Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/58 of 15 January 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(222) The Commission considered that the import prices were not impacted by the devaluation of the Turkish lira, the Commission considered that any increase will be reflected by an increase of the total costs of goods sold and/or SG&A expenses and thus in the decrease of the profit margin of the representative producer. As SG&A and profit margins were expressed in percentage, this had no impact on the calculation of the normal value. Regarding the inflation of certain specific costs, as labour or electricity, the Commission considered that the inflation reported in Türkiye is largely attenuated by the evolution of the exchange rate between Turkish lira and the Renminbi. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(223) Following the final disclosure, Giti argued that the Commission's approach to calculating SG&A expenses failed to account for the significant impact of currency devaluation on exports and imports, which were denominated in foreign currencies. In particular, Giti noted that the Commission's requirement to distinguish between realized and translation exchange gains/losses was not feasible, as the Turkish companies' financial data did not provide this level of detail.

(224) The Commission also examined the potential impact of exchange gains or losses on the SG&A margin, but found no evidence in the file to suggest that it was significant. In any case, it is clear that any changes to the SG&A total amount would have a corresponding impact on the total profit amount, and therefore would not affect the final determination of the dumping margins. As a result, the claim was disregarded.

South Africa

(225) For South Africa, Giti agrees with the Commission that South Africa does not appear to constitute a suitable representative country on account of the negligible imports for all factors of production.

(226) The Commission therefore intends to consider Türkiye as representative country.

(227) Following the disclosure of the First Note, Hankook group revised several times its initial submission on factors of production. This resulted in the Commission revising the list of HS codes of each category described in the recital (186) and its initial analysis. After revision, the main category in the Second Note represented around 64 % of the direct material costs, and the second category of products represented around 22 % of the direct material costs.

(228) Following the final disclosure, Giti claimed that the Commission failed to provide explanations on the reclassification of the HS code 4002 80 from category A to category B.

(229) As mentioned in recital (227), the list of HS codes of each category was revised following the revision of Hankook factors of production. The methodology used for establishing each category was based on the weight of each HS codes as described in recital (186). Therefore, the Commission considered that the methodology used was explicitly disclosed to interested parties. The claim was disregarded.

(230) As noted in recital (219), the Commission revised the list of HS codes for each category in response to the revision of Hankook's factors of production. This revision was made in accordance with the methodology described in recital (186), which is based on the weight of each HS code. The Commission had explicitly disclosed this methodology to interested parties, and therefore considered that the claim was unfounded. As a result, the claim was disregarded.

(231) In their comments, the Hankook group reiterated its claim that the consolidated financial statements could not be used (please refer to recital (218)) and the Commission had not provided any evidence to support the consideration of Brisa Bridgestone as a reliable source. Therefore, Hankook group considered that Brisa Bridgestone's financial data was unwarranted and unjustified.

(232) The Commission found that Hankook group did not substantiate its claim with new evidence that the absorption of Arvento impacted the profit margin of Brisa Bridgestone. When Brisa Bridgestone and Goodyear Lastikleri Turk financial statements were consolidated, it provided a reasonable profit margin of 10,8 %, and thus it should be considered as the most appropriate benchmark available.

(233) In their comments, Giti group reiterated its claim that Malaysia should not be disregarded as the country was selected in recent cases by the Commission and the US DoC. Giti group considered that Malaysia constituted a much more suitable representative country as the main inputs were imported in sufficient quantity. Furthermore, with regards to the selection of a producer in the representative country, the Giti Group considered that Toyo Tyre Malaysia could still be considered appropriate, even though it only produced SUV tyres. This was based on the fact that the Turkish producer, Goodyear Lastikleri Turk, did not exclusively produce truck tyres. Notably, in the first quarter 2023, tyres for cars accounted for 85 % of the number of tyres sold by exporting producer in the Union.

(234) The Commission rejected the claim as Toyo Tyre Malaysia did not produce at all the product under review.

(235) Regarding Türkiye, Giti group reiterated its claims on inflation and devaluation of the Turkish Lira, that electricity prices or labour costs were influenced by political factors, and tyres originating from various origins were subject to anti-dumping measures.

(236) As no additional evidence was submitted by Giti group, the claim was disregarded.

(237) Having established that Türkiye was the only available appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation.

(238) In view of the above analysis, and in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation, the Commission considered Türkiye as the most appropriate representative country and Brisa Bridgestone consolidated financial statements and Goodyear Lastikleri Turk financial statements as an appropriate and reasonable source for financial data.

(239) In the First Note, the Commission listed the factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under review by the sampled exporting producers and invited the interested parties to comment and propose readily available information on undistorted values for each of the factors of production mentioned in that note.

(240) Subsequently, in the Second Note, the Commission stated that, in order to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it would use Global Trade Atlas (‘GTA’) to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials. In addition, the Commission stated that it would use on one hand the Turkish Statistical Institute (105) for establishing undistorted costs of labour, natural gas, liquefied natural gas (‘LNG’) and steam, and on the other hand the statistics provided by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (106) for establishing undistorted cost of electricity. The statistics provided by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Investment Office (107) will be used by the Commission for establishing undistorted cost of water.

(241) The Commission informed that it would calculate the percentage of the consumables on the total cost of raw materials and apply this percentage to the recalculated cost of raw materials when using the established undistorted benchmarks from the appropriate representative country.

(243) In order to establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price to the representative country as reported in the GTA to which import duties and transport costs were added. The import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding the PRC and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex 1 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and the Council (109). The Commission decided to exclude imports from the PRC into the representative country as it concluded in Section 3.2 that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices. After excluding imports from the PRC into the representative country, the volume of imports from other third countries remained representative.

(244) The Commission expressed the transport cost incurred by the cooperating exporting producers for the supply of raw materials as a percentage of the actual cost of such raw materials and then applied the same percentage to the undistorted cost of the same raw materials in order to obtain the undistorted transport cost. The Commission considered that, in the context of this investigation, the ratio between the exporting producer’s raw material and the reported transport costs could be reasonably used as an indication to estimate the undistorted transport costs of raw materials when delivered to the company’s factory.

(245) Following the final disclosure, Giti claimed that the Commission wrongly disregarded its purchases of natural rubber when directly imported and invoiced in foreign currencies.

(246) The Commission noted that, even if it were to use the cost of the purchases of natural rubber when directly imported and invoiced in foreign currencies, the dumping margin would only decrease by approximately 2 % while remaining well-above de minimis, thereby not changing the overall finding of continuation of dumping. Accordingly, the Commission did not further address the claim.

