concluded that the imposition of any anti-dumping measures are unlikely to affect seriously the situation of the user industry.

(320) On the basis of the above, the Commission provisionally concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was clearly not in the Union interest to impose provisional measures on imports of EMD originating in the People’s Republic of China at this stage of the investigation.

(321) As explained in recital (300) above this provisional conclusion is without prejudice to the conclusions of the investigation on the raw material distortions, in particular the investigation concerning Union’s interest under Article 7(2b) of the basic Regulation.

(322) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

(323) Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of electrolytic manganese dioxides originating in the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins. The amount of the duties was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins.

(324) The Commission will conclude its analyses on the raw material distortion in accordance with Article 7(2a) and 7(2b) of the basic Regulation at the definitive stage as mentioned in recital (280).

(326) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(327) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(328) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(329) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(330) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE’s website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

(331) Daxin submitted a comment regarding the treatment of the Chinese export VAT. Tosoh raised a point concerning the calculation of the target profit. Autlan requested to review and confirm the accuracy of the Daxin’s dumping margin calculation and requested the disclosure of exporter’s data marked as sensitive in the disclosure. Since none of the comments have raised any concerns regarding the accuracy of the disclosed calculations, the Commission will address these comments in the definitive stage.

(332) In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline.

(333) The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 1 shall apply for a period of six months.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 October 2023.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain manganese dioxides originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C 57, 16.2.2023, p. 11).

(3) https://www.fastmarkets.com/newgen/battery-materials/manganese.

(4) For the majority of the months during the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 prices of the Chinese manganese ore are significantly lower than prices in the representative international markets (July–November 2021 (– 3,8 %), February–March 2022 (– 3,6 %)).

(5) OJ C 323, 13.9.2023, p. 10.

(6) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2656.

(7) In water treatment, ceramic dyeing, feed additives, medicine, biochemical products, welding materials and other chemical uses.

(8) Button battery, zinc air battery producers, pigments, water purification, pharmaceuticals. These users represent around 1 % of the Union’s consumption in the investigation period.

(9) Such as cathode material in lithium manganese iron phosphate, lithium manganate, nickel cobalt manganese base precursor, etc.

(10) Without providing information on imports of EMD contained in manganese dioxide non-alkaline dry cell batteries.

(11) For example, the import data used for evidence of injury, or to determine the export price, only take into consideration imports under (CN) code ex 2820 10 00. Also, the normal value and injury indicators relate exclusively to the producers of EMD in the representative country or the Union.

(12) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2 (hereafter ‘Report’).

(13) Report – Chapter 2, p. 6–7.

(14) Report – Chapter 2, p. 10.

(15) Available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/constitution2019/201911/1f65146fb6104dd3a2793875d19b5b29.shtml (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(16) Report – Chapter 2, p. 20–21.

(17) Report – Chapter 3, p. 41, 73–74.

(18) Report – Chapter 6, p. 122–135.

(19) Report – Chapter 7, p. 167–168.

(20) Report – Chapter 8, p. 169–170, 200–201.

(21) Report – Chapter 2, p. 15–16, Report – Chapter 4, p. 50, p. 84, Report – Chapter 5, p. 108–9.

(22) Report – Chapter 3, p. 22–24 and Chapter 5, p. 97–108.

(23) Report – Chapter 5, p. 104–9.

(24) Annual Report 2022, page 76–77. Information about shareholders (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(25) http://www.chinaemd.com/about/1172116.html (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(26) http://www.chinaemd.com/news_1/2.html (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(27) https://www.gongsi.com.cn/detail/753dfdb1-b132-3109-a33d-c17b877265651 (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(28) http://www.southmn.com/en/subsidiaries.php (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(29) https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/SOUTH-MANGANESE-INVESTMEN-6880445/company/ (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(30) https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/SOUTH-MANGANESE-INVESTMEN-6880445/company/ (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(31) http://dangxiao.southmn.com/content/?2166.html last viewed 22 August 2023).

(32) See Guizhou Red Star 2022 annual report. Page 108: http://static.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/new/2023-04-21/600367_20230421_6QES.pdf (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(33) https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ySOAhaU-6KSkA0uHWRS9oA (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(34) See for example Art. 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law or General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era (see below for full reference) (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(35) See at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/40288043661e27fb01661e386a3f0001?e=1 (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(36) Report – Chapter 5, p. 100–1.

(37) Report – Chapter 2, p. 26.

(38) Report – Chapter 2, p. 31–2.

(39) Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies-idUSKCN1B40JU (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(40) Available at www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm (last viewed on 22 August 2023).

(41) Financial Times (2020) ‘Chinese Communist Party asserts greater control over private enterprise’, available at: https://on.ft.com/3mYxP4j (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(42) Report – Chapters 14.1 to 14.3.

(43) Report – Chapter 4, p. 41–42, 83.

(44) ‘14th Five-Year Plan (“FYP”) raw material industry development plan’ available at https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2021/art_2960538d19e34c66a5eb8d01b74cbb20.html (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(45) 2019 version of the Guiding Catalogue for industry structural adjustment, page 83 and page 106, available at: http://www.gov.cn (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(46) Guiding Opinion to Promote the High-Quality Development of the Petrochemical and Chemical Industries during 14th FYP. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-04/08/content_5683972.htm#msdynttrid=WRmyf07ph0z74SHmXoOLKjRWl09BdZ4lGdYp9fiI9xU (last viewed on 22 August 2023).

(47) Ibid., Section I.3.

(48) Ibid.

(49) Ibid., Section VIII.

(50) Source: SOHU news website available at https://www.sohu.com/a/676687101_385826 (last viewed on 22 August 2023).

