Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2659 of 27 November 2023 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate originating in People’s Republic of China

(223) The sales price of the Union industry increased over the period considered by 49 %, while the cost of production increased by 46 %. This resulted in increasing profit margins for 2021 and the investigation period. However, due to the large influx of dumped Chinese imports in the investigation period at prices undercutting the Union industry’s prices, the Union industry was forced to lower its prices in the last quarter of the investigation period and the first quarter after the investigation period, resulting in a lossmaking situation in those two quarters.

(224) The continuing large volume of Chinese imports at decreasing prices after the investigation period show a further shift towards these dumped imports at prices that suppress the prices offered by the Union producers.

(225) An unrelated trader claimed that import prices from the PRC have increased in the second half of the IP, while the Union industry price has shown a decrease in the same period. This resulted in Chinese import prices above Union industry’s prices in the last quarter of the IP.

(226) The Commission found that over the investigation period the Chinese import price was undercutting the Union industry’s price and that the Chinese import price increased less than the overall increase in the cost of production. With regard to the last quarter of the IP, the increasing Chinese imports in the quarters before pushed the Union industry to decrease its prices to an unsustainable lossmaking level to remain competitive, as set out in recital (223).

(227) CPCIF claimed that the transport costs have stabilised since the beginning of the investigation period after historical highs.

(228) The Commission assessment showed that an extreme surge in the shipping costs provided an impediment to Chinese exports to the Union from 2021 until mid-2022. Now that the costs have dropped to previous levels, this impediment no longer exists allowing for Chinese dumped imports to flood the European market. It is this return to the usual level of transport costs, and the disappearance of the previous surge, that contributes to the threat of injury.

(229) The evolution of the level of inventories of the sampled Union producers has been described in detail in recitals (189) and (190). The Commission considered that this factor is not of any particular significance for the analysis because producers are able to respond to changes in demand relatively rapidly, hence keeping stocks at sustainable levels. No evidence could be found that stockpiling activities might have taken place by the Union industry or the Chinese exporting producers to an extent which may significantly influence the Union market in the near future.

(230) While the Union industry showed an increase in profitability during the period considered, there was a significant deterioration in the last quarter of the IP due to depressing sales prices on the Union market caused by the dumped Chinese imports. Also other injury indicators showed a deterioration of the Union industry situation. The Union sales volume, the Union production, and capacity utilisation all dropped significantly in the course of the IP, causing a drop in the Union industry’s market share. This situation caused the Union industry to reduce its sales prices in the last quarter of the IP while the cost of production kept increasing, resulting in a lossmaking situation. This negative trend continued in the first quarter of 2023 (see Table 14 for more details).

(231) Furthermore, the Commission established the existence of price suppression. Indeed, the Union industry was selling below the cost of production in the last quarter of the IP and the first quarter post-IP. Due to the significant price pressure caused by the low-priced dumped imports from the PRC, the Union industry was prevented from increasing its sales prices to achieve a profitable situation, resulting in a loss at the end of the IP, which continued after the IP.

(232) Article 3(9) of the basic Regulation provides that ‘[…] the change in circumstances which would create a situation in which the dumping would cause injury must have been clearly foreseen and must be imminent.’.

(233) All the above-mentioned factors have been analysed and verified with respect to the investigation period. In particular, the profitability of the sampled Union producers reached an unsustainable level of -12 % in the fourth quarter of 2022 when Chinese price pressure was felt most after the continuous increase in undercutting Chinese imports during the first three quarters of the IP. Furthermore, the post-investigation period data revealed that this negative situation was still present during the first quarter of 2023. If this trend continues, the fragile situation of the Union industry will be turned into a material injury immediately. Moreover, the fact that the Chinese capacity is expected to almost double in the period 2020 – 2026 which cannot be absorbed by domestic Chinese demand or by other Chinese export markets, makes the Union market increasingly attractive to low-priced Chinese imports. Based on the data for the investigation period, the Commission thus concluded that there was a clearly foreseeable and imminent change in circumstances at the end of the investigation period, which will create a situation in which the dumping will cause injury. When the market conditions changed after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese imports started to come back to the Union market, displacing the sales of the Union industry, which had to start reducing prices and incurred in losses towards the end of the IP and Q1 2023, having to sell at loss to compete with the dumped imports.