(247) The Turkish Statistical Institute publishes detailed information on wages in different economic sectors in Türkiye (110). The Commission established the benchmark based on the latest available statistics covering 2022 for average hourly labour costs for the economic activity ‘Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes products’ NACE code C.22 according to NACE Rev.2 classification and a headcount category of more than 1 000 employees. The values were further adjusted for inflation using the labour cost index published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (111) to reflect the costs in the investigation period.

(248) Following the final disclosure, Giti claimed that the benchmark used appeared to be inflated compared with other recent cases.

(249) The Commission reviewed the claim and found no evidence of calculation errors. The party's references to other cases in different industries, such as steel ropes and cables, melamine, and tungsten carbide, did not provide a basis for challenging the Commission's calculations. The differences observed in these cases can be attributed to the distinct characteristics of each industry. The claim was disregarded.

(250) The price of electricity for companies (industrial users) in Türkiye is published by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) (112) in Türkiye. The Commission used the data on the industrial electricity prices that EMRA mandated to be applied as of 1 January 2023, net of VAT as the Turkish producers of the product under investigation are entitled at its reimbursement.

(251) The price of natural gas for industrial users in Türkiye is published by the Turkish Statistical Institute. The Commission used the price available for the second semester of 2021 and the first semester of 2022 corresponding to the consumption band of 2 610 000 – 26 100 000 m3 (113). This price was further adjusted for inflation using the Producer Price Index published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (114) to reflect the price in the investigation period. The VAT, which is included in the published price, was deducted as the Turkish producers of the product under investigation are entitled at its reimbursement .

(252) For steam gas, the benchmark was derived from the natural gas benchmark using a conversion ratio. Specifically, under standard conditions, it is estimated that approximately 0,421 tonnes of natural gas are consumed to produce 1 tonne of steam gas.

(253) The Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Investment Office (115) published the cost of water for industrial use. The Commission used the price valid in 2023 for the Balikesir region where Sisecam Elyaf is located, net of VAT as the Turkish producers of the product under investigation are entitled at its reimbursement.

(254) According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, “the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits”. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

(255) The manufacturing overheads incurred by the cooperating exporting producers were expressed as a percentage of the costs of manufacturing actually incurred by the exporting producers. This percentage was applied to the undistorted costs of manufacturing.

(256) For establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG&A costs and profit, the Commission used the readily available financial data, for the review investigation period of the Turkish producers Brisa Bridgestone and Goodyear Lastikleri Turk mentioned in recital (238) above.

(257) Based on the consolidated financial statements of Brisa Bridgestone and the financial statements of Goodyear Lastikleri, the weighted average rates for SG&A and profit, expressed as a percentage of the cost of goods sold, are 22,0 % and 10,8 % respectively. These rates were considered reasonable for the tyres industry.

(258) Following the final disclosure, Giti claimed that the Commission used as profit margin a benchmark reflecting the profit of tier 1 brand companies, and thus cannot constitute a reasonable benchmark for them.

(259) As mentioned above in recital (257), the Commission relied on the available information and set a margin of 8,1 % (expressed as a percentage of total revenue). Although a calculation based on the three tiers was not feasible, the Commission considered that this margin was close to a weighted average between tier 1 and tier 2 as Bridgestone and Goodyear do not produce only tier 1 truck tyres but also tier 2 truck tyres under different brand names. However, the Commission considered that this benchmark was reasonable for the purposes of an expiry review. This is because an exact margin is not required in such a review. As a result, the claim was disregarded.

(260) After the disclosure, Hankook reiterated that the financial statements of Brisa Bridgestone should not be used for the purpose of the dumping calculation and that Hankook presented arguments at different stages of the investigation. Hankook considered that the Commission did not address its arguments and thus hindered Hankook rights of defence given that its claim was evidently not assessed to the standard required by the fundamental principles of good and sound administration.

(261) Hankook claimed that the reasons invoked by the Commission to justify the use of Brisa Bridgestone are mere speculations unsupported by evidence and the Commission failed to substantiate its own choice and to satisfy the required standard proof to identify a representative value for the SG&A expenses and profit as mandated by Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(262) The General Court recently confirmed this principle as it reiterated the fundamental principle that the party seeking to rely on a claim bears the corresponding burden of proof. (116) In this specific case, since the relevant SG&A expenses and profits are not those of Hankook Group, it is the Commission that must prove that these figures are “appropriate”, as required by Article 2(6a). Thus, it is for the Commission to provide consistent evidence that the choice of Türkiye as a representative country, and the choice of – inter alia - Brisa Bridgestone as a representative local producer, is appropriate and justified pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation — and not for the interested parties to demonstrate the opposite.

(263) Hankook claimed that the Commission decided to exclude the Malaysian producer due to the fact it was also active in other sectors.

(264) Hankook claimed that it is for the Commission to prove its choice of representative local producer is appropriate pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation and not for the interested parties to prove the contrary.

(265) The consolidated figures of Brisa Bridgestone involved a variety of different products, including some which are blatantly unrelated to the investigation and therefore it makes them unrepresentative within the meaning of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(266) Hankook claimed that the Commission failed to explain why the use of the financial statements of Brisa Bridgestone was necessary. Moreover, Hankook clarified that the use of financial statements of Goodyear Lastikleri was never questioned and therefore there was no need to add another company.

(267) These claims had to be disregarded. The Commission considered that Brisa Bridgestone was a representative producer in the representative country as (i) it produces the product concerned, (ii) it had available financial data for the period considered and (iii) its SG&A and profit did not appear disproportionately high and thus were deemed as appropriate. On the contrary, Hankook did not provide any evidence that the consolidation of other activities in the financial statement of Brisa Bridgeston resulted in abnormal SG&A and profit. Therefore, having available financial data for two producers of the product concerned in Turkey, the Commission found no elements to exclude one or the other.

(268) As regards the argument on the exclusion of the Malaysian producer, as explained above in recital (234), it did not produce at all the product concerned, as opposed to the two producers identified in Turkey.

(269) Hankook and Giti claimed that the Commission wrongly established the SG&A as certain expenses, such as transport and storage costs, were not removed from the total amount of the SG&A amounts. Moreover, Hankook and Giti claimed that other type of expenses should be also removed from the SG&A such as commission expenses or marketing expenses.

(270) The Commission reviewed the claims and determined that a revision to the SG&A percentage was necessary. Regarding the methodology applied, the Commission used its standard methodology for establishing the SG&A percentage net of transportation expenses: from the total revenue, the costs of good sold and the profit were removed, then the transportation expenses were deducted.

