Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2211 of 5 September 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in India and the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(224) For establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG & A and profit the Commission relied on the financial data of Sucroal SA in 2022, as extracted from the Orbis (133) database.

(225) On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(226) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers, the Commission relied on the information provided by the applicant in the review request on the usage of each factor (materials and labour) for the production of oxalic acid and the verified information provided by the applicant.

(228) On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(229) In the absence of cooperation by exporting producers from PRC, the export price was determined based on CIF Eurostat data corrected to ex-works level. Thus, the CIF price was reduced by domestic transport cost, handling and ocean freight based on the evidence provided in the request.

(230) The Commission compared the constructed normal value established in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation and the export price on an ex-works basis as established above.

(231) On this basis, the dumping margin was found to be significant for the country (59 %). It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

(232) Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping, should the measures be repealed. The following additional elements were analysed: (i) the production capacity and spare capacity in India, (ii) the relation between export prices to third countries and the price level in the Union and (iii) the attractiveness of the Union market.

(233) In the previous expiry review the total capacity of Indian oxalic acid producers was estimated at around 40 000 tonnes/year. Furthermore, the Commission found no evidence that any known Indian oxalic acid producer closed down any of their production capacities in the meantime. Based on verified data of the cooperating exporting producers, the Indian producers had capacity utilisation of around 78 %. Therefore, the Commission estimated the spare capacity in India to be around 8 500 tonnes, which correspond to at [86 %-105 %] of the total Union free market consumption during the RIP.

(234) The two cooperating Indian companies had significant exports sales to the rest of the world in the RIP.

(235) The verified data of the two cooperating Indian producers, cross-checked with data provided in the review request and data available in GTA, indicate that the average Indian export price to the Union is 11 % higher than the average export price to the rest of the world. Thus, on the basis of export prices to third countries, the dumping margin would be higher than on the basis of export prices to the Union.

(236) Although the Union is a relatively small market for oxalic acid, it remains attractive to Indian exporting producers. Indeed, as indicated in the recitals above, the Union average price is higher than the rest of the world. The attractiveness is further confirmed by the fact that despite the relatively high level of anti-dumping duties in force, Indian exporting producers continue to export to the Union market.

(237) The investigation showed that Indian imports continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices during the RIP.

(238) Given the available spare capacity in India, the Indian producers level of prices generally on third markets and the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of prices, it is highly likely that in the absence of measures at least some of the available capacity in India would be used to produce oxalic acid for export to the Union and/or that some exports to third markets would be re-directed to the Union considering the higher prices at the Union market.

(239) Further to the above, the Commission found that the spare capacity in India alone can cover for almost all Union consumption during the RIP and that the Union market is very attractive to Indian exporting producers in view of its prices.

(240) Thus, the Commission concluded that should the measures be allowed to lapse it is likely that Indian companies would export to the Union in larger quantities than currently and at dumped prices. Thus, should the measures lapse, it is likely that dumping will continue or, in any event, recur.

(241) Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping, should the measures be repealed. The following additional elements were analysed: (i) the production capacity and spare capacity in China, (ii) the relation between export prices to third countries and the price level in the Union, (iii) the attractiveness of the Union market, and (iv) possible absorption capacity of third country markets.

(242) In the absence of cooperation of the Chinese exporting producers, this analysis was made on the basis of best facts available, namely on the basis of the information contained in the review request and publicly available information.

(243) China is by far the world’s largest oxalic acid producing country, with an estimated production of 416 500 tonnes in 2022, according to the request (135).

(244) In the previous expiry review, Chinese producers were found to have a combined annual capacity of approximately [150 000-200 000] tonnes (136). In the current case, the applicant submitted in the request that this figure was an under-estimation and that, according to a study it commissioned, the total production capacity for oxalic acid in China in 2018 was around 450 000 tonnes per year, and rose to 595 000 tonnes per year in 2022, representing almost half of world consumption, estimated at 1 215 000 tonnes in 2022, according to public sources (137).

(245) The applicant also reported that, as part of the overall increase in production capacity, the main Chinese producers also expanded or introduced new capacity, demonstrating an ability to expand production capacity extremely rapidly (138).

(246) Based on the request, internal market consumption of oxalic acid in China amounted to about 250 000 tonnes in 2022 and Chinese total exports to about 167 000 tonnes in 2022 (139). There are no imports into China originating in the Union or in India, thus the Chinese domestic market is supplied exclusively by Chinese producers. Consequently, Chinese producers’ spare capacity is estimated at about 180 000 tonnes, which amounts to about 30 % of their total capacity in 2022 (140), and [18-22] times the Union free market consumption.