(234) Svepol argued that the complainant could not be considered to be in a vulnerable situation on the basis of the data submitted in the complaint, but that this data showed a return to normal market conditions following the post-COVID-19 pandemic boom. Svepol further submitted that the Union producers’ profit margins in fact showed signs of a stabilising industry after a period with exceptionally high profitability, when the Union producers have been able to increase prices above unit costs, made high investments and maintained a dominant market share.

(235) The Commission acknowledged that profit level of the Union industry during the period considered, especially in 2021 and the first three quarter of the IP, was much higher than seen in the years before. However, a multitude of injury indicators, such as production, sales, and profitability, show a massive and extraordinary drop at the end of the IP to unsustainable levels. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the situation at the end of the IP could not simply be considered a return to normal market conditions.

(236) CPCIF and Svepol argued that the Chinese imports did not indicate foreseen or imminent injury, since they dropped by more than half during the last quarter of the investigation period and the increased imports in the third quarter of the investigation period were an exception. Svepol moreover claimed that there was no coincidence in time between the decline in the Union industry’s sales and the Chinese import volume trend.

(237) The Commission found that the Chinese imports had significantly increased over the full period considered. Moreover, the drop in imports in the last quarter of the investigation period succeeded a continuous and steep increase in dumped imports in the quarters before and was followed by a further increase in the first quarter after the investigation period. Contrary to the claim of Svepol, this coincided with a continuous decrease in sales by the Union industry during the investigation period. Therefore, the Commission concluded that there was a significant rate of increase of dumped imports indicating the likelihood of substantially increased imports.

(238) While the Union industry was doing well until the third quarter of 2022, almost all injury indicators started to fall dramatically during the last quarter of 2022. The investigation provisionally revealed that this negative situation continued during the first quarter of 2023.

(239) Whereas the average cost of Union producers and Union producer sales prices were highly correlated during the period considered, with an increase of 46 % in costs matched by an increase of 49 % in the average sales price in the IP compared to 2019, the Chinese prices had only risen by about 26 %. In 2019 and 2020, average Chinese import prices had been above Union industry prices, whereas in the IP, Chinese imports were undercutting.

(240) Although imports from other countries also exhibited a slight increase in the IP, notably from Türkiye, Egypt, and Vietnam, the average prices of those imports were on average 1,2 % lower to 2,0 % higher than Union average sales prices. When assessed cumulatively, these imports were slightly higher than Union prices.

(241) The Union industry’s forecast concerning future profitability and future sales is negative. Decreasing sales and negative margins are most likely to lead to heavy losses, lost orders and reduced jobs. As a result, all factors assessed in the framework of Article 3(9) of the basic Regulation, in particular the significant rate of increase of dumped imports in 2022 which continued in the first half of 2023 at further decreasing prices, the excess capacity in the PRC, and the negative developments in profitability of the Union industry point to the same direction.

(242) In the view of this analysis, at this stage the Commission concluded that there was a threat of a clearly foreseeable and imminent injury to the Union industry at the end of the investigation period.

(243) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the threat of material injury to the Union industry was caused by the existing and future dumped imports from the country concerned. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have threatened to injure the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible threat of injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: imports by the complainants and related companies to the complainants, the increased use of recycled PET by PET users, imports from other third countries, cost increases in raw materials and energy prices, and an increase in investment costs.

(244) As set out in recital (210), the import volume of PET from the PRC increased significantly over the period considered and showed an increasing trend over the IP and the first quarter after the IP, with the exception of the last quarter of the IP. As shown in recital (164), the Chinese imports were undercutting the Union industry prices. The Commission also established that the Chinese PET imports suppressed the Union industry prices, in particular at the end of the investigation period.