(271) Based on the financial statements available, the Commission removed the transportation expenses from the total SG&A amount (as established based on the methodology described above). Due to the absence of quarterly information, the Commission estimated the transportation expenses during the RIP based on the financial statements for January-June 2023. The estimated transportation expenses accounted for a percentage of the total SG&A amount. As a result of this revision, the SG&A percentage decreased from 22,0 % to 18,5 % when expressed as a percentage of the cost of goods sold (13 % when expressed as a percentage of total revenue).

(272) Based on the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(273) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. The Commission applied the undistorted unit costs to the actual consumption of the individual factors of production of the cooperating exporting producers. These consumption ratios provided by the cooperating exporting producers were verified during the verification visit. The Commission multiplied the consumption ratios by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country, as described in Section 3.3.14.

(274) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost established, the Commission applied the manufacturing overheads, as described in recital (255).

(275) The Commission then added SG&A of 18,5 % and profit of 10,8 %, as explained in recital (271).

(276) The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers and/or through related companies acting as an importer.

(277) If the exporting producers export the product under review directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product under review when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

(278) If the exporting producers export the product under review to the Union through related companies acting as an importer, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits accruing.

(279) In absence of cooperation from an unrelated importer, the Commission relied on the profit established during the original investigation for an unrelated importer, that is 6,7 %.

(280) The Commission compared, per product type, the constructed normal value established in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation and the export price of the sampled exporting producers on an ex-works basis as established above.

(281) Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for freight costs in the Union, Customs duties, quantity discounts credit costs and bank charges.

(282) For the sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product under review covering all export transactions, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

(283) On this basis, the weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, was in the range of around 7 % to around 22 % for the sampled cooperating producers. It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

(284) Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures be repealed.

(285) The following additional elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC; relation between export prices to third countries and the price level in the Union and the attractiveness of the Union market.

(286) In the absence of cooperation, the Commission established production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC on the basis of information provided in the expiry review request.

(287) According to the data provided in the request by the applicant, CRIA reported a production output of 122,39 million tyres in 2021, for an estimated production capacity of 141,76 million tyres in the same year, which marks an increase in tyres produced of 2,72 million with the preceding year. Capacity utilisation rates derived from these figures would stand at around 86 %. In 2022, at least 1,5 million units of additional tyres production capacities had already been added, as reported by CRIA. This puts the total tyres production capacity at around 143,25 million units for 2022. If the same capacity utilisation rates are taken as for the year 2021, this would bring output at around 123,67 million tyres produced. The available unused capacity in China in 2022 therefore amount to almost 20 million units, almost equivalent to the total consumption on the EU market (117).

(288) Chinese producers, in line with the GOC's and CCP's industrial policies outlined above, have continued to increase their already overdeveloped production capacities since the original IP. Recent foreign trade defence investigations concluded to the significance of the existing production capacity in China. The Brazilian antidumping investigation published in May 2021 already highlighted the existence of significant production capacities, with evidence of several investments in production capacities by the biggest companies, which would be able to overcome the Brazilian consumption. (118) The South African antidumping investigation published in August 2022 equally considered the significant production capacities of Chinese producers that would be able to increase their production for export demand. (119)

(289) The Commission examined whether it was likely that PRC exporting producers would continue their export sales at dumped prices on the Union market should measures be allowed to lapse. Therefore, the Commission analysed the price level of Chinese exports to third country markets and compared them to the price level of Chinese exports to the Union market, to determine whether the Union market was attractive in terms of price levels.

(290) The Commission examined the level of prices during the RIP reported by the sampled exporting producers and found that for comparable transactions (i.e. commercial invoice set on FOB incoterms) the unit price of truck tyres exported to third countries represented around 80 % of their unit price in the EU. Moreover, the attractiveness of the Union market was demonstrated by the fact that despite the anti-dumping measures in force, Chinese export volumes to the Union remained at around 30 % of the volume of imports during the initial investigation.

(291) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Union market constituted an attractive market for Chinese exporting producers of truck tyres both in terms of its prices and its size.

(292) In addition to the above, the Commission found that trade defence measures on exports of the product under review from PRC are in force in Armenia, Botswana, Brazil, Egypt, Eswatini, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Namibia, Russian Federation, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (120). As a consequence, these third country markets, which are significant consumers of truck tyres, are less attractive for the Chinese exporting producers. This is an additional element which supports the finding that PRC’s current production capacity would most likely end in the Union market, should measures be repealed.

(293) The investigation showed that the imports from the PRC continued to enter the Union market in high volumes (compared to the size of the market) at dumped prices during the RIP.

(294) In addition, the spare capacity in the PRC was significant in comparison with the Union consumption (recital (301)) during the RIP. Moreover, the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of size and prices pointed to the likelihood that Chinese exports would be directed towards the Union market, should the measures lapse, and spare capacity would also be used to increase production and exports to the Union.

(295) Consequently, the Commission concluded that there was a likelihood that the expiry of the anti-dumping measures would result in a significant increase of dumped imports of the product under review from the PRC to the Union due to the large spare capacity in the PRC and the price level of the Union market compared to other export destinations.

(296) In the light of the above, the Commission concluded that the expiry of the anti-dumping measures would likely to lead to a continuation of dumping.

(297) The like product was manufactured by more than 400 producers in the Union during the period considered. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

(298) The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at around 18 million tyres. The Commission established the total Union production figure on the basis of the information provided by European Tyre & Rubber Manufacturers Association (‘ETRMA’), the applicant and Eurostat statistics. As indicated in recital (27), five Union producers in the final sample represent more than 25% of Union production and sales of the like product. Therefore, the microeconomic indicators were examined on the basis of data obtained from the replies of those five Union producers.

(299) Some of the sampled producers were found to import and resell the product concerned on the Union market from the PRC. However, by comparison to their overall sales, the imports remain marginal (less than 1% of their overall sales) and do not affect their qualification as Union producers.

(300) The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of information provided by the ETRMA and Eurostat.

(302) Consumption on the Union market increased by 11% over the period considered. There was a notable increase from 2020 to 2022. This is likely to be linked with the recovery from the Covid crisis and is explained by the fact that consumption of tyres is intrinsically linked to kilometres travelled by the fleets which, in turn, is very dependent on the overall economic activity and notably of the volume of goods transported by road. The increase in consumption peaked in 2022 and slowed down during the review investigation period.

(303) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat. The market share of the imports was established on the basis of the Union consumption in Table 1.

(305) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat. The market share of the imports on the basis of the Union consumption is found in Table 3.