(51) Guangxi Metallurgical Industry Second Entrepreneurship Implementation Plan (2017-2025) [2017] No 157 available at: https://h5.drcnet.com.cn/docview.aspx?version=mineral&docid=4997334&leafid=23025&chnid=5819 (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(52) Guangxi province’s 2018 ‘Development plan for manganese industry clusters and industry chain’ available at: http://gxt.gxzf.gov.cn/xxgk/fgzc/gfxwj/t4240632.shtm (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(53) Source: ‘Policy Interpretation of Guangxi Manganese Industry Cluster and Industrial Chain Development Plan’, Department of Raw Materials Industry, 30 October 2018.

(54) Guangxi Province CCP’s recommendations available at: http://www.gxzx.gov.cn/html/wylz/weiyuanfengcai/492.html (last viewed 22 August 2023).

(55) Guizhou Province 14 FYP on economic and social development and 2035 perspectives, available at: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/dffzgh/202105/t20210508_1279407.html (last viewed on 22 August 2023).

(56) Report – Chapter 6, p. 138–149.

(57) Report – Chapter 9, p. 216.

(58) Report – Chapter 9, p. 213–215.

(59) Report – Chapter 9, p. 209–211.

(60) Report – Chapter 13, p. 332–337.

(61) Report – Chapter 13, p. 336.

(62) Report – Chapter 13, p. 337–341.

(63) Report – Chapter 6, p. 114–117.

(64) Report – Chapter 6, p. 119.

(65) Report – Chapter 6, p. 120.

(66) Report – Chapter 6, p. 121–122, 126–128, 133–135.

(67) See official policy document of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) of 28 August 2020: ‘Three-year action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors (2020-2022)’, http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=925393&itemId=928 (last viewed on 22 August 2023). The Plan instructs to ‘further implement the spirit embodied in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s keynote speech on advancing the reform of corporate governance of the financial sector’. Moreover, the Plan’s Section II aims at promoting the organic integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance: ‘we shall make the integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance more systematic, standardised and procedure-based […] Major operational and management issues must have been discussed by the Party Committee before being decided upon by the Board of Directors or the senior management’.

(68) See CBIRC’s Notice on the Commercial banks performance evaluation method, issued on 15 December 2020. http://jrs.mof.gov.cn/gongzuotongzhi/202101/t20210104_3638904.htm (last viewed on 22 August 2023).

(69) See IMF Working Paper ‘Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem’, by Wojciech Maliszewski, Serkan Arslanalp, John Caparusso, José Garrido, Si Guo, Joong Shik Kang, W. Raphael Lam, T. Daniel Law, Wei Liao, Nadia Rendak, Philippe Wingender, Jiangyan, October 2016, WP/16/203.

(70) Report – Chapter 6, p. 121–122, 126–128, 133–135.

(71) See OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 29. Available at: OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019 | OECD Economic Surveys: China | OECD iLibrary (oecd-ilibrary.org).

(72) See: https://m.jiemian.com/article/4179811.html (last viewed on 22 August 2022).

(73) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

(74) https://ilostat.ilo.org/resources/concepts-and-definitions/description-wages-and-working-time-statistics/ (last viewed on 5 August 2023).

(75) https://www.enel.com.co/en/people/energy-rates.html (last viewed on 5 August 2023).

(76) Tarifas 2022 (acueducto.com.co).

(77) Applies to both manganese dioxides and manganese carbonate.

(78) From the import statistics for Türkiye provided as annex to the Second Note, the other acid imported under code 2807 00 00 00 11 Saf Sülfirik Asit (Kodeks Evsafında Veya Daha Saf) was considered to be food grade acid and was therefore excluded from the price calculation.

(79) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value.

(80) https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/wages/.

(81) DANE - Encuesta Anual Manufacturera -EAM-.

(82) https://www.banrep.gov.co/en/wage-index.

(83) Publi-tarifas – Enero 2022 Formato Web(95).xls [Solo lectura] [Modo de compatibilidad] (emcali.com.co) (last viewed on 5 August 2023).

(84) Impuesto a las Ventas (dian.gov.co) (last viewed on 5 August 2023).

(85) SIIS – / (supersociedades.gov.co) (last viewed on 1 September 2023).

(86) CN code ex 2820 10 00.

(87) As reported under TARIC code 2820100010 available till 2018, the last full calendar year.

(88) The Commission took only the period 2015–2018 into account, because those were the last four full calendar years for which TARIC data was available. Commission decided not to consider earlier years because this would risk skewing the ratio due to changes in trade flows.

(89) Energy cost representing on average [25–30] % of cost of production over the period considered.

(90) Raw material cost representing on average [30–38] % of cost of production over the period considered.

(91) USA, Japan and India combined comprise less than 0,5 % of total imports throughout the period 2019–2020, and only increased to just above 1 % of total imports in the investigation period, due to one shipment of test quantities coming from Japan (this shipment was accounted for during verification visits to Union producers).

(92) Council Regulation (EC) No 221/2008 of 10 March 2008 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain manganese dioxides originating in South Africa (OJ L 69, 13.3.2008, p. 1).

(93) https://csimarket.com/Industry/industry_Profitability_Ratios.php?ind=101.

(94) The production of high-performance batteries (around 1/2 of their business) needs a high drain performance EMD grade.

(95) https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials_en (last visited on 8 September 2023).

(96) As cathode material in lithium manganese iron phosphate, lithium manganate, nickel cobalt manganese base precursor, etc.

(97) Production process includes three main phases: dissolving phase (removing impurities like Cr, Ni, Co, Mo and other), electrolysis (where different grades of carbon-zinc or alkaline EMD can be produced) and post-treatment phase (where impurities from electrolysis are removed and optimum powder characteristics of EMD are defined).

(98) Below 1 % of the total Union production during the period considered.