(245) Due to the significant increase of the Chinese PET imports during the investigation period at prices below those of the Union industry, the Union industry lost market share to the Chinese imports and lost its profitable situation in the last quarter of the IP.

(246) Therefore, the Commission provisionally concluded that those dumped imports had a negative impact on the situation of the Union industry.

(247) Moreover, not only do the Chinese PET producers have significant spare capacity as set out in recital (212), which is forecasted to grow even larger in the coming years, but the Union has also been the most attractive destination for dumped Chinese imports during the investigation period, to the detriment of the Union industry, and no other third countries would be able to absorb the Chinese spare capacity of PET.

(248) The CPCIF claimed with reference to the Commission’s reasoning in Silico-Manganese and Styrene-Butadiene-Styrene cases that there has been a lack of coincidence in time between the profitability and capacity utilisation trend of the Union industry and the increase of dumped imports from the PRC, a claim that was echoed by Svepol, and that the increase in market share of the Chinese imports and the level of undercutting were too limited to have a material impact on the Union industry. Also, comparing Eurostat figures on PRC import prices with the Union industry sales figures presented in the complaint, the unrelated importer argued that the Union industry could not be threatened by PRC imports when import prices from the PRC actually increased and stood above the Union industry’s sales prices since September 2022.

(249) The Commission found that the production level and capacity utilisation of the Union industry showed a significant drop during the investigation period, right after a period where a significant increase in Chinese imports was seen. The Chinese prices, which were below the Union industry’s price and the price from other third countries in the first three quarters of the investigation period, drove the prices of the Union industry and third countries down in the last quarter of the investigation period to the price level of the Chinese imports in the previous quarter, resulting in a lossmaking level for the Union industry. This showed that the Chinese prices were capable of negatively impacting the price level on the Union market. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(250) Therefore, the Commission provisionally concluded that the Chinese dumped imports had a negative impact on the situation of the Union industry and were causing a threat of material injury to the Union industry.

(251) The Commission also examined whether other known factors, individually or collectively, are capable of attenuating the causal link established between the dumped imports and the threat of injury provisionally found to exist to the effect that such link would no longer be genuine and substantial.

(252) UNESDA argued that the sampled Union producers Indorama and NEO have made imports of PET from the PRC. Indeed, the Commission found that a part of the imports from the PRC were made by the complaining companies accounting for [15 –25] % of imports from the PRC in 2022 and [25 – 35] % in the last quarter of 2022 alone. However, even when assessing the import trends without these imports, a significant increase in Chinese imports took place over the period considered. Therefore, the existence of imports by the complainant did not attenuate the causal link.

(253) UNESDA claimed that policies by the European Union concerning waste management and reduction of plastic use have led to the increasing substitution of vPET for rPET (despite the systematically higher prices of rPET over vPET), resulting in a high usage rate of rPET.

(254) Indeed, when analysing the injury indicators at a more granular level, an increasing trend in capacity, production, and sales of rPET can be observed during the period considered. However, this increase of around 250 000 tonnes in production and around 200 000 tonnes in sales, representing around 20 % of the Union industry’s PET capacity and production, did not make up for the loss of production to the dumped Chinese imports and stagnation of sales and therefore did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped Chinese imports and the threat of injury suffered by the Union industry. Moreover, the complainant provided data that rPET producers were reducing their production post-IP due to low vPET prices on the Union market, caused by the dumped imports from the PRC.

(255) CPCIF and UNESDA submitted that import volumes from Egypt, Türkiye, and Vietnam have increased considerably during the period considered but all showed a significant drop in import volume in the last quarter of the IP. However, the fall in import volumes from the PRC during this quarter was far larger than for the other third countries. Furthermore, CPCIF observed that imports from India remained significant and stable over the period considered and imports from South Korea increased in the last quarter of the IP. Therefore, CPCIF argued that any injury suffered by the Union industry is caused by the imports from other countries and not by imports from the PRC, notably because the imports from these other countries also undercut the Union industry’s prices to a similar degree as the Chinese imports. Moreover, the 6,5 % customs duty levied on the Chinese imports when entering the Union should be incorporated in this analysis.