(247) Since three quarters of the review investigation period fell in 2022, the Commission considered the above data applicable also to the first quarter of 2023. Indeed, according to the study presented in the request, there are ongoing plan to increase capacity on the part of Chinese producers, and thus 2022 data would correspond to a conservative estimate, as in the first quarter of 2023 additional capacity may have come online.

(248) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Chinese exporting producers have significant spare capacities, which would likely be used for exporting oxalic acid at dumped prices to the Union if the measures were allowed to lapse.

(249) In order to analyse the likely behaviour of Chinese exporting producers in the absence of the measures, the Commission examined the price level with regard to Chinese exports sales to the rest of the world. In the absence of cooperation, the Commission used Eurostat and GTA statistics.

(250) In the review investigation period, the average sales price of the Union industry ([1 478-1 817] EUR/tonne) was higher than the average export price from China to third countries (excluding the EU, 868 EUR/tonne).

(251) Moreover, also the Chinese import price to the Union during the review investigation period (1 262 EUR/tonne) was higher than the average export price from China to its top 10 export markets (889 EUR/tonne). Thus, on the basis of export prices to third countries, the dumping margin would be higher than on the basis of export prices to the Union.

(252) Without anti-dumping duties, Chinese exporters could easily export to the Union at prices higher than those to other third country markets, making an increase of export volumes at dumped prices highly likely if the measures were allowed to expire. Chinese exporting producers would be attracted by the higher market prices in the Union, leading to the continuation of dumping.

(253) Although the Union is a relatively small market for oxalic acid, it remains attractive to Chinese exporting producers in terms of prices. In addition to the anti-dumping duty, Chinese imports into the Union are subject to a normal ad valorem import duty of 6,5 %. but despite this they are still present in the Union market, as reported in recital 267.

(254) As indicated above, Chinese exporting producers are able to supply third-country markets at extremely low prices. According to the applicant, now these markets are thus likely saturated and so unable to absorb any additional volumes of Chinese exports, as indicated by the rapid switch from traditional country markets identified in the previous expiry review to new countries where China has made strategic investments in rare earth metal purification projects such as Myanmar, Peru and Ivory Coast. However, in the applicant’s view, demand in those countries can only grow as fast as Chinese investment allows, which is unlikely to be as fast as the build-up of new capacity in China (141).

(255) Moreover, according to the request, growth in demand abroad for Chinese oxalic acid is unlikely to increase. On the contrary, it is more likely to rapidly decline if China will continue imposing export restrictions on rare earth metals and minerals – the purification of which constitutes one of the uses of oxalic acid – in the context of trade tensions (142).

(256) Therefore, on the basis of the request, the Commission concluded that the possible absorption of Chinese spare capacity by third countries is limited.

(257) Considering the significant spare capacity in China and taking into account the evidence on the attractiveness of the Union market, the Commission concluded that, should the measures lapse, it is likely that the Chinese exporting producers would activate the spare capacity and also redirect exports from third countries towards the Union market at dumped prices and in significant volumes. Thus, the Commission concluded that there was a strong likelihood that the expiry of the anti-dumping measures on imports from China would result in the continuation of dumping, or in any event, recurrence of dumping.

(258) The like product was manufactured by two producers in the Union during the period considered, namely Oxaquim and WeylChem. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. Taking into account that the data used in the injury analysis was sourced from only two Union producers, the figures established on the basis of this data presented below are given in ranges in order to protect confidentiality of the Union producers.

(259) The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at between 16 000 and 20 000 tonnes. The Commission established the Union production on the basis of the verified questionnaire reply from Oxaquim and the questionnaire reply submitted by WeylChem. As explained in recital (19), the Commission could not verify the questionnaire reply from WeylChem. Nevertheless, the Commission cross-checked data provided in that questionnaire reply of WeylChem with the corresponding data available in the request for review and gained reasonable assurance that it could be used to establish injury indicators relevant for the whole Union industry, namely Union production, Union consumption and macroeconomic indicators. The other injury indicators were established on the basis of the verified questionnaire reply of Oxaquim.

(260) The two Union producers represented 100 % of the total Union production of the like product.

(261) The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of questionnaire replies from the Union producers and Eurostat import data.

(263) Union free market consumption increased by 11 % over the period considered. In 2020, Union consumption was low due to the economic slowdown caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2021 and 2022, it returned to the pre-pandemic level, while during the review investigation period it decreased due to lower sales volume of the Union industry caused by temporary problems with the supply of one of the main raw materials used to produce oxalic acid, which temporarily disrupted the production process.