(306) Import volumes from the PRC increased by 22 % during the period considered, from around 900 thousand tyres in 2020 to around 1,1 million tyres in the investigation period. The increase of Chinese imports was particularly significant in 2022 when the original measures were partially annulled by General Court of the European Union as described in the recital (4). The import volumes remained at the same level also during the review investigation period despite the decrease in demand. This resulted in an increase of the market share of Chinese imports from 4,9 % to 5,4 % during the period considered.

(307) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat.

(309) Over the period considered, the average Chinese import prices into the Union (all tiers) increased by 61 %.

(310) As the sampled exporting producers exported predominantly Tier 1 and Tier 2 tyres, the Commission lacked detailed information about Chinese exports in Tier 3, where the primary injury occurred during the original investigation, subsequently causing a reverse cascade effect into the other two tiers.

(311) For that reason, the Commission estimated the price undercutting for the totality of imports on the basis of import statistics.

(313) This comparison showed that the average Chinese landed import price (270 EUR/item) was below the Union industry’s average selling price (281 EUR/item) and only slightly above the Union industry’s average cost of production (260 EUR/item). Should the landed price be established without the anti-dumping duties, it would amount to 254 EUR/item, which would significantly undercut the Union industry’s average selling price and would be also below the Union industry’s cost of production.

(314) The Commission thus concluded that, overall, the prices of Chinese imports were lower than the average selling price of the Union industry.

(315) Following final disclosure, Hankook claimed that the Commission had incorrectly changed its undercutting calculation methodology compared to the original investigation. Hankook claimed that instead of estimating the price undercutting for the totality of imports on the basis of import statistics the Commission should have carried out an analysis on a type-by-type or tier-by-tier basis. In the sensitive version of its submission Hankook also brought forward data on its export volumes and prices and claimed that by using this data the Commission could have deduced the import prices for all tiers and carried out a tier-by-tier undercutting analysis.

(316) The Commission disagreed with these claims. First, due to non-cooperation of the Chinese exporting producers operating in tier 3 and as stated in the recital (310), the Commission lacked detailed information about Chinese exports especially in tier 3 and was unable to carry out a tier-by-tier undercutting analysis. Thus, there was a change in the underlying data available to the Commission. Second, the data brought forward by Hankook on its own export volumes and prices was insufficient for carrying out any further undercutting analysis. Even according to this data, it remains that there are other operators in tier 1, 2 and 3 on which there is no detailed information available and, in contrary to what Hankook claims, this data is not sufficient to bring any further information on the undercutting on tier-by-tier level or to invalidate any of the results of the undercutting analysis made by the Commission. Therefore, this claim is rejected.

(317) The imports of tyres from third countries other than China were mainly from Thailand, Türkiye and Vietnam.

(319) During the period considered, imports from other third countries increased by around 2 million items, i.e. by 41 %. This is faster than the progression of the Union consumption and resulted in the market share increase from 26,5% to 33,5%.

(320) The main increase took place from imports from Thailand (856 thousand items), Türkiye (590 thousand items) and Vietnam (486 thousand items). For other third countries the increase was only modest (53 thousand items).

(321) The price level of imports from other third countries, especially from Thailand and Vietnam, was markedly below the Union industry selling prices.

(322) The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(323) As mentioned in recitals (15) to (17), sampling was used for the assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(324) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the review request, Eurostat statistics and submissions from ETRMA. The data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The data related to the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(325) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(326) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(327) The original investigation conducted analysis of the economic situation of the Union industry on an aggregated basis and, in certain microeconomic indicators, also at the level of tiers given the Union market segmentation. In the current investigation the Commission first analysed the economic situation of the Union industry on an aggregated basis.

(328) The Commission also conducted the analysis of certain indicators at the tier level. As shown in recitals (370) to (377), this analysis confirms that the trends for the product concerned considered as a whole in general correspond to those for the tiers considered separately.

(329) In the original investigation, the Commission weighted the results of the sampled Union producers in accordance with their share in the total Union sales of the Union producers to ensure that the SMEs were represented according to their share in the total Union sales in all micro-indicators. As SMEs are active only in tier 3 segment, this adjustment had as a direct consequence to increase the share of tier 3 sales within the set of data originating from the sampled Union producers.

(330) In the current investigation, the Commission considered that the original weighting was not needed in order to make an objective assessment of the state of the Union industry in the context of the expiry review. Indeed, the investigation found that the injury picture of the SMEs operating only in Tier 3 was even worse than the injury picture of the Tier 3 overall. Moreover, the Commission found that, even without weighting the data of the sampled Union producers, the Union industry suffered injury in all tiers (see recitals (370) to (377)). Thus, logically, any weighting would only increase the negative trends currently observed in the overall injury picture.

(332) Along with the growth of the market and the sales in the Union market, the production volumes increased from 2020 to 2021. After that, the production declined in 2022 and decreased even further in the review investigation period. The decrease of the production volumes was attributable to the decreased sales volumes, which in turn was linked to the decrease of Union consumption and resulted in the loss of market share of the Union industry. In the review investigation period, the Union industry’s production volumes returned to the same level as in 2020. The Union industry was however able to adapt its capacity to the changes in production volumes, tempering the fluctuations of the capacity utilisation rate - which even improved slightly (by 3 %) over the whole period considered.

(334) In the growing market, the Union industry’s sales volumes increased from 2020 to 2021. During 2022, the sales volumes of the Union industry declined despite the growth of the market and decreased further in the review investigation period. In the review investigation period, the Union industry’s sales volumes had returned to the same level as 2020. Because the sales of the Union industry lagged behind the increase of the market in 2022 and deteriorated faster than the market in the review investigation period, the market share fell from 69% to 61% during the period considered.

(335) In its comments on initiation Hankook group claimed that the sales of the Union industry as well as its market share remained essentially stable across the period considered and that the slight decrease from 2022 to the review investigation period could be explained by the decrease in consumption.

(336) The findings of the investigation do not support this claim. Albeit the sales of the Union industry were on the same level in the review investigation period compared to 2020, there was an important decrease (13 %) from 2022 to the review investigation period. Also, the Union industry’s market share decreased from 69% to 61% during the period considered.

(337) Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(338) The Union consumption first increased from 2020 to 2022 in line with the increase of economic activity after the Covid. The increase in consumption peaked in 2022 and slowed down during the review investigation period, resulting in an overall increase of 11% during the period considered. Only during 2021 the Union industry sales could follow the positive trend of the market. In 2022 the Union industry’s sales did not increase in the same pace as the market and they deteriorated faster than the market in review investigation period. This resulted in decrease of 8 percentage points of market share (from 69% to 61%) during the period considered.