(257) As set out in the table in recital (157), imports from the PRC grew with 58 % during the period considered. Although the growth rate for Egypt, Türkiye, and Vietnam cumulatively has been larger, their individual levels of imports were much lower than the imports from the PRC in absolute figures.

(258) Moreover, the average prices of all other third countries in the investigation period were higher than the import price from the PRC and were around the price of the Union industry. Cumulatively assessed, these imports were above the price of the Union industry.

(259) Therefore, the Commission provisionally concluded that aside from the fact that these imports were not made at prices below the prices of the Union industry, the import volumes were also not of such a scale that they would attenuate the causal link between the Chinese dumped imports and the threat of injury to the Union industry.

(261) The exports of the Union industry increased from 2019 to 2021, after which they dropped but remained significantly above the quantity sold at the start of the period considered.

(262) Exports were only a small part of the Union industry’s overall sales, accounting for between 7 % and 10 % of its production in 2019. The average sales price for exports followed the fluctuations in the cost of production of the Union industry.

(263) Therefore, the Commission provisionally concluded that the export performance of the Union industry did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports from the country concerned and the threat of injury found.

(264) UNESDA claimed that the price of PET in the second semester of 2022 has been affected by the energy crisis that unfolded due to the war of Russia on Ukraine. CPCIF also contended that the increase in the costs of raw materials, energy costs and the inflationary pressure were factors that caused injury to the Union industry, arguing that the decrease in profitability of the Union industry coincided with a high inflation rate, caused by increasing energy costs. As a result of war in Ukraine petroleum prices have increased significantly in Europe, affecting the price of the raw materials paraxylene, purified terephthalic acid, and mono-ethylene glycol, while Chinese producers of PET were less affected by the rise in energy costs.

(265) As set out in recital (183), the Union industry’s cost of production first showed a decrease in 2020, after which the costs increased significantly in the investigation period. However, the Union industry could also increase its prices in line with the increase in cost of production for most of 2021 and the investigation period. When assessing this data at a quarterly level for the investigation period, it is visible that the Union industry had to lower its prices in the last quarter of the investigation period to the level below its cost of production in response to the unfair competition of dumped imports. Therefore, the cost increase did not attenuate the causal link.

(266) CPCIF claimed that the investment figures of the Union industry more than quadrupled over the period considered, caused by an increase in working capital due to higher inventories and to comply with the regulatory obligations under the Single-use plastics Directive.

(267) As set out in recital (191), the Commission found that investments indeed increased substantially. However, when compared to the sales value on the Union market, investment costs were limited and never got above 2,1 % of turnover for the sampled Union producers. Moreover, the investments were made in order to ensure compliance with existing Union regulations, for plants’ maintenance and to increase their longevity. This level of investment costs could therefore not attenuate the causal link between the dumped Chinese imports and the threat of injury found.

(268) Svepol argued that the declining production and sales volumes were responses to changes in customer purchasing preferences (including shifting from long-term contracts to more flexible spot contracts) and wide-spread destocking by PET customers.

(269) The Commission found that while the Union consumption temporarily decreased in the last quarter of 2022, it has actually increased in the IP compared to the beginning of the period considered and remained at the average quarterly IP level also in the first quarter of 2023 (see Table 3 and Table 14). Therefore, the alleged destocking by customers is not duly substantiated. Moreover, a potential change in preferred purchasing terms itself cannot be considered a factor that should automatically lead to a drop in production or sales of the Union producers. Indeed, the investigation provisionally found that the Chinese imports were done on spot contract basis, while historically the Union industry sold mainly on a long-term contract basis. However, the Chinese imports were made at dumped prices undercutting the Union industry, thus potentially even aggravating this shift from long-term contracts to spot contracts. The difference in purchase contracts might therefore have aggravated the effect between the dumped Chinese imports and the threat of injury found.