(264) Oxalic acid was used internally by one of the Union producers to manufacture other products. Captive consumption increased by 29 % over the period considered, following a similar trend as the free market consumption.

(265) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat import data. The market share of the imports was established on the basis of this data as a percentage of Union free market consumption.

(267) Volume of imports from the countries concerned increased from 984 tonnes in 2020 to 1 565 tonnes in the review investigation period, i.e. by 59 %.

(268) Volume of imports from the PRC increased from 771 tonnes in 2020 to 1 149 tonnes in the review investigation period, i.e. by 49 %.

(269) Volume of imports from India increased from 213 tonnes in 2020 to 416 tonnes in the review investigation period, i.e. by 95 %.

(270) During the same period, the Union free market consumption increased by only 11 %. As a result, the exporting producers from the countries concerned increased their market share from 9,2 % to 12,4 % for the PRC, from 2,5 % to 4,5 % for India and from 11,7 % to 16,9 % from both countries concerned over the period considered.

(271) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat import data. Price undercutting of the imports was established on the basis of verified questionnaire replies for Indian producers and on the basis of Eurostat import data for the PRC as there was no cooperation from that country.

(273) The average prices of imports from the countries concerned on the Union market increased by 60 % over the period considered.

(274) The average price of imports from India increased by 30 % and the average price of imports from the PRC increased by 71 % over the period considered.

(276) For China, the Commission determined the price undercutting during the review investigation period by comparing the average sales price of the cooperating Union producer charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level with the average price of imports from the PRC on a CIF basis. Due to the non-cooperation from the PRC, the import price from China was established based on Eurostat data which are provided at CIF Union frontier level.

(277) The CIF prices were then adjusted for the post-importation costs, in particular conventional customs duty, customs administration costs and anti-dumping duty.

(278) The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the cooperating Union producer’s turnover during the review investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin of [5-25] % by imports from India and undercutting margin of [4-10] % by imports from the PRC on the Union market. The cumulated undercutting margin by imports from the countries concerned was [6–12] %.

(279) The imports of oxalic acid from third countries other than India and the PRC were mainly from Taiwan.

(281) Imports from Taiwan decreased during the period considered by 9 %. Taiwan’s market share decreased by 0,3 percentage points.

(282) Imports from third countries except the countries concerned increased by 50 % over the period considered. Its share in the Union market increased from 2 % in 2020 to 2,7 % during the same period.

(283) The average price of imports from third countries except the countries concerned increased by 75 % during the period considered and was much higher than the average price of Union industry.

(284) The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(286) Production volume in 2021 increased by 11 % compared to 2020. In 2020, production volume was below the normal level due to temporary closure of plant caused by the Covid-related restrictions. Thus, the increase in 2021 was a mere return of production volume to the normal, pre-Covid level. In 2022 and during the review investigation period, production volume decreased due to temporary problems with supply of one of the main raw materials, which disrupted the production process, as mentioned in recital (263), and due to lower demand for European oxalic acid, caused by increased and relatively cheaper imports from the PRC and India. Overall, production volume decreased by 8 % during the period considered.

(287) As production capacity did not change over the period considered, capacity utilisation fluctuated in line with changes in production volume.

(289) Sales volume developed in line with production volume and there were no significant stock movements (except in 2021). Thus, sales volume increased in 2021, thanks to a post-Covid recovery, and then decreased due to production disruptions caused by temporary problems with supply of one of the main raw materials, as mentioned in recital 286. Overall, during the whole period considered, sales volume increased by 3 %.

(290) As during the same period Union consumption increased at a higher rate than the Union producers’ sales volume, namely at 11 %, the market share of Union producers decreased from 86,3 % in 2020 to 80,4 % in the review investigation period.

(291) While the Union consumption increased by 11 % over the period considered, the sales volume of the Union industry increased by only 3 % during the same period. As a result, Union industry’s share in the EU market decreased by almost six percentage points.

(293) Employment remained stable during the period considered.

(294) Productivity was established as production volume divided by employment. Since employment remained stable over the period considered the trend of productivity was determined by the development of production volume. Therefore, the trend of profitability followed the trend of production volume explained in recital (286).

(295) During the review investigation period, the individual dumping margins found for the cooperating exporting producers in India and for the PRC were still substantial (see recitals (47) and (231) above).

(296) However, despite the fact there was still dumping for India and for the PRC, the analysis of the injury indicators shows that the measures in place had a positive impact on the Union industry.

(298) The average unit sales price in the Union increased by 88 % during the period considered. This was due to the increase of the unit cost of production by 93 % during the same period.

(299) The unit cost of production increased due to the increase of cost of main raw materials (sugar and nitric acid) as well as of energy and transport costs.

