Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilizing activities

Type Regulation
Publication 2024-10-09
Last updated 2026-09-24
State In force
Department Council of the European Union
Source EUR-Lex
articles 23
Reform history JSON API
73.

Pavel Alekseyevich ASTAKHOV

(Russian: Павел Алексеевич АСТАХОВ) Function: Russian politician, lawyer and television personality DOB: 8.9.1966 POB: Moscow, former Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Pavel Astakhov is a Russian lawyer, media personality and former Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights of the Russian Federation (2009 to 2016). He has maintained a sustained and influential presence in Russian state-aligned media. He has hosted and appeared on television and radio programmes on outlets including REN TV and Radio Sputnik, where he has repeatedly commented on political developments concerning Ukrainian and Russian foreign policy. Following the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Pavel Astakhov publicly supported the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation and endorsed official narratives justifying Russian actions in Ukraine. He has also travelled to territories of eastern Ukraine occupied by Russia, including the Donbas region, where he engaged in public activities presented as humanitarian or child-protection missions. Those visits were conducted without the consent of the Ukrainian authorities and contributed to the legitimisation of Russia-backed structures operating in those territories. Through his public statements, media activities and audiovisual productions, Pavel Astakhov has engaged in and supported the dissemination of narratives aligned with the strategic objectives of the Government of the Russian Federation, including narratives justifying violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and discrediting Ukraine. Therefore, he is supporting, implementing and facilitating actions and policies attributable to the Government of Russian Federation, which undermine and threaten stability and security in the Union, its Member States and a third country (Ukraine) through engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference, and supporting a violent conflict in a third country (Ukraine). 15.6.2026

74.

Olga Adolfovna KIRIY

(Russian: Ольга Адольфовна КИРИЙ) Function: Russian national and a journalist and producer at RT Documentary DOB: 19.7.1968 POB: Tambov, former Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: female Olga Kiriy is a Russian national and a journalist and producer at RT Documentary, a state-controlled media outlet that plays a central role in the Kremlin’s information warfare. She systematically contributes to the dissemination of disinformation narratives aimed at justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Her work directly supports the Kremlin’s strategic communication objectives by portraying Ukraine as a ‘fascist’ or ‘toxic’ state and by legitimising Russia’s military actions. Olga Kiriy is the author and producer of multiple propaganda films, including Azovstal (2022), The Victims Speak … (2023), Cossacks (2023), I Blame Fascism (2025) and Ukraine’s Toxic War (2025). Those productions amplify core Kremlin narratives, distort facts about the situation in Ukraine and seek to influence both domestic and international audiences. Through her activities, Olga Kiriy actively participates in foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns orchestrated by the Russian state. Her work is disseminated within Russia and also abroad, including through RT Documentary’s international promotional campaigns and through participation in foreign events, screenings, and media initiatives. Those activities aim to circumvent existing restrictions on Russian state media and to influence public opinion in the third countries. By virtue of her position and activities, Olga Kiriy is supporting, implementing and facilitating actions and policies attributable to the Government of Russian Federation, which undermine and threaten stability and security in the Union, its Member States and a third country (Ukraine) through engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference, and supporting a violent conflict in a third country (Ukraine). 15.6.2026

75.