(270) The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. The effect of these other factors on the Union industry’s negative developments were however only limited, if any.

(271) On the basis of the above, the Commission provisionally concluded at this stage that the dumped imports from the PRC caused a threat of material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

(272) To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

(273) The injury would be removed if the Union Industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

(274) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the PRC, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (‘R&D’) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(275) The profit in the first two years of the period considered was below 6 % (in 2019 or 2020) and the market conditions were abnormal in 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic coupled with unprecedented rise in transport costs associated with an overall drop in imports from third countries in 2021. None of these years would therefore qualify for providing a target profit in accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. None of the sampled Union producers made a substantiated claim for investments foregone or R&D and innovation costs. In view of those facts, the Commission resorted to the use of the minimum 6 % target profit which was added to the Union industry’s actual cost of production to establish the non-injurious price.

(276) As no substantiated claims were made pursuant to Article 7(2d) concerning current or future costs which result from multilateral environmental agreements and protocols thereunder or from the listed ILO Conventions, no further costs were added to the non-injurious price thus established.

(277) The Commission then determined the injury margin level based on a comparison of the weighted average import price of the individual sampled cooperating exporting producers in the PRC, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(278) Svepol suggested that if the Commission were to impose duties, the actual prices and profit realised by the Union producers during the second half of 2022 should be relied upon in order to establish the injury margin, since the Union industry sales prices were neither depressed, nor suppressed in 2022. It is noted that 2022 was the year when imports from the PRC increased substantially and hence the profit realised by the Union producers in the investigation period or any period within 2022 was not deemed appropriate to be used as a target profit.

(281) The Commission examined whether, despite the determination of injurious dumping, the imposition of measures would not be against the Union interest in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users, and consumers.

(282) Across the Union around 60 companies produced PET, providing employment to around 1 500 staff. 16 producers cooperated during the investigation. None of the known producers opposed the initiation of the investigation. As shown above when analysing the injury indicators, the Union industry showed a deteriorating trend at the end of the investigation period. In particular, injury indicators related to the financial performance of the sampled Union producers, such as profitability, were seriously affected. The Union industry experienced a deterioration of its situation at the end of the investigation period and was negatively affected by the dumped imports from the PRC, causing the threat of injury at the end of the investigation period.

(283) It is expected that the imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties will restore fair trade conditions on the Union market, putting an end to the price suppression and enabling the Union industry to recover. This would result in an improvement of the Union industry’s profitability. In absence of measures, it is very likely that the threat of injury will materialise and that there will be a further deterioration of the Union industry’s economic situation and idling or closure of Union industry plants.

(284) The Commission therefore concluded at this stage that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would be in the interest of the Union industry.

(285) An unrelated importer (Svepol) and a number of large user companies like Danone, Nestle Waters, Coca-Cola, and Refresco, along with associations like Soft Drinks Europe (UNESDA) and Natural Mineral Waters Europe (NWME), have come forward and cooperated in this investigation. UNESDA represents major corporate users, national soft drink producers, bottlers, and distributors, while NWME speaks for the natural mineral water producers. Svepol as well as four groups of users (Refresco, Danone, Nestle and Retal) provided structured replies (verified at this stage for Svepol) to the Commission questionnaire. Furthermore, over 30 other users (mainly bottlers) and national associations from Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Poland came forward, providing comments and voicing the opposition to the potential duties on PET imports.

(286) The PET bottling industry is significant in terms of employment, with over 300 000 direct jobs provided across 1 000 bottling sites. Importantly, most of these businesses are small and medium enterprises (‘SMEs’), often employing fewer than 50 people. Many of the users claimed to already operate on thin margins and face rising costs due to EU regulatory measures on single-use plastics and other packaging obligations. They further argued that PET is a commodity not produced in sufficient quantities in the Union, making therefore imports an essential component of the Union consumption.

(287) Furthermore, the users and Svepol (importer) claimed that imposing anti-dumping measures on PET imports from the PRC would adversely affect these European businesses in several ways, as set out below.