(301) Between 2020 and the review investigation period, the average labour costs per employee increased by 16 % due to the inflation.

(303) Given the nature of the product concerned, stocks are very small. Since the product concerned deteriorates quickly, the producers produce goods for almost immediate shipment. Therefore, this indicator is not very meaningful in order to describe the Union industry condition.

(305) The Commission established the profitability of the cooperating Union producer by expressing the pre-tax profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of these sales. Profitability fluctuated in line with the development of the unit sales price and unit cost of production described in recitals 298 and 299. Between 2020 and 2022, the unit sales price increased slower than the unit cost of production and as a result profitability decreased. During the review investigation period the unit sales price continued to grow, whereas the unit cost of production stabilised, and therefore the profitability improved. Overall, the cooperating Union producer remained profitable during the whole period considered.

(306) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The cash flow was stable in 2020 and 2021 and increased thereafter so that during the review investigation period it was 146 % higher than in 2020. This was due to the increase of depreciation from 2022 onwards. In 2020 and 2021, the Union producer recognised a lower depreciation amount than would have been normally applicable due to lower utilisation of fixed assets resulting from the Covid-related restrictions. In the following periods, the company booked the full depreciation amount.

(307) Investments decreased by 26 % over the period considered. However, since the absolute value of investments was low, this trend is not meaningful for the assessment of the financial performance of the Union producer.

(308) The return on investments is the pre-tax profit of the sales to unrelated customers in the Union in percentage of the net book value of assets related to the production of the product under review. Despite decreasing profit, return on investments increased by 33 % over the period considered as net book value of assets went down.

(309) Imports from the countries concerned increased by 59 % over the period considered, due to which Indian and Chinese producers increased their market share from 11,7 % in 2020 to 16,9 % in the review investigation period. Their prices undercut the Union industry prices by [4-25] %.

(310) Certain injury indicators, like production volume and market share, showed a negative trend. Production volume decreased by 8 % due to temporary problems with the supply of one of the raw materials. Market share decreased by almost six percentage points but remained at over 80 %.

(311) The trend of other injury indicators was positive. Union industry sales volume increased by 3 % and employment remained stable over the period considered. Additionally, during the same period average sales price in the Union increased by 88 %. This was slightly below the increase of the unit cost of production, but sufficient to maintain profitability over the whole period considered, though profitability was below the target profit (8 %) in the RIP. Cash flow improved significantly, increasing by 146 % between 2020 and the review investigation period. Return on investments also improved.

(312) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry did not suffer material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.

(313) In their comments on the final disclosure, Oxaquim submitted that data ranges provided in some tables in the Regulation, in particular the tables related to the economic performance of the Union industry, were too narrow and suggested using indexation instead of ranges arguing that indexes would show the trend without giving the magnitude order for each value.

(314) The Commission considered that it was necessary to present not only the trend but also the magnitude of the injury indicators to ensure proper understanding by interested parties of the injury assessment. To this end, the Commission had to use both indexes and ranges. The Commission defined the ranges in such a way that they enable interested parties to understand its reasoning, while at the same they are wide enough to protect confidential business information. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(315) The Commission concluded in recital (312) that the Union industry did not suffer material injury during the review investigation period. Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from India and the PRC if the measures against were allowed to lapse.

(316) In this regard, the Commission examined (i) the production capacity and spare capacity in India and the PRC, (ii) relation between export prices to third countries and the price level in the Union, (iii) likely price levels of imports from India and the PRC in the absence of anti-dumping measures and their impact on the Union industry, (iv) the attractiveness of the Union market and (v) the impact of Indian and Chinese imports on the situation of the Union industry should measures be allowed to lapse.

(317) As explained in recital (244), the total production capacity of oxalic acid in China was 595 000 tonnes in 2022. After deduction of domestic demand and total exports, the Chinese producers’ free capacity available for the Union market is estimated at about 180 000 tonnes, which is [18-22] times more than the total Union free market consumption (see recital (246)).

(318) As regards India, the free capacity available for the Union market is estimated at 8 500 tonnes as stated in recital (233), that is to say [86-105] % of the total Union free market consumption.

(319) Therefore, it can be concluded that there is substantial spare capacity both in China and India, which can be used to increase exports to the Union market should the measures in force be allowed to expire.

(320) As explained in recitals (250) and (251), the average export price from China to third countries (868 EUR/tonne) was much lower than its average export price to the Union (1 262 EUR/tonne) and the average sales price of the Union industry ([1 478-1 817] EUR/tonne) during the review investigation period.

(321) As regards India, during the review investigation period, the average export price to the Union was 11 % higher than to the rest of the world as stated in recital (235).

