Legalize
Legalize / European Union / Decision

Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2258 of 8 October 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

Type Decision
Publication 2026-10-08
State In force
Text As published
Department Council of the European Union
Source EUR-Lex
articles 2

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API
Image omitted; see official source Official Journal of the European Union EN L series
--- --- ---
2026/2258 8.10.2026

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended as follows:

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 8 October 2026.

For the Council

The President

T. BYRNE

[^ntr1-L_202602258EN.000101-E0001]: Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities (OJ L, 2024/2643, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2643/oj).

ANNEX

Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended as follows:

  • ‘11. Olga Alekseevna BELYAVTSEVA’;
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
‘4. Andrey Vladimirovich AVERYANOV (Russian: Андрей Владимирович АВЕРЬЯНОВ) Function: Deputy director of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), Commander of GRU unit 29155, Major General DOB: 29.9.1967 POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax Identification Number (INN): 773378888007 Andrey Averyanov is a deputy director of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the restructuring of the Wagner Group, the command of Russian military operations in Africa was restructured and placed under the Africa Corps under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and Averyanov was placed in charge of the operations. In many African countries, Russian forces provide security to military juntas that have overthrown legitimate democratic governments, gravely worsening the stability, security and democracy of the countries. In addition, Russian forces in Africa exploit the natural resources there to finance their operations. In the beginning of 2024, Russian forces took control of the Intahaka gold mine in Mali. Therefore, Andrey Averyanov is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in third countries by undermining the democratic political process in the African countries where Russian forces operate and by exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country. 16.12.2024
6. Vladimir Vladimirovich SERGIYENKO (Russian: Владимир Владимирович СЕРГИЕНКО) Function: Former assistant of Member of Bundestag Eugen Schmidt DOB: 23.5.1971 POB: Lviv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian / Ukrainian Gender: male Vladimir Sergiyenko is a former parliamentary assistant of the Member of the German Bundestag, Eugen Schmidt. In parallel, Sergiyenko actively colluded with Russian intelligence officers seeking to leverage his privileged parliamentary and political access to the detriment of the democratic political process and constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany. He is also the host of the Russian radio programme “Eurozone” on Vesti FM and regularly hosts radio segments on Balt News. He uses those platforms to spread disinformation about the European Union and its member states. Therefore, Vladimir Sergiyenko implemented and supported actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law and security in the Union and its Member States by engaging in, directly or indirectly, the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, and by engaging in, directly or indirectly, and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference. 16.12.2024
20. Hüseyin DOGRU Nationality: German Gender: male Hüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ș., which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ș. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations. RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas. During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest. Hüseyin Doğru continues to spread false information through AFA Medya A.Ș. as well as through his own social media accounts. Through AFA Medya A.Ș. and his personal social media accounts, Hüseyin Doğru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation. 20.5.2025
23. Alina LIPP Function: war correspondent DOB: 17.9.1993 POB: Hamburg Nationality: German Gender: female Alina Lipp runs the blog “Neues aus Russland”, in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine. Those activities are supported by the Russian State. Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda. Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country. 20.5.2025
27. Iurie NECULITI (Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ) Function: CEO of Stark Industries Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova Gender: male Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova Iurie Neculiti was the CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provided server hosting, with server locations all over the world. In 2025, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.’s technical infrastructure was transferred to a newly established entity, WorkTitans B.V., which served as a front, while a second entity, MIRhosting, ensured the first was connected to the internet. Iurie Neculiti and Ivan Neculiti are named as the beneficiaries of the set-up, which is reported to reflect an attempt to obfuscate ownership and maintain hosting services under new legal and network entities. That network of entities enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies. Therefore, as former CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., and as beneficiary of its front companies, Iurie Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti, Stark Industries, WorkTitans B.V. and MIRHosting. 20.5.2025
28. Ivan NECULITI (Russian: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ) Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ Hosting Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova Gender: male Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova Ivan Neculiti was the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provided server hosting, with server locations all over the world. In 2025, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.’s technical infrastructure was transferred to a newly established entity, WorkTitans B.V., which served as a front, while a second entity, MIRhosting, ensured the first was connected to the internet. Iurie Neculiti and Ivan Neculiti are named as the beneficiaries of the set-up, which is reported to reflect an attempt to obfuscate ownership and sustain hosting services under new legal and network entities. That network of entities enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies. Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti, Stark Industries, WorkTitans B.V. and MIRHosting. Therefore, as the former owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., and beneficiary of its front companies, Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. 20.5.2025
29. Andrei KHARKOVSKY (Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ) Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad Nationality: Russian POB: Tomsk Region, Russia Gender: male Address: Germany Andrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. Kharkovsky is a supporter of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad and similar Russian Cossack organizations including by organising military gatherings for its members in Germany. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia’s war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a “historical mission” to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. Moreover, Kharkovsky is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova and Rostislav Teslyuk including by providing security services during events where fundraisers for Pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine took place. Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Russian Government which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by supporting the undermining of the public order and safety, including by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine. He also supports natural persons who support actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) and which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. 20.5.2025
57. Jacques BAUD Function: former colonel in the Swiss army; former strategic analyst, intelligence and terrorism specialist DOB: 1.4.1955 Nationality: Swiss Gender: male Jacques Baud, a former Swiss army colonel and strategic analyst, is a regular guest on pro-Russian television and radio programmes. He acts as a mouthpiece for pro-Russian propaganda and makes conspiracy theories, for example accusing Ukraine of orchestrating its own invasion in order to join NATO. Therefore, Jacques Baud is responsible for, implementing or supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine democracy and threaten stability or security in a third country by engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference. 15.12.2025’

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/2258/oj

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)

Reading this document does not replace reading the official text published in the Official Journal of the European Union. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies arising from the conversion of the original to this format.

This text is published under EUR-Lex's own terms of reuse, not a Legalize or public-domain licence. EUR-Lex
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu — Source: EUR-Lex (Publications Office of the European Union). Reused under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence. Only EU legislation published in the printed Official Journal of the European Union is deemed authentic; consolidated texts are reproduced here for documentation purposes and have been reformatted to Markdown.