(340) During the period considered the Union industry lost over 2 700 direct jobs. When the Union industry’s production volumes increased from 2020 to 2021 also the employment increased. However, as the Union industry was also able to improve its productivity, the employment did not increase at the same rate as the production volumes. The falling production volumes from 2021 to the review investigation period resulted in decrease of jobs and also some loss of productivity.

(341) During the review investigation period, the individual dumping margins found for the cooperating exporting producers were still substantial (see recital (283) above).

(342) However, despite the fact there was still dumping from China the analysis of the injury indicators shows that the measures in place had a positive impact on the Union industry at the beginning of the period considered. This positive situation however reversed in 2022 when the situation of the Union industry deteriorated again.

(344) Sales prices of tyres to unrelated customers in the Union market increased by 25% during the period considered. From 2020 to 2021 the increase of prices coincided with an increase of demand. In this situation the Union industry was able to increase its sales prices more (by 7%) than the cost of production increased (by 4 %).

(345) This favourable situation changed in 2022, after which the Union industry was unable to pass-on the cost increases to its selling prices. Although the sales prices increased by 18 percentage points between 2021 and the review investigation period these price increases were not in line with the increase of cost of production.

(346) Overall, the cost of production increased by 40 % during the period considered. The most significant increase took place from 2021 to 2022 when the cost of production increased by 30 %.

(347) The key injury indicators were also analysed for the three tiers.

(352) The average labour cost per employee increased by 9% from 2020 to 2021 and then by 20 % from 2021 to 2022, remaining on the same level in the review investigation period.

(354) Compared to the production, the closing stock remained on the same level from 2020 to 2022 (being 14 % – 16% of the production volume). An increase (to 21% of the production volume) was observed when comparing the closing stock at the end of the investigation period (30 June 2023) with the year-end stock levels in 2020 – 2022. This increase is however largely explained by seasonality. Higher volumes of tyres are sold during the second half of the year compared to the first half, whereas the production is less seasonal. Due to this seasonality, the stock volumes are usually higher at end June compared to end December. Therefore, as such, the apparent increase of stock levels during the review investigation period is not indicative of the financial situation of the Union producers.

(356) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.

(357) The overall profitability first improved from 2020 to 2021 when the demand of tyres increased following the recovery of road transports from the Covid crisis and when overall imports had not yet increased to the same extent as afterwards. As explained in the recital (344), the Union industry was able to increase its sales prices in 2021 more than the increase of cost of production which contributed to increased profit margins from 7,9% to 13,4 %.

(358) The situation changed in 2022, when the Union industry was unable to increase its prices in line with the cost increases. As a consequence, the Union industry’s profitability dropped to low levels (1,8% in 2022 and 1,3 % in the review investigation period).

(359) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow was declining during the whole period considered. It was influenced by two main factors. On one hand, the overall profitability of the Union industry contributed positively to the cash flow at the beginning of the period considered. This contribution was practically exhausted after the drop in profitability in 2022. On the other hand, the increase of production volumes and closing stock levels absorbed working capital and had thus a negative impact to cash flow already from 2021. Overall, the cash flow decreased from positive 96 million EUR to negative 95 million EUR during the period considered.

(360) Over the period considered, investments increased from 50 million EUR to 66 million EUR, i.e. by 32 %. Overall, their level remained below 10 % of the total turnover during the whole period considered.

(361) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It first increased from –2,1 % to 3,9 % from 2020 to 2021, in line with the improved profitability. Thereafter, when the overall profitability of the Union industry deteriorated, the return of investments decreased to –15,2 % in 2022 and –16,3 % in the review investigation period.

(362) The Union industry is fragmented between large groups of multi-national companies and over 400 SMEs throughout the Union and heterogeneous in relation to their ability to raise capital.

(363) A separate analysis on the same methodology as described was made for profitability in the three tiers.

(364) Development of the profitability in tier 1 during the period considered was similar to the fluctuation of the profitability of the Union industry considered as a whole. It first improved from 2020 to 2021 and then dropped to low levels (1,9% in 2022 and 1,3 % in the review investigation period).

(366) Development of the profitability in tier 2 during the period considered first improved from 2020 to 2021, then dropped to 3,5% in 2022 and further to 2,5% in the review investigation period.

(368) Tier 3 was unprofitable during the whole period considered. During the period considered the situation worsened and the negative profitability of –1,6% in 2020 decreased to –3,5% in the review investigation period. The situation was even worse for the SMEs operating in tier 3 for which the profitability fluctuated between 4,6% and –7,0% during the period considered. The slight “improvement” between 2022 and the review investigation period showed the limited success of the efforts of the industry to adapt to the difficult situation.

(370) The investigation found that the Union industry as a whole showed recovery from past dumping during 2021. Between 2022 and the review investigation period, there was a reverse of this recovery.

(371) This is particularly evident in the Union industry’s decreased profitability, loss of market share and inability to increase prices in line with rising costs. In addition, indicators related with the profitability, such as cash flow and return of investment, also deteriorated. This was especially observed among tier 3 producers, who are particularly exposed to price pressure from low-priced imports, which in turn adversely affects the higher tiers through the reverse-cascading effect described in the original investigation (121).

(372) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.

(373) During the period considered the Union industry lost its market share to imports from other countries, notably Thailand, Vietnam, Türkiye and also China.

(374) The deterioration of Union industry’s the market share was partly attributable to the increase of Chinese imports following the partial annulment of the anti-dumping duties and more importantly due to increase of imports from other countries at low prices. The lower priced imports have made it difficult for the Union industry to increase its prices and maintain its market share in the environment of increased costs.

(375) Following the start of Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, prices of input materials and energy increased considerably resulting in rapid increase of cost of production. At the same time, import volumes increased and from 2022 the Union industry was unable to pass-on the cost increases to its selling prices. Although the sales prices increased by 18% between 2021 and the review investigation period, these price increases were insufficient to compensate the increase of cost of production.

(376) As a result, the Commission also notes that the injurious situation in which the Union industry is found comes at a time when other factors such as significant cost increases and substantial increase of low-priced imports from other countries, especially Thailand, Vietnam and Türkiye took place. As shown in recitals (317) to (321) above, the imports from Thailand and Vietnam increased substantially and their price levels were markedly below the Union industry’s prices.

(377) For this reason, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from China contributed to the material injury to the Union industry during the review investigation period; however, other factors in particular the cost increase and imports from other countries, were capable of putting into question the genuine relationship between the dumped imports and the effects on the Union industry. Thus, the Commission decided to further assess whether injury caused by the dumped imports from China would likely recur if measures were allowed to lapse.

(378) Following final disclosure, Hankook claimed that injury suffered by Union industry is not caused by Chinese imports. Hankook claimed that the Chinese imports do not undercut the Union industry prices in tier 3 nor in tier 1. To support its claim, Hankook submitted sensitive data on its export prices and volumes.