(288) The users argued that measures will likely raise the prices of vPET. This is documented on the example of the United States, which has significantly higher PET prices compared to countries with lower or no duties such as the Union or South Korea. This would impact SMEs who cannot easily transfer these increased costs to their customers hampering the beverage industry, where PET is a major cost component. The users have indicated (without further substantiation) that the price of PET on the final product varies between 8 and 15 % and that a price increase cannot be fully passed on to buyers.

(289) The soft drinks industry submitted that it is trying to shift from vPET to rPET, which is currently more expensive. Higher vPET prices might slow this shift, undermining the industry’s sustainability initiatives.

(290) Several users submitted that anti-dumping measures on PET imports from the PRC would further consolidate the control of the Union producer Indorama in the PET market, also in a view of Indorama’s ownership of PET production facilities in Türkiye and Egypt, the next major PET exporters to the Union, and argued that such market constellation could negatively impact competition and might not align with the broader interests of the Union.

(291) While the anti-dumping measures are indeed likely to increase the PET price and negatively impact the user industries and final users of PET-packaged products, this would not necessarily result in job losses among PET users, given the PET costs make up to 15 % of final product prices. Furthermore, it follows from the evidence available that not only are the PET production facilities at the Union producers fully utilised, but that also numerous other countries such as Türkiye, Egypt, and Vietnam have the capacity to supply PET to the user industry in the Union.

(292) The European Union, in its commitment to counteract pollution and single-use plastics, adopted the EU Action Plan for a Circular Economy in 2015. This plan marked plastics as a priority, aiming for strategies that consider the entire life cycle of plastics. PET, a fully recyclable plastic, is at the forefront of these efforts. In 2016, while 72,7 % of plastic waste was collected in the Union, only 31,1 % was recycled, underscoring the importance of pure plastics like PET.

(293) The Union’s directive on single-use plastics set ambitious recycling targets for the upcoming decade, pushing Union PET producers to invest in rPET technologies. However, this progress is threatened by the influx of dumped vPET from the PRC. These dumped imports have made European-produced rPET less competitive, leading to a shift back to vPET, especially when energy costs for rPET production are high. The dumped imports might hinder innovation and built up of rPET production capacity, and weaken the recycling PET loop, essential for the Union’s carbon reduction and recycling targets.

(294) The duties (see Section 9 below) are moreover set at a level which would allow imports of Chinese PET at fair prices.

(295) The Union’s commitment to environmental protection, as evident in the single plastics directive, emphasizes recycling investments, would be potentially hindered by cheap vPET.

(296) Overall, it is provisionally found that the benefits of measures outweigh potential negative impact for importers, users, and consumers.

(297) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of PET originating in the PRC at this stage of the investigation.

(298) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent that the imminent threat of material injury which is caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports would materialise.

(299) Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of PET originating in the PRC, in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins in recital (279) above. The amount of the duties was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins.

(301) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(302) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(303) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(304) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(305) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE’s website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

(306) No comments on the accuracy of the calculations were received.

(307) In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline.

(308) The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Article 1 shall apply for a period of six months.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 27 November 2023.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate (‘PET’) originating in People’s Republic of China (OJ C 115, 30.3.2023, p. 5).

(3) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2661

(4) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2.

(5) Report – Chapter 2, p. 6-7.

(6) Report – Chapter 2, p. 10.

(7) Available at: Constitution of the People's Republic of China (npc.gov.cn) (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(8) Report – Chapter 2, p. 20-21.

(9) Report – Chapter 3, p. 41, 73-74.

(10) Report – Chapter 6, p. 120-121.

(11) Report – Chapter 6. p. 122-135.

(12) Report – Chapter 7, p. 167-168.

(13) Report – Chapter 8, p. 169-170, 200-201.

(14) Report – Chapter 2, p. 15-16, Report – Chapter 4, p. 50, p. 84, Report – Chapter 5, p. 108-109.

(15) See at: http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STOCK/2023/2023-4/2023-04-25/9052858.PDF (accessed on 12 October 2023).