(322) Thus, the Commission concluded that the Chinese and Indian exporting producers would have an economic incentive to shift exports from third countries to the Union should the measures lapse. In such case they would be able to export to the Union at prices higher than those to other third country markets but still below the Union industry’s price level.

(323) Regarding import price levels, the investigation showed that despite the anti-dumping measures in force, there was still an undercutting of Union industry’s prices during the review investigation period. Should the measures in force be repealed and assuming that import prices from the countries concerned and the price of the Union industry would remain the same as during the review investigation period, the undercutting margin would increase to [15 %-40 %]. In such case, in order to remain competitive, the Union industry would have to lower its sales prices below the profitability level.

(324) Taking into account the price analysis in recitals (320) to (323) the Chinese and Indian exporting producers would have a high incentive to divert their exports to the Union where they would achieve higher prices, while still being able to significantly undercut the Union industry sales price. In addition, they would be able to use their spare capacities to increase export quantities to the Union market.

(325) The attractiveness of the Union market is further confirmed by the fact that despite the relatively high level of anti-dumping duties in force which come in addition to the conventional import duty of 6,5 %, the Chinese and Indian exporting producers continued to export to the Union and even increased their market share.

(326) It is therefore concluded that the exporting producers in India and the PRC have the potential and incentive to substantially increase the volume of their exports to the Union at dumped prices significantly undercutting the prices of the Union industry, should measures be allowed to lapse.

(327) The Union industry, under the scenario that it would keep the current price level, will not be able to maintain its sales volume and market share against the dumped imports from China and India. It is highly likely that, should the measures be allowed to lapse, the Chinese and Indian producers’ market share would increase rapidly. This would be at the expense of the Union industry whose prices are higher. Losing sales volume would further decrease capacity utilisation rate and, consequently, increase in the average unit cost of production. This would reduce profitability, which given its currently low level, would turn the Union industry unprofitable.

(328) If the Union industry decided to lower its prices in an attempt to keep its sales volume and market share, its financial situation would also quickly deteriorate. The price decrease would have to be significant to match the prices of the Indian and Chinese exporters as, should the measures be allowed to lapse, they would undercut the Union industry prices by [15 %-40 %] (without the anti-dumping duties). Such a significant price decrease would make the Union industry heavily loss-making taking into account that its profit margin is at a single-digit level.

(329) Under both scenarios, the expiry of the measures would have a negative impact on the Union industry, worsening its already fragile financial situation and ultimately threatening its viability.

(330) On this basis, it is concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from India and the PRC at injurious prices and material injury would be likely to recur.

(331) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

(332) The investigation revealed that although the Union industry did not suffer material injury, it experienced certain negative consequences of imports from India and the PRC, such as loss of market share, and its financial situation was fragile considering decreasing profitability. Should the measures against India and the PRC be repealed it is likely that the injury would recur as the Union industry would be exposed to significant volumes of imports exerting significant price pressure. As a consequence, the economic situation of the Union industry would likely deteriorate significantly for the reasons described in recitals 327 and 328. On the contrary, maintaining the measures would bring more certainty to the market, allowing the Union industry to strengthen its economic situation and improve prospects of a long-term viability.

(333) On this basis the Commission concluded that the continuation of the anti-dumping measures in force would be in the interest of the Union industry.

(334) All known unrelated importers were contacted at the initiation of the investigation. The Commission did not receive cooperation from any unrelated importers during the investigation.

(335) On this basis, there were no indications that the maintenance of the measures would have a significant negative impact on the importers outweighing the positive impact of the measures on the Union industry.

(336) Jervois Finland Oy (‘Jervois’), the sole user cooperating in the investigation, opposed the continuation of the anti-dumping measures.

(337) Jervois used oxalic acid as a raw material to produce one of its products. Oxalic acid accounted for around [5-9] % of total cost of production of this product which in turn generated around [9-13] % of total company’s turnover. Therefore, the impact of the cost of oxalic acid on the overall financial performance of Jervois was very limited.

(338) In addition, Jervois used oxalic acid imported from the countries concerned to manufacture products which it sold outside the EU. Therefore, it was eligible to import under the inward processing system and hence not pay the anti-dumping duty. In such case, the measures in force would not have any direct effect on the financial situation of Jervois.

(339) In view of the above and taking into account that the Commission did not receive comments from other users, maintaining the anti-dumping measures would not have a negative impact on Union users outweighing the positive impact of the measures on the Union industry.