(379) The Commission disagreed with this claim. As stated in recital (316) the data provided by Hankook is insufficient for carrying out any further undercutting analysis as it does not contain sufficient information on other operators active in tier 1, 2 and 3. Consequently, this data could not invalidate any of the results of the undercutting analysis made by the Commission. The Commission therefore considered that the premise of this claim, i.e. that there is no undercutting in tier 1 or tier 3, is incorrect, and therefore, this claim is rejected.

(380) Following final disclosure Hankook also claimed that the injury suffered by the Union industry is not caused by Chinese imports but by tyres imported from other third countries.

(381) As stated in the recital (377), the Commission concluded that dumped imports from China contributed to the material injury to the Union industry but also other factors, in particular the cost increase and imports from other countries, were capable of putting into question the genuine relationship between the dumped imports and the effects on the Union industry. Therefore, the Commission considers that this claim does not invalidate the conclusion above and is therefore rejected.

(382) The Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from China if the measures against were allowed to lapse.

(383) In this respect the following elements were analysed by the Commission: the production capacity and spare capacity in China, attractiveness of the Union market and export prices to third country markets and relationship between prices in the Union and China, possible absorption capacity of third country markets, likely price levels of imports from China in the absence of anti-dumping measures, and their impact on the Union industry, including undercutting and injurious level and increase of Chinese imports following temporary annulment of the anti-dumping duties.

(384) As set out in recitals (286) - (288), there is substantial production capacity and spare capacity in China to increase exports to the Union market rapidly in the event that the anti-dumping measures are allowed to expire. As established in recital (287) the available unused capacity in China in 2022 amount to almost 20 million units, almost equivalent to the total consumption on the EU market.

(385) As set out in recitals (289) - (291), the Union market, which is the second largest market in the world after the United States, is an attractive market both in terms of its prices and its size. In 2023, the price level of Chinese exports to the Union was significantly higher compared to the Chinese average export prices to other main destinations, including the USA. Moreover, despite the anti-dumping measures in force, Chinese imports into the Union remained at around 30 % of the volume of imports during the initial investigation.

(386) As set out in recital (292) trade defence measures on exports of the like product from PRC are in force in most of the third country markets which are significant consumers of truck tyres. This makes these markets less attractive for the Chinese exporting producers. This is an additional element which supports the finding that PRC’s current production capacity would most likely end in the Union market, should measures be repealed.

(387) As shown Table 4, import prices into the Union from China during the review investigation period were 218 EUR/item which is materially lower than the average sales price of the Union industry 281 EUR/item shown in Table 9, and also below their cost of production 260 EUR/item.

(388) Therefore, it is likely that without anti-dumping duties, the Chinese imports would materially undercut the Union prices.

(389) As shown in Table 3 and set out in recital (306), the increase of Chinese imports was particularly significant in 2022 when the original measures were partially annulled by General Court of the European Union.

(390) This indicates that the Chinese exporting producers remain interested in the Union market and imports would be likely to increase again, should the measures be repealed.

(391) In its comments upon initiation, the Hankook group claimed that import trends indicate that there is no threat of continuation or recurrence of injury. According to Hankook group the current market share of the Chinese imports could not have significant impact in the future of the Union industry. Also, the Hankook group claimed that the increased Chinese production capacity was not dedicated to the Union market but to other markets.

(392) The Commission disagreed with this view. Even if, to certain extent, the current duties somewhat shield the Union industry from the dumped imports from the PRC, Chinese imports were still able to increase their market share during the period considered. Given Chinese price levels without duties and the spare capacity available in China, it is likely that the market share of the Chinese imports would increase substantially should measures be allowed to lapse. Also, the claim that the increased Chinese capacity has been mainly directed to other markets during the period considered was not substantiated. Even if correct, the Commission considers that the Union market remains attractive to Chinese imports.

(393) Therefore, these claims were rejected.

(394) Following final disclosure Hankook claimed that there is no sufficient evidence of likelihood of recurrence of injury. In particular, Hankook claimed that the increase of imports in 2022 cannot be linked to the partial annulment of measures in 2022 and is not indicative of behaviour of the Chinese exporting producers. Hankook also claimed that there was no undercutting in tier 3, that the Chinese producers would rather increase their profits than lower their prices should the measures be allowed to lapse and, that given that Union market represented only 4% of the total Chinese export volume, the Union market cannot be considered attractive.

(395) The Commission disagreed with these claims. First, the partial annulment of the measures by the General Court did send a signal to the market on the possibility of partial cancellation and subsequent reimbursement of duties, making the imports potentially more attractive. Second, as explained in the recitals (316) and (379) above, the premise of the claim that there is no undercutting in tier 3 is incorrect. Third, Hankook did not submit any evidence to support its claim that the Chinese producers would rather increase their profits than lower their prices should the measures be allowed to lapse. Finally, the current level of Chinese exports to the Union when duties are in force, cannot invalidate the fact that Union market remains attractive for the reasons listed in the recitals (289) - (291) and (385) above. Therefore, this claim is rejected.

(396) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that should the measures lapse, it is likely that this will result in a significant increase of dumped imports from China at injurious price levels, and therefore further aggravating the injurious situation of the Union industry.

(397) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and end users.

(398) Union producers representing more than 25% of the Union production volume cooperated with the investigation.

(399) The investigation showed that the Union industry was in a vulnerable situation where it was not able to fully pass-on the cost increases to its selling prices and its profit margins had diminished.

(400) The Commission concludes that given that the Union industry is already suffering injury and in case of lapse of the measures there is a strong likelihood of increase of dumped imports from China at injurious price levels this would lead to increasing price pressure on the Union market and would further aggravate the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(401) The continuation of the measures is therefore clearly in the interest of the Union industry.

(402) No importers or users cooperated with the investigation.

(403) The original investigation concluded that while the measures were not in the interest of importers that predominantly rely on the import of very cheap tyres from China, importers with broader portfolio are unlikely to be severely affected by the restoration of fair competition.

(404) In the absence of new evidence, the Commission therefore concluded that, like in the original investigation, the continuation of measures will not affect importers or users to any significant extent.

(405) The original investigation found that measures protecting the Union industry’s premium tyre manufacturers producing new high-quality tyres which are designed to have along life cycle and can be retreaded, and also the retreaders active in the tier 3 market, are in the interest of the Union's policy to reduce waste and to manage raw materials in a sustainable way. Moreover, given that it is mostly SMEs which are active in the retreading business, the imposition of measures would also be in line with the important Commission objective to support SMEs (122).