(16) See at: http://en.sasac.gov.cn/.

(17) See for example Article 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law or General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era (see below for full reference).

(18) See at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/40288043661e27fb01661e386a3f0001?e=1 (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(19) See at: http://www.ccema.org.cn/wzsy (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(20) See at: http://www.ccema.org.cn/xhzc (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(21) Report – Chapter 5, p. 100-101.

(22) Report – Chapter 2, p. 26.

(23) See for example: Blanchette, J. – Xi’s Gamble: The Race to Consolidate Power and Stave off Disaster; Foreign Affairs, vol. 100, no. 4, July/August 2021, pp. 10-19.

(24) Report – Chapter 2, p. 31-32.

(25) Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies-idUSKCN1B40JU (accessed on 12 October 2023).

(26) Available at: www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(27) Chinese Communist Party asserts greater control over private enterprise, available at: https://on.ft.com/3mYxP4j (accessed on 12 October 2023).

(28) See at: http://www.fl.gov.cn/zwxx_206/ywdt/202307/t20230703_12113878.html (accessed on 12 October 2023).

(29) See at: http://www.sinopec.com/listco/Resource/Pdf/2023032507.pdf, p. 26 (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(30) See at: http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/gywm/ddjs.shtml http://jscc.sinopec.com/jscc/about_us/teammanagement/ (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(31) Report – Chapters 14.1 to 14.3.

(32) Report – Chapter 4, p. 41-42, 83.

(33) See, p. 145 and 147 of the Made in China 2025 Roadmap available at: https://www.cae.cn/cae/html/files/2015-10/29/20151029105822561730637.pdf (accessed on 12 October 2023).

(34) See p. 44 and 47 of the 2019 Guiding Catalogue for industry structural adjustment available at: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-11/06/5449193/files/26c9d25f713f4ed5b8dc51ae40ef37af.pdf (accessed on 12 October 2023).

(35) Ibid. p. 115.

(36) 14th FYP on raw materials, Sections IV.2 and VIII.1. Available at: https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2021/art_2960538d19e34c66a5eb8d01b74cbb20.html (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(37) Guiding Opinion on promoting the high quality development of the petrochemical and chemical industry 2022/34, available at: https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/yj/art/2022/art_4ef438217a4548cb98c2d7f4f091d72e.html (accessed on 22 October 2023).

(38) See at: http://gxt.shandong.gov.cn/module/download/downfile.jsp?classid=0&filename=17e54531cb74483596b5cca1a40ec8d8.pdf. (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(39) See at: http://gxt.jiangsu.gov.cn/art/2021/9/3/art_6197_10099378.html (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(40) See at: http://www.qg.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfg/sjfgwj/202208/t20220829_2769471.htm (accessed on 12 October 2023).

(41) Report – Chapter 6, p. 138-149.

(42) Report – Chapter 9, p. 216.

(43) Report – Chapter 9, p. 213-215.

(44) Report – Chapter 9, p. 209-211.

(45) Report – Chapter 13, p. 332-337.

(46) Report – Chapter 13, p. 336.

(47) Report – Chapter 13, p. 337-341.

(48) Report – Chapter 6, p. 114-117.

(49) Report – Chapter 6, p. 119.

(50) Report – Chapter 6, p. 120.

(51) Report – Chapter 6, p. 121-122, 126-128, 133-135.

(52) See: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/328 of 24 February 2021 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of continuous filament glass fibre products originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 18 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 65, 25.2.2021, p. 1), recitals 71-75, and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2287 of 17 December 2021 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of aluminium converter foil originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2170 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of aluminium converter foil originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 458, 22.12.2021, p. 344), recitals 151-188.

(53) See official policy document of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) of 28 August 2020: Three-year action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors (2020-2022), available at: http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=925393&itemId=928 (accessed on 22 March 2023). The Plan instructs to ‘further implement the spirit embodied in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s keynote speech on advancing the reform of corporate governance of the financial sector’. Moreover, the Plan’s section II aims at promoting the organic integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance: ‘we shall make the integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance more systematic, standardised and procedure-based […] Major operational and management issues must have been discussed by the Party Committee before being decided upon by the Board of Directors or the senior management.’