(340) In their comments on the final disclosure, Oxaquim claimed that the Commission’s statement in recital (339) of the Regulation that it did not receive any other comments from the Union users, except from Jervois Finland Oy, was not correct. According to Oxaquim several Union users made representations in support of the continuation of the anti-dumping measures. Oxaquim requested the Commission to mention the number of such Union users and their support for the continuation of the measures.

(341) The Commission noted that it received comments from two distributors of oxalic acid. They expressed support for the extension of the anti-dumping measures on imports of oxalic acid from China and India. In addition, the Commission received sensitive comments from three other parties: one distributor, one user and one trader and user. The Commission requested these parties to submit non-sensitive version on their comments, but the parties failed to do so. Therefore, the Commission could not disclose their position in the Regulation.

(342) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of the Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of oxalic acid originating in India and the PRC.

(343) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on oxalic acid from India and the PRC should be maintained.

(344) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(345) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(346) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(347) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(348) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (143). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(349) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure.

(350) In their comments to the final disclosure, Oxaquim claimed that oxalic acid made by certain Chinese producers was being imported into the Union market via the company Yuanping, taking advantage of this company’s lower individual duty rate. Oxaquim requested the Commission to consider withdrawing Yuanping’s individual duty rate on the basis that this company is no longer a genuine oxalic acid producer.

(351) The Commission noted that, in the context of an expiry review, measures cannot be terminated for an individual company only. Therefore, this comment was rejected.

(352) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (144) when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(353) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 5 September 2024.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 325/2012 of 12 April 2012 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of oxalic acid originating in India and the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 106, 18.4.2012, p. 1).

(3) Judgment of 20 May 2015, Yuanping Changyuan Chemicals v Council, T-310/12, ECLI:EU:T:2015:295.

(4) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2081 of 28 November 2016 re-imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in the People’s Republic of China and produced by Yuanping Changyuan Chemicals Co. Ltd (OJ L 321, 29.11.2016, p. 48).

(5) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/931 of 28 June 2018 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in India and the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 165, 2.7.2018, p. 13).

(6) OJ C 379, 3.10.2022, p. 11.

(7) OJ C 230, 30.6.2023, p. 12.

(8) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2668

(9) Estimation based on the information provided by the two exporting producers cooperating in the investigation, on the website of one of the exporting producers that did not cooperate in the investigation, and on the previous expiry review investigation.

(10) Common Customs Tariff. The conventional rate of duty for 2917 11 00 Oxalic acid, its salts and esters is 6,5 %. See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1821 of 6 October 2016 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 294, 28.10.2016, p. 1) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1925 of 12 October 2017 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 282, 31.10.2017, p. 1).

(11) The MEIS scheme was introduced in 2015 to replace former schemes: https://www.dgft.gov.in/CP/?opt=meis

(12) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017 (SWD(2017) 483 final/2).

(13) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/607 of 14th April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of citric acid originating in the People’s Republic of China as extended to imports of citric acid consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 129, 15.4.2021, p. 73) (‘Expiry Review, Citric Acid from the PRC’), recital (101).

(14) Information on subsidies is available on the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture website: http://www.moa.gov.cn/gk/zcfg/qnhnzc/201904/t20190416_6179338.htm

(15) National Development and Reform Commission Notice 2017/627 repealing the ‘NDRC Notice on Matters Concerning the Management of Corn Deep Processing Projects’, available at: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/cyfz/zcyfz/201704/t20170417_1149901.html

(16) Expiry Review, Citric Acid from the PRC, recital (101).

(17) 14th Five-Year Plan, Article XXIII, ‘Boost the Quality, Benefits and Competitiveness of Agriculture’, p. 54.

(18) WTO, Trade Policy Review China, Report by the Secretariat (‘WTO TPR China’), WT/TPR/S/415 (15.9.2021), Para 4.10, p. 124, available via the following link: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s415_e.pdf

(19) WTO TPR China, Para 4.12, p. 125.

(20) Xinhua News Agency Report, ‘Chinese vice premier underlines stable corn, rice production’, 2 April 2022, accessible via: https://english.news.cn/20220402/6654f6332c0b49488ab133489bb84cc6/c.html

(21) WTO TPR China, Para 4.6, p. 123.

(22) WTO TPR China, Para 4.9, p. 123.

(23) WTO TPR China, supra note 60, 4.20, p. 127. The quota is allocated by the NDRC and MOFCOM and the licence is issued by MOFCOM.

(24) US Department of Commerce/International Trade Administration Memorandum (‘ITA NME Memorandum’) dated 26 October 2017, entitled China’s Status as a Non-Market Economy (A-570-053), p. 149, https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-nme-review-final-103017.pdf

(25) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1336 of 25 September 2020 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain polyvinyl alcohols originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 315, 29.9.2020, p. 1) (‘Initial Investigation PVA from China’), recital (139).