(406) In the original investigation treads suppliers had made submissions supporting the imposition of anti-dumping measures alleging such measures are essential for the survival of the retreading industry and stating that without retreading activities, their business will be severely affected. Subsequently, the Commission concluded that measures would be in the interest of treads suppliers.

(407) In the absence of new evidence, the Commission therefore concluded that, like in the original investigation, the measures would be in the interest of treads suppliers.

(408) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons under Article 21 of the basic Regulation that it would not be in the interest of the Union to maintain the existing measures on imports of tyres originating in the People’s Republic of China.

(409) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on tyres from China should be maintained.

(410) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(411) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of the Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(412) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(413) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in the People’s Republic of China and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(414) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (123). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(415) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure.

(416) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509of the European Parliament and of the Council when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(417) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

(a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in People’s Republic of China during the period between 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 (‘original investigation period’);

(b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and which have or could have cooperated in the investigation that led to the duty; and

(c) it has either actually exported the product under review originating in People’s Republic of China or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the original investigation period.

In cases where the countervailing duty has been subtracted from the anti-dumping duty for certain exporting producers, refund requests under Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 shall also trigger the assessment of the dumping margin for that exporting producer prevailing during the refund investigation period. The amount to be reimbursed to the applicant for refund cannot exceed the difference between the duty collected and the combined countervailing and anti-dumping duty established in the refund investigation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 15 January 2025.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

(2) Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/683 of 4 May 2018 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China, and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/163 (OJ L 116, 7.5.2018, p. 8).

(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1579 of 18 October 2018 imposing a definitive antidumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/163 (OJ L 263, 22.10.2018, p. 3).

(4) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1690 of 9 November 2018 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries and with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1579 imposing a definitive antidumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/163 (OJ L 283, 12.11.2018, p. 1).

(5) Judgement of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 4 May 2022, China Rubber Industry Association (CRIA) and China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC) v European Commission, T-30/19 and T-72/19, EU:T:2022:226.

(6) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/737 of 4 April 2023 re-imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China following the judgment of the General Court in joined cases T-30/19 and T-72/19 (OJ L 96, 5.4.2023, p. 9–44).

(7) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/738 of 4 April 2023 re-imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People's Republic of China following the judgment of the General Court in joined cases T-30/19 and T-72/19 (OJ L 96, 5.4.2023, p.45).

(8) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2217 of 6 September 2024 terminating the partial interim review of the anti-subsidy measures applicable to imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries and with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China.

(9) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2219 of 6 September 2024 terminating the partial interim review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries and with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China.

(10) OJ C 29, 26.1.2023, p. 45.

(11) Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People's Republic of China, OJ C 379, 20.10.2023.

(12) The segmentation between tiers is explained in section 2.4.

(13) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2687.

(14) Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles (OJ L 263, 9.10.2007, p. 1).

(15) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2.

(16) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/433 of 15 March 2022 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in India and Indonesia and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2012 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in India and Indonesia, OJ L 88, 16.3.2022, p. 24.

(17) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/802 of 20 May 2022 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electrolytic chromium coated steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and Brazil, OJ L 143, 23.5.2022, p. 11.

(18) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1805 of 12 October 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of wire rod originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 364, 13.10.2021, p. 14.

(19) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/558 of 6 April 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain graphite electrode systems originating in the People’s Republic of China, OJ L 108, 7.4.2022, p. 20.

(20) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1394 of 11 August 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon originating in the People’s Republic of China, as extended to imports of silicon consigned from the Republic of Korea and from Taiwan, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or Taiwan or not, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and the Council, OJ L 211, 12.8.2022, p. 86.

(21) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/934 of 11 May 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of high tenacity yarns of polyesters originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) and a partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 127, 12.5.2023, p. 1.

(22) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 10 April 2024, SWD(2024) 91 final.

(23) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 7.

(24) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 7-8.

(25) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 10, 18.

(26) Available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm (accessed on 8 April 2024).

(27) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 29-30.

(28) Updated Report – Chapter 4, p. 57, 92.

(29) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 149-150.

(30) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 153 -171.

(31) Updated Report – Chapter 7, p. 204-205.

(32) Updated Report – Chapter 8, p. 207-208, 242-243.

(33) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 19-24, Chapter 4, p. 69, p. 99-100, Chapter 5, p. 130-131.

(34) https://www.sinochem.com/en/17197.html (consulted on 10 July 2024).

(35) https://q.stock.sohu.com/newpdf/202457883741.pdf (consulted on 10 July 2024).

(36) http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESH_STOCK/2024/2024-4/2024-04-30/10153300.PDF (consulted on 10 July 2024).

(37) https://q.stock.sohu.com/newpdf/202457251875.pdf (consulted on 10 July 2024).

(38) https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN202404151630237833_1.pdf?1713215477000.pdf (consulted on 10 July 2024).

(39) Art. 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law. See updated Report – Chapter 3, p. 47-50.

(40) https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-04/08/content_5683972.htm (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(41) https://huanbao.bjx.com.cn/news/20211201/1191133.shtml (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(42) Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 24-27.

(43) https://www.cria.org.cn/c/member (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(44) https://ccb.cria.org.cn/;https://tyre.cria.org.cn/c/id/1772857864279343106; https://www.cria.org.cn/c/id/1760859134713970690 (accessed on 25 September 2024).

(45) Ibid.

(46) https://tyre.cria.org.cn/c/id/1772857864279343106 (consulted on 25 September 2024).

(47) Ibid.

(48) https://www.ty-tyre.com/news/industry/2024/0124/739.html (accessed on 25 September 2024).

(49) https://q.stock.sohu.com/newpdf/202457251875.pdf, page 14 (accessed on 25 September 2024).

(50) http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESH_STOCK/2024/2024-4/2024-04-30/10153300.PDF, page 9 (accessed on 25 September 2024).

(51) https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN202404151630237833_1.pdf?1713215477000.pdf, page 41 (accessed on 25 September 2024).

(52) Updated Report – Chapter 3, p. 40.

(53) See for example: Blanchette, J. - Xi's Gamble: The Race to Consolidate Power and Stave off Disaster; Foreign Affairs, vol. 100, no. 4, July/August 2021, pp. 10-19.

(54) Updated Report – Chapter 3, p. 41.

(55) Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-companies-idUSKCN1B40JU (accessed on 26 September 2024).

(56) https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/China-s-companies-rewrite-rules-to-declare-Communist-Party-ties#:~:text=HONG%20KONG%20--%20China's%20Communist%20Party%20congress%20underlined%20fears%20that (accessed on 26 September 2024).