Igor Valentinovich MALTSEV

(Russian: Игор Валентинович МАЛЬЦЕВ) Function: columnist for ‘RT in Russian’, ‘Life’ and ‘Kommersant’, Russian writer, publicist, TV presenter and journalist DOB: 26.10.1958 POB: Leningrad, former Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Igor Maltsev is a Russian journalist, writer and media commentator who uses major pro-Kremlin outlets (including RT, Life and Kommersant) to disseminate propaganda, disinformation and narratives aimed at undermining Ukraine’s statehood and sovereignty, discrediting Ukraine’s political and military leadership and weakening Western support for Ukraine. Igor Maltsev openly supports Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and justifies the occupation of Ukrainian territory. In his media outputs and Telegram channel, Igor Maltsev glorifies Russian military personnel, illegal armed groups, mercenaries and occupation administrators and expresses admiration for Vladimir Putin. Igor Maltsev has also promoted a Russian Ministry of Defence video game, entitled Squad 22: ZOV, that celebrates participants of the invasion, while discrediting Ukrainian defenders. Igor Maltsev regularly labels Ukrainian soldiers as ‘Nazi fanatics’, and falsely accuses them of causing the war and of prisoner abuse. He also spreads disinformation about ‘chaos,’‘rampant crime’ and ‘mass looting’ in Kyiv and advances fake narratives portraying Ukraine as a global hub of illegal arms trafficking. By consistently disseminating such narratives, Igor Maltsev is supporting, implementing and facilitating actions and policies attributable to the Government of Russian Federation, which undermine and threaten stability and security in the Union, its Member States and in a third country (Ukraine) through engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference, and supporting a violent conflict in a third country (Ukraine). 15.6.2026

76.

Maria Yurievna VOLKONSKAYA

(Ukrainian: Марія Юріївна ВОЛКОНСЬКА; Russian: Мария Юрьевна ВОЛКОНСКАЯ) Function: Editor-in-chief of ‘Krymskaya Gazeta’ DOB: 13.7.1985 POB: Yalta, former Ukrainian SFSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Ukrainian, Russian Gender: female Maria Volkonskaya is a Russian propagandist, media executive and editor-in-chief of the state-controlled newspaper ‘Krymskaya Gazeta’. Maria Volkonskaya plays an active role in the Russian state propaganda system and regularly disseminates hostile and manipulative narratives targeting Ukraine. Through her editorial work and public commentary, she promotes a strongly anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, including narratives that dehumanise Ukrainians and that portray Ukraine and its authorities as illegitimate or extremist. Her publications contribute to the justification of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to the mobilisation of public support for Russian military actions. Maria Volkonskaya also spreads disinformation concerning Ukraine’s international partners, including Poland and other Western states, portraying them as hostile actors allegedly manipulating or exploiting Ukraine. Through such narratives, she seeks to undermine international support for Ukraine and to distort public understanding of the role of Western countries in the conflict. Through her systematic dissemination of anti-Ukrainian propaganda and disinformation, including narratives aimed at dehumanising Ukrainians, distorting historical facts, and discrediting Ukraine’s partners, Maria Volkonskaya is supporting, implementing and facilitating actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in Ukraine, through engaging in the use of information manipulation. 15.6.2026

77.

Anatoly Aleksandrovich KUZICHEV

(Russian: Анатолий Александрович КУЗИЧЕВ) Function: Radio and television host, columnist and producer, host of the programme ‘Vremya Pokazhet’ on channel ‘One’, an All-Russia People’s Front TV programme DOB: 15.5.1969 POB: Moscow, former Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Anatoly Kuzichev is a prominent Russian propagandist who actively spreads Russian propaganda and disinformation to justify Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. He openly states that he participates in an information war on Russia’s side, asserting that journalistic principles do not apply during wartime and that he defends Russia’s position. Anatoly Kuzichev consistently portrays Ukraine as an aggressive, deceptive and repressive state, controlled by extremists and supported by the West. He claims that Russia was compelled to enter the conflict, that Ukrainian leadership and society are motivated by hostility toward Russians, and that military pressure, including strikes and targeted killings, is both necessary and justified. He dismisses peace talks as harmful, labels Ukrainians who oppose Russia as traitors or terrorists, and frames the war as a defensive, righteous struggle. Therefore, Anatoly Kuzichev is implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through coordinated information manipulation and interference, as well as through instigating and supporting a violent conflict in the third country (Ukraine). 15.6.2026

78.