(54) See CBIRC’s Notice on the Commercial banks performance evaluation method, issued on 15 December 2020. http://jrs.mof.gov.cn/gongzuotongzhi/202101/t20210104_3638904.htm (accessed on 22 March 2023).

(55) See IMF Working Paper ‘Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem’, by Wojciech Maliszewski, Serkan Arslanalp, John Caparusso, José Garrido, Si Guo, Joong Shik Kang, W. Raphael Lam, T. Daniel Law, Wei Liao, Nadia Rendak, Philippe Wingender, Jiangyan, October 2016, WP/16/203.

(56) Report – Chapter 6, p. 121-122, 126-128, 133-135.

(57) See OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris. p. 29, available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-chn-2019-en (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(58) See: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-04/20/content_5504241.htm (accessed on 12 September 2023).

(59) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

(60) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33).

(61) Global Trade Atlas, http://www.gtis.com/gta/secure/default.cfm

(62) https://www.dosm.gov.my/portal-main/home

(63) https://www.st.gov.my/en/

(64) Global Trade Atlas, http://www.gtis.com/gta/secure/default.cfm

(65) Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Economy of the Government of Malaysia, https://www.dosm.gov.my/portal-main/landingv2

(66) Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Pricing and tariffs for industrial users, https://www.tnb.com.my/commercial-industrial/pricing-tariffs1

(67) Suruhanjaya Tenaga, https://www.st.gov.my/en/

(68) Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value.

(69) https://www.dosm.gov.my/portal-main/home

(70) https://www.dosm.gov.my/portal-main/release-content/3ea8a244-81c4-11ed-96a6-1866daa77ef9

(71) Statistics on working time – ILOSTAT

(72) https://www.mida.gov.my/setting-up-content/statutory-contributions/

(73) https://www.mida.gov.my/setting-up-content/statutory-contributions/; https://www.perkeso.gov.my/en/our-services/employer-employee/contributions.html; https://www.mida.gov.my/setting-up-content/human-resources-development-fund/; https://ins-globalconsulting.com/news-post/severance-pay-malaysia/

(74) https://www.tnb.com.my/commercial-industrial/pricing-tariffs1

(75) https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/inflation-database

(76) https://www.st.gov.my/en/

(77) https://www.st.gov.my/en/web/consumer/details/2/10 and https://www.st.gov.my/contents/2021/Fuel%20Prices/11%20Nov/1-%20Regulated%20piped%20gas%20prices%20as%20of%20November%202021.pdf

(78) https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/inflation-database

(79) Orbis | Company information across the globe | BvD (bvdinfo.com)

(80) In the IP, [30-35] % of the sales by the sampled Union producers in the Union was made indirectly via related trading entities.

(81) The price of PET is by around 90 % determined by the prices of the main raw material, i.e. purified terephthalic acid (PTA), which in turn fluctuates on the basis of prices of crude oil. This causes high volatility of the PET prices.

(82) World Trade Organization, WT/DS132/R, 28 January 2000, Mexico- Anti-dumping investigation of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) from the United States – Report of the Panel, recital 7.140, page 214. The WTO Panel stated the following: ‘in order to conclude that there is a threat of material injury to a domestic industry that is apparently not currently injured, despite the effects of dumped imports during the period of investigation, it is necessary to have an understanding of the current condition of the industry as a background. Merely that dumped imports will increase, and will have adverse price effects, does not, ipso facto, lead to the conclusion that the domestic industry will be injured – if the industry is in very good condition, or if there are other factors at play, dumped imports may not threaten injury’.

(83) Judgment of The Court of Justice, 7 April 2016, case number C-186/14, paragraph 72, confirming the General Court’s judgment of 29 January 2014, on case T-528/09, Hubei Xinyegang Steel Co. Ltd versus Council of the European Union.