(57) General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era: www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(58) Financial Times (2020) - Chinese Communist Party asserts greater control over private enterprise: https://on.ft.com/3mYxP4j (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(59) https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021-12/29/5665166/files/90c1c79a00b44c67b59c29392476c862.pdf (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(60) https://www.cria.org.cn/c/member (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(61) Updated Report – Chapter 14, Sections 14.1 to 14.3.

(62) Updated Report – Chapter 4, p. 56-57, 99-100-, .

(63) https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021-12/29/5665166/files/90c1c79a00b44c67b59c29392476c862.pdf (accessed on 26 September 2024).

(64) https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021-12/29/5665166/files/90c1c79a00b44c67b59c29392476c862.pdf (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(65) Anhui province 14 FYP on developing new materials industry, published 28 February 2022, SECTION III, Table 6.

(66) Ibid.

(67) https://gxt.gansu.gov.cn/gxt/c106992/202201/1959993/files/bc8a41db8b904e55b5bd7017eb42d119.pdf (accessed on 26 September 2024).

(68) Ibid.

(69) https://huanbao.bjx.com.cn/news/20211115/1187880.shtml (accessed on 26 September 2024).

(70) http://gxt.jl.gov.cn/xxgk/zcwj/sgxtwj/202109/t20210914_8217060.html (accessed on 26 September 2024).

(71) https://q.stock.sohu.com/newpdf/202457883741.pdf, page 146 (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(72) https://q.stock.sohu.com/newpdf/202457251875.pdf, page 145 (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(73) http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESH_STOCK/2024/2024-4/2024-04-30/10153300.PDF, page 190 (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(74) https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN202404151630237833_1.pdf?1713215477000.pdf, page 193 (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(75) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 171-179.

(76) Updated Report – Chapter 9, p. 260-261.

(77) Updated Report – Chapter 9, p. 257-260.

(78) Updated Report – Chapter 9, p. 252-254.

(79) Updated Report – Chapter 13, p. 360-361, 364-370.

(80) Updated Report – Chapter 13, p. 366.

(81) Updated Report – Chapter 13, p. 370-373.

(82) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 137-140.

(83) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 146-149.

(84) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 149.

(85) See official policy document of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission of 28 August 2020: Three-year action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors (2020-2022): http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=925393&itemId=928 (accessed on 8 April 2024). The Plan instructs to “ further implement the spirit embodied in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s keynote speech on advancing the reform of corporate governance of the financial sector’. Moreover, the Plan’s section II aims at promoting the organic integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance: “we shall make the integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance more systematic, standardised and procedure-based […] Major operational and management issues must have been discussed by the Party Committee before being decided upon by the Board of Directors or the senior management”.

(86) See CBIRC’s Notice on the Commercial banks performance evaluation method, issued on 15 December 2020: http://jrs.mof.gov.cn/gongzuotongzhi/202101/t20210104_3638904.htm (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(87) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 157-158.

(88) Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 150-152, 156-160, 165-171.

(89) OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris. p. 29, available at:

https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-chn-2019-en (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(90) http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-04/20/content_5504241.htm (accessed on 10 July 2024).

(91) https://business.sohu.com/a/709659690_121375869 (accessed on 26 September 2024).

(92) https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1707938919540030050&wfr=spider&for=pc (accessed on 26 September 2024).

(93) http://www.doublestar.com.cn/news/3966.html (accessed on 26 September 2024); http://www.doublestar.com.cn/news/3816.html (accessed on 26 September 2024).

(94) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

(95) https://www.globaltradealert.org/data_extraction.

(96) http://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=ExportRestrictions_IndustrialRawMaterials.

(97) https://www.globaltradealert.org/data_extraction.

(98) https://www.macmap.org/

(99) Demonstracoes-Financeiras-Anuais-Completas-Vipal-Borrachas-2022-12-31-FhFCcWCt.pdf.

(100) brisa.com.tr/yatirimci-iliskileri/sunumlar-ve-raporlar/finansal-tablolar-ve-bagimsiz-denetci-raporu/

(101) United States Department of Commerce, Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Results of the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the People’s Republic of China; 2021-2022, p. 15.

(102) www.toyotiresasia.com/about-us : “Currently TOYO TIRES offers a range of tires including PROXES car tires designed for mileage and performance, and OPEN COUNTRY tires for SUVs and 4x4 vehicles that caters for both on-road and off-road users in Malaysia”.

(103) Statista is a global data and business intelligence platform with an extensive collection of statistics, reports, and insights.

(104) Finansal Bilgiler (goodyear.eu)

(105) Turkish Statistical Institute: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr.

(106) EMRA | Energy Market Regulatory Authority: http://epdk.gov.tr.

(107) Türkiye Investment Office : https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/investmentguide/pages/cost-of-doing-business.aspx.

(108) www.gtis.com/gta/secure/default.cfm.

(109) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value.

(110) Turkish Statistical Institute - Actual weekly working hours and monthly average labour cost by economic activity and Actual weekly working hours and monthly average labour cost by status of being covered by collective agreement and size class of enterprise : https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=istihdam-issizlik-ve-ucret-108&dil=2. Last consulted on 18 July 2024. The relevant files are provided in file for interested parties under save number: t24.005240.

(111) Turkish Statistical Institute - Labour cost indices : https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Labour-Input-Indices-Quarter-I:-January-March,-2024-53682. Last consulted on 18 July 2024. The relevant files are provided in the file for interested parties under save number: t24.005240.

(112) Energy Market Regulation Authority (EMRA) : https://www.epdk.gov.tr/Detay/Icerik/3-0-39/kurul-kararlari- Last consulted on 18 July 2024. The relevant files are provided in the file for interested parties under save number: t24.005240.

(113) Turkish Statistical Institute - Industry natural gas prices by consumption bands for period January-June, 2022: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Electricity-and-Natural-Gas-Prices-Period-I:-January-June,-2022-45567. Last consulted on 18 July 2024. The relevant files are provided in the file for interested parties under save number: t24.005240.

(114) Turkish Statistical Institute - Domestic producer price index and rate of change: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Domestic-Producer-Price-Index-June-2024-53691. Last consulted on 18 July 2024. The relevant files are provided in the file for interested parties under save number: t24.005240.

(115) Investment Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye: https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/investmentguide/pages/cost-of-doing-business.aspx – Cost of doing business section. Last consulted on 18 July 2024. A screenshot of the relevant data is available in the file for interested parties under save number: t24.005240.

(116) Judgment of the General Court of 21 February 2024, Sinopec, Case T-762/20, EU:T:2024:113, para. 65.