(26) http://spc.sinopec.com/spc/en/investor/com_notice/Documents/20220429/doc_20220429_563439419677.pdf

(27) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017 (SWD(2017) 483 final/2), p. 406.

(28) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/116 of 27 January 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of acesulfame potassium originating in the People’s Republic of China, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 19, 28.1.2022, p. 22) (‘Expiry Review, Acesulfame Potassium from the PRC’), recital (98).

(29) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017 (SWD(2017) 483 final/2), p. 219.

(30) ITA NME Memorandum, p. 164.

(31) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1924 of 10 October 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sodium cyclamate originating in the People’s Republic of China and Indonesia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 264, 11.10.2022, p. 12) (‘Expiry Review, Sodium Cyclamate from the PRC’), recital (63).

(32) Initial Investigation PVA from China, recital (150).

(33) Government of China, 13th Five-Year Plan for Natural Gas Development, available at: https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/node/3044

(34) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017 (SWD(2017) 483 final/2), p. 219, footnote 757.

(35) ITA NME Memorandum, p. 163.

(36) http://www.fengyuanhuaxue.com/en/

(37) Expiry Review, Sodium Cyclamate from the PRC, recital (47), footnote 20.

(38) Initial Investigation, PVA from the PRC, recital (140).

(39) See https://www.futuremarketinsights.com/reports/oxalic-acid-market

(40) See https://www.fengyuanhuaxue.com/portal/about#honor

(41) See https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/2013%20HNTE%20Backgrounder.pdf

(42) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2001 of 21 October 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of aspartame originating in the People’s Republic of China, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 274, 24.10.2022, p. 24) (‘Expiry Review, Aspartame from the PRC’), recital (100).

(43) Expiry Review, Aspartame from the PRC, recital (100).

(44) Expiry Review, Acesulfame Potassium from the PRC, recital (103).

(45) Expiry Review, Sodium Cyclamate from the PRC, recital (69) and Expiry Review, Aspartame from the PRC, recital (105).

(46) CBIRC, Three-year action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors (2020-2022), issued on 28th August 2020, available via the following link: http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=925393&itemId=928

(47) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 10 April 2024 (SWD(2024) 91 final).

(48) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 7.

(49) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 7-8.

(50) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 10, 18.

(51) Available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(52) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 29-30.

(53) Updated Report – Chapter 4, p. 57, 92.

(54) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 149-150.

(55) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 153-171.

(56) Updated Report – Chapter 7, p. 204-205.

(57) Updated Report – Chapter 8, p. 207-208, 242-243.

(58) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 19-24, Chapter 4, p. 69, p. 99-100, Chapter 5, p. 130-131.

(59) Updated Report – Chapter 5, p. 120-131.

(60) Article 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law. See updated Report – Chapter 3, p. 47-50.

(61) See the company’s 2023 Annual Report, p. 58, available at: https://static.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/new/2024-03-30/600426_20240330_6FMX.pdf (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(62) See the Danhua Technology’s 2023 Annual Report, p. 21 and 48, available at: http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESH_STOCK/2023/2023-4/2023-04-21/9019783.PDF (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(63) See https://www.sohu.com/a/434414645_100011043 (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(64) See the company’s 2023 Annual Report, p. 94, available at: http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STOCK/2024/2024-4/2024-04-27/10123345.PDF (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(65) See https://www.fengyuanhuaxue.com/portal/news/detail.html?id=8&type=1 (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(66) See http://www.moa.gov.cn/gk/cwgk_1/nybt/202206/t20220610_6402146.htm, paragraph 20 (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(67) Updated Report – Chapter 13, p. 466.

(68) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 24-27.

(69) See further: http://www.cfia.org.cn/ (accessed 22 May 2024).

(70) Charter of the China Biofermentation Industry Association. Available at: http://www.cfia.org.cn/site/term/5.html (accessed 22 May 2024).

(71) Ibid.

(72) See further: http://www.cciepa.org.cn/ (accessed 22 May 2024).

(73) See http://www.cciepa.org.cn/page.htm?id=1002 (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(74) See above, footnote 60.

(75) Updated Report – Chapter 5, p. 124-125.

(76) Updated Report – Chapter 3, p. 40.

(77) See for example: Blanchette, J. – Xi’s Gamble: The Race to Consolidate Power and Stave off Disaster; Foreign Affairs, vol. 100, no. 4, July/August 2021, pp. 10-19.

(78) Updated Report – Chapter 3, p. 41.