Georgiy Aleksandrovich SHEVKUNOV

(Russian: Георгий Александрович ШЕВКУНОВ) Function: Bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan of Simferopol and Crimea, Head of Crimea Metropole; Deputy Chairman of the Public Council under the Ministry of Education of Russia DOB: 2.7.1958 POB: Moscow, former Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Georgiy Shevkunov is a Bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church who plays an active role in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation aimed at justifying Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine. Georgiy Shevkunov systematically spreads pro-Kremlin disinformation, including claims of ‘Nazism’ in Ukraine. He also denies Ukraine’s sovereignty, and justifies Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as necessary, defensive and divinely sanctioned. Through sermons, media platforms, state-funded cultural projects, and direct fundraising for Russian troops in occupied Crimea, he promotes and enables Russia’s military actions. Therefore, Georgiy Shevkunov is implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union and a third country (Ukraine), with coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through supporting a violent conflict in the third country (Ukraine). 15.6.2026

79.

Kirill FEDOROV

(Russian: Кирилл ФЕДОРОВ) Position: Military blogger, author of the Telegram channel ‘Kirill Fedorov/War. History of Weapons’ (‘Kirill Fedorov/Voina. Istoriya Oruzhiya’), host of an original programme on Russian propaganda channel ‘Solovyov LIVE’ DOB: 3.9.1991 POB: Riga, Latvia Nationality: Latvian Gender: male Kirill Fedorov is a prominent propagandist and military correspondent who plays an active role in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation aimed at justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Kirill Fedorov portrays occupied Ukrainian territories as ‘liberated’. He also raises money for Russian frontline units, presenting himself as a volunteer organiser while using those campaigns to reinforce pro-war messaging. In the content he creates, Kirill Fedorov amplifies disinformation and unverified claims, often framing events in ways that discredit Ukraine and glorify Russian forces. Therefore, Kirill Fedorov is implementing, supporting and facilitating actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union and a third country (Ukraine), through coordinated information manipulation and interference, and by supporting a violent conflict in the third country (Ukraine). 15.6.2026

80.

Ivan Sergeevich KASYANENKO

(Russian: Иван Сергеевич КАСЬЯНЕНКО) Function: deputy commander and senior official of the Special Operations Service (SSD) of the GRU Rank: Lt. General DOB: 9.9.1975 Nationality: Russian Gender: male Individual Taxpayer Number: 773471856698 Ivan Kasyanenko is the deputy commander of the Special Operations Service (SSD) of the GRU, which absorbed certain elements of Unit 29155, and is a senior official who oversees SSD operations. He has been identified as a principal organiser and supervisor of Unit 29155 activities connected to Afghanistan, including alleged efforts to provide financial incentives for attacks targeting the United States and personnel of the international coalition operating in Afghanistan. Ivan Kasyanenko also coordinated operations linked to the 2018 Novichok poisonings of Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia Skripal. In addition, he has been linked to the coordination of covert Russian activities in Europe, the management and integration of Wagner Group networks in Africa in 2023 and military-technical cooperation initiatives involving Iran. Therefore, Ivan Kasyanenko is responsible for and implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in third countries by undermining public order and safety, and by exploiting armed conflicts, instability and insecurity. 13.7.2026

81.

Xenia Vladimirovna FEDOROVA

(Russian: Ксения Владимировна ФЁДОРОВА) Function: Former President and Director of Information of Russia Today France (between 2017 and 2022), writer, journalist and columnist DOB: 26.12.1980 Nationality: Russian Gender: female X account: https://x.com/xfedorova Instagram account: https://www.instagram.com/xfedorova Xenia Fedorova is a Russian media figure and former senior executive of Russia Today (RT) France who is active in the dissemination of pro-Russian narratives in France and the Union in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Xenia Fedorova joined RT in 2005 and subsequently held senior positions within the RT media network. She headed Ruptly, RT’s Berlin-based video agency, from 2015 to 2017, before becoming President and Director of Information of RT France in 2017. In that capacity, Xenia Fedorova participated in the implementation and dissemination of RT France’s editorial line, including narratives aligned with those promoted by the Russian authorities. Following the suspension of RT’s broadcasting activities in the Union, Xenia Fedorova continued to disseminate in French media narratives aligned with those promoted by the Russian authorities concerning Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, European support for Ukraine, NATO and relations between Russia and the Union. In particular, Xenia Fedorova has portrayed Western and European support for Ukraine as prolonging the war, presented Russia as seeking peace while portraying Europe as pursuing confrontation, questioned established accounts concerning the unlawful transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children, and disseminated narratives portraying European and NATO policies as threats to European security. Since 2025, Xenia Fedorova has regularly contributed to several French media outlets, including CNews, Europe 1 and Le JDNews, through which she has continued to disseminate such narratives to a broad French audience. Xenia Fedorova has been publicly identified by the French authorities as relaying Kremlin disinformation. In July 2026, the French authorities also adopted an expulsion measure against her. Therefore, Xenia Fedorova is supporting, involved in and facilitating actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in one of its Member States and in a third country by engaging in and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference. 24.9.2026

  • B. Legal persons, entities and bodies Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
1.

GRU Unit 29155

ФКУ ‘Войсковая Часть 29155’ Place of registration: 105077, Moscow 11th Parkovaya Street, 38A Registration No: 7719737879 OGRN: 1097746770395 GRU Unit 29155 is a covert unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU), known for its involvement in foreign assassinations and destabilisation activities across Europe. Through coups, assassinations, bombings, and cyberattacks against other countries around the world in connection with the war in Ukraine, it has sought to create chaos and destabilise European Union countries. By carrying out such actions, it seeks to help and benefit Russia. GRU Unit 29155 carried out cyberattacks and other attacks against critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, as well as planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure. 16.12.2024

2.

Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l’Investissement

GPCI Place of registration: Lomé, Togo Date of registration: January 2022 Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l’Investissement (GPCI) is a disinformation network carrying out pro-Russian covert influence operations, particularly in the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. GPCI was dismantled by Meta in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI is still active and is running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. GPCI has been indirectly funded by the Wagner Group. Therefore, GPCI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 16.12.2024

3.

African Initiative

Place of Registration: Moscow, Russia Date of registration: September 2023 African Initiative is a news agency that operates on the African continent. It has been involved in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation against the West, and has hired journalists and influencers for the purpose of spreading Russian propaganda. It has also organised press tours for African journalists in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, during which pro-Russian narratives about the war were spread. African Initiative has also organised events serving the interests of the Government of the Russian Federation, including by facilitating access to mineral resources. Therefore, African Initiative is responsible for or supporting actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 16.12.2024

4.

AFA Media aka RED

AFA Medya Anonim Șirketi aka RED AFA Медиа Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye Type of entity: media company Place of registration: Istanbul Date of registration: 22.11.2022 VAT Nr.: 0081804196 Registration number 423277-5 Principle place of business: Türkiye Website: https://thered.stream/imprint/ Founder: Hüseyin Dogru AFA Medya A.Ș. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ș. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations. RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas. During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED’s online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform. AFA Medya Anonim Șirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation. 20.5.2025

5.

Voice of Europe

(Russian: Голос Европы) Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech Republic Website: www.voiceofeurope.com, www.voiceofeurope.eu Type of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.) Place of registration: Prague Date of registration: 14.3.2023 Registration number: CZ05185327 Principal place of business: Czech Republic Voice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine’s defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States. Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025

6.

Norebo JSC

Address: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian Federation Type of entity: Joint Stock Company Place of registration: Murmansk Date of registration: 2.11.2007 Registration number: 1201000007889 TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001 Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage. Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank. Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time. Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure. 20.5.2025

7.

Murman SeaFood

(Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты) Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025 Type of entity: limited liability company Place of registration: Murmansk Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner. Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time. MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure. 20.5.2025

8.

Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Radio Frequency Centre”

General Radio Frequency Centre GRFC Федеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Главный Радиочастотный Центр” ФГУП “ГРЧЦ” Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15 115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15 Type of entity: Federal agency Place of registration: Moscow, Russian Federation Date of registration: 30.3.2001 BIN: 1027739334479 INN: 7706228218 KPP: 772501001 Principal place of business: Russia The General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector. Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC. The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas. Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025

9.

Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.

Date of registration: 10.2.2022 Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom (maildrop address) Registration number: 13906017 Website: https://stark-industries.solutions/ Website: https://pq.hosting/ Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world. Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies. Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti. 20.5.2025

10.

Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS);

Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие “Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть” Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia Website: https://moscow.rtrs.ru/ Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia Date of registration: 30.11.2001 Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084 The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS) operatеs Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there. Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025

11.

841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet

841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбы Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643 238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643 Type of entity: Military unit Place of registration: Kalininingrad region, Russian Federation Phone number: 8(40153)37-244 Military unit 09643 The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges. Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes. The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas. Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. 15.7.2025

12.

BRICS Journalist Association

Website: bricspress.live The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS). Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025

13.

Center for Geopolitical Expertise

Центр геополитических экспертиз, CGE Website: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.su Place of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044 Date of registration: 17.12.2002 Registration number: 1027739806940 The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations. Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025

14.

Foundation to Battle Injustice

Date of creation: 23.3.2021 Website: fondfbr.ru The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d’état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516’s information operations. Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025

15.

Tigerweb

Website: Tigerweb.ru Place of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office 408 Date of registration: 2019 Registration number: 1199112018973 Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project “Portal Kombat”, which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called “informational portals”. Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025

16.

142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion

142-й батальон радиоэлектронной борьбы 142-й батальон РЭБ 142-й отдельный батальон радиоэлектронной борьбы 236000, Posyolok Kumachevo, Kaliningrad region, Russian Federation The 142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion, based in Kaliningrad region, is part of electronic warfare and plays an important role in ensuring the security and defence of the region. The battalion is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges. Recently, several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and ‘spoofing’ of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes. The 142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas. Therefore, the 142nd Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the (mis)use of the radio frequency sector, is responsible for actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in, or the sovereignty of, the Member States of the Union by engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference or actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying critical infrastructure through malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities. 15.12.2025

17.

International Russophile Movement

(Russian: Международное движение русофилов) (French: Mouvement International Russophile)

The International Russophile Movement is a movement responsible for amplifying destabilising narratives globally, on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation. The movement has strong ties with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, receiving endorsements for their work. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has given keynote speeches in congress meetings of the movement. The movement is also associated with the Kremlin’s top ideologue Aleksandr Dugin and media oligarch Konstantin Malofeev. The Government of the Russian Federation uses the movement as a cover for manipulating the public opinion of other countries, promoting anti-Western sentiment and echoing other Kremlin speaking points. Therefore, the International Russophile Movement is supporting or implementing actions attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in a third country (Ukraine) by engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 15.12.2025

18.

Euromore

a.k.a. Euroview a.k.a. Euroview Media Address: Avenue Ariane 5, 1200 Brussels, Belgium Website: https://euromore.eu/, https://euroview.media Euromore is a media platform which operates within the pro-Kremlin information architecture as an unofficial media relay, intended to amplify, recycle, and legitimise Russian narratives and disinformation targeting European audiences. Euromore recurrently disseminates content challenging the legitimacy of Union institutions and justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Its editorial line consistently converges with talking points promoted by the Kremlin, particularly regarding the alleged responsibility of NATO and the Union in the conflict in Ukraine and the delegitimisation of the Ukrainian authorities. The platform regularly hosts contributors known for their dissemination of conspiracy-driven narratives or disinformation, allowing those contributors to retain public visibility and to continue their influence activities. Euromore’s website appears to have been cleaned up and to contain only an article complaining about Western sanctions targeting propaganda media. However, the URL is still active, albeit now referring to the new name ‘Euroview Media: euroview.media’, and relays RT and Sputnik content. Therefore, Euromore is supporting, involved in and facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third country (Ukraine), through engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting and otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 21.4.2026

19.

The Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond)

(Russian: Некоммерческая организация ‘Фонд поддержки и защиты прав соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом’) Address: Arbat Street, 55/32, Moscow, 119200, Russian Federation Place of registration: Moscow, Russia Date of registration: 21.11.2011 Registration number: 1117799023330 Website: www.pravfond.ru The Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond) constitutes a core instrument of the Russian Federation’s foreign influence and propaganda strategy. Founded and financed by the Russian state, the Foundation is fully embedded within the Kremlin’s soft power architecture and operates as a para-institutional relay for official narratives. Pravfond’s legal and analytical output is systematically used to reinforce key Kremlin talking points, notably allegations of the ‘nazification’ of Ukraine, claims of widespread ‘Russophobia,’ and assertions of systematic persecution of Russian-speaking populations in neighboring states. The Foundation channels funds to actors closely linked to pro-Kremlin influence networks. The Executive Director of Pravfond has publicly expressed support for President Vladimir Putin and for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In parallel, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has praised the Foundation’s ‘consistent work’ in countering alleged xenophobia, neo-Nazism, and attempts to falsify history, thereby confirming Pravfond’s direct integration into the Kremlin’s official communication and conflict-legitimation strategy. Therefore, Pravfond is responsible for, implementing, supporting, involved in and facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten sovereignty and stability in the Union or in a third country (Ukraine), through planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 21.4.2026

20.

Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives/ PFKI

(Russian: Президентский Фонд Культурных Инициатив / ПФКИ) Address: Sredniy Ovchinnikovsky 8, Moscow, Russian Federation Place of registration: Moscow, Russian Federation Date of registration: 1.6.2021 OGRN: 1217700257170 INN: 9704068763 The Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives is a foundation created by decree of Russian President Vladimir Putin. It provides grants for various projects, including for projects supporting the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. That foundation has also provided funding for public relations (PR) agency ‘Limitless’ (Bezgranichnye), thereby enabling its operations. PR agency ‘Limitless’ is responsible for managing Western influencers who echo Kremlin narratives and pro-war propaganda talking points, thereby destabilising Ukraine and Ukrainian allies by flooding the information space with disinformation. As the Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives has funded the activities of PR agency ‘Limitless’, it is involved in actions attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of a third country (Ukraine) through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 15.6.2026

ANNEX II

Websites for information on the competent authorities and address for notifications to the Commission

BELGIUM

https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions

BULGARIA

https://www.mfa.bg/en/EU-sanctions

CZECHIA

https://fau.gov.cz/en/international-sanctions

DENMARK

https://um.dk/udenrigspolitik/sanktioner

GERMANY

https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/embargos-aussenwirtschaftsrecht.html

ESTONIA

https://vm.ee/sanktsioonid-ekspordi-ja-relvastuskontroll/rahvusvahelised-sanktsioonid

IRELAND

https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/ireland-in-the-eu/eu-restrictive-measures/

GREECE

http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html

SPAIN

https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx

FRANCE

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/

CROATIA

https://mvep.gov.hr/vanjska-politika/medjunarodne-mjere-ogranicavanja/22955

ITALY

https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica_europea/misure_deroghe/

CYPRUS

https://mfa.gov.cy/themes/

LATVIA

https://www.fid.gov.lv/en

LITHUANIA

http://www.urm.lt/sanctions

LUXEMBOURG

https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/organisations-economiques-int/mesures-restrictives.html

HUNGARY

https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ensz-eu-szankcios-tajekoztato

MALTA

https://smb.gov.mt/

NETHERLANDS

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties

AUSTRIA

https://www.bmeia.gv.at/themen/aussenpolitik/europa/eu-sanktionen-nationale-behoerden/

POLAND

https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/sankcje-miedzynarodowe

https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/international-sanctions

PORTUGAL

https://portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/politica-externa/medidas-restritivas

ROMANIA

http://www.mae.ro/node/1548

SLOVENIA

http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi

SLOVAKIA

https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu

FINLAND

https://um.fi/pakotteet

SWEDEN

https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner

Address for notifications to the European Commission:

European Commission Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA) SPA2 The Pavillion Rue de Spa 2 B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

Email: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu

ANNEX III

List of tangible assets referred to in Article 1a

[…]

ANNEX IV

List of legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 1b

[…]

ANNEX V

List of legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 1c

[…]

[^E0001]: Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities (OJ L, 2024/2643, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2643/oj).

[^E0002]: Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1).

[^E0003]: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

[^E0004]: Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73).

[^E0005]: Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349).

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