(79) Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies-idUSKCN1B40JU (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(80) General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era: www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(81) Financial Times (2020) – Chinese Communist Party asserts greater control over private enterprise: https://on.ft.com/3mYxP4j (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(82) See http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STOCK/2023/2023-10/2023-10-28/9608338.PDF (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(83) See http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESH_STOCK/2023/2023-11/2023-11-16/9644604.PDF (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(84) See http://www.hualuholdings.com/news/800.html (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(85) Updated Report – Chapter 14, Sections 14.1 to 14.3.

(86) Updated Report – Chapter 4, p. 56-57, 99-100.

(87) http://www.moa.gov.cn/gk/cwgk_1/nybt/202206/t20220610_6402146.htm, paragraphs 6 and 15 (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(88) See https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2022-02/11/content_5673082.htm (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(89) Ibid., Section II.1.

(90) Ibid., Section IV, Box 3.

(91) See Notice of 15 departments including the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on several policies and measures to promote the high-quality development of intensive processing of agricultural products (moa.gov.cn) (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(92) See https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/yj/art/2022/art_4ef438217a4548cb98c2d7f4f091d72e.html – First section, General Requirements (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(93) Ibid. – Second section, Improve the level of innovation and development.

(94) Ibid.

(95) Ibid., Section 11.

(96) See http://lvsefazhan.cn/index.php/guozijianguan/408.html (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(97) Ibid., Section IV.3.

(98) See http://www.moa.gov.cn/xw/qg/202206/t20220614_6402372.htm (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(99) See https://www.sohu.com/a/756699103_121769698 (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(100) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 171-179.

(101) Updated Report – Chapter 9, p. 260-261.

(102) Updated Report – Chapter 9, p. 257-260.

(103) Updated Report – Chapter 9, p. 252-254.

(104) Updated Report – Chapter 13, p. 360-361, 364-370.

(105) Updated Report – Chapter 13, p. 366.

(106) Updated Report – Chapter 13, p. 370-373.

(107) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 137-140.

(108) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 146-149.

(109) See https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/yj/art/2022/art_4ef438217a4548cb98c2d7f4f091d72e.html – Eighth section, Strengthen organizational safeguards (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(110) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 149.

(111) See official policy document of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission of 28 August 2020: Three-year action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors (2020-2022): http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=925393&itemId=928 (accessed on 13 May 2024). The Plan instructs to ‘further implement the spirit embodied in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s keynote speech on advancing the reform of corporate governance of the financial sector’. Moreover, the Plan’s section II aims at promoting the organic integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance: ‘we shall make the integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance more systematic, standardised and procedure-based […] Major operational and management issues must have been discussed by the Party Committee before being decided upon by the Board of Directors or the senior management’.

(112) See CBIRC’s Notice on the Commercial banks performance evaluation method, issued on 15 December 2020: http://jrs.mof.gov.cn/gongzuotongzhi/202101/t20210104_3638904.htm (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(113) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 157-158.

(114) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 150-152, 156-160, 165-171.

(115) OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris. p. 29, available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-chn-2019-en (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(116) See http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-04/20/content_5504241.htm (accessed on 13 May 2024).

(117) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income

(118) If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered.

(119) https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/

(120) https://www.enel.com.co

(121) https://www.acueducto.com.co

(122) https://www.gdo.com.co

(123) http://www.gtis.com/gta/secure/default.cfm

(124) Annex 21J of the request.

(*1)  Commodity code in Türkiye.

(125) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value.

(126) Annex 21J of the request.

(127) Annex 21J of the request.

(128) https://ilostat.ilo.org/

(129) https://safetya.co/normatividad/decreto-768-de-2022/

(130) https://www.enel.com.co/en/people/energy-rates.html

(131) https://www.acueducto.com.co

(132) https://www.gdo.com.co

(133) http://orbis4.bvdinfo.com/

(134) http://orbis4.bvdinfo.com/

(135) This estimate was based on the production capacity and spare capacity reported in a study commissioned by the applicant.

(136) Recital (60) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/931.

(137) https://www.chemanalyst.com/industry-report/oxalic-acid-market-2969

(138) Information on the expansion of capacity was included in the study commissioned by the applicant.

(139) The source for total exports was the IHS database, whereas domestic consumption was estimated on the basis of the production capacity reported in the study commissioned by the applicant and of the export data from IHS.

(140) Spare capacity was estimated on the basis of the study commissioned by the applicant.

(141) Request, para. 219.

(142) Request, para. 221. See, by way of example, the export restrictions on gallium and germanium imposed as of 1 August 2023 and the export controls on graphite in place as of 1 December 2023.

(143) European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

(144) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).