Regulation (EU) 2026/261 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 January 2026 on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and preparing the phase-out of Russian oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

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	2026/261	2.2.2026

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194(2) and Article 207 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee [^ntr1-L_202600261EN.000101-E0001],

After consulting the Committee of the Regions,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure [^ntr2-L_202600261EN.000101-E0002],

Whereas:

• (1) The unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 revealed the dramatic consequences of the existing dependencies on Russian natural gas for markets and security. In their Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, Heads of State or Government therefore agreed to gradually decrease and eventually fully eliminate the dependency on Russian energy. In its REPowerEU Communication of 8 March 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy’ and in its Communication of 18 May 2022 on the REPowerEU Plan the Commission proposed concrete measures to allow for the full diversification away from Russian energy imports in a safe, affordable and sustainable manner. Significant progress in the process of diversifying gas supplies away from the Russian Federation has been achieved since then. As the remaining volumes of Russian natural gas entering the Union are still significant, in its Communication of 6 May 2025 on the Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports (REPowerEU Roadmap), the Commission announced a legislative proposal to fully phase out Russian gas imports and to improve the existing framework for addressing energy dependencies. In order to ensure energy security and resilience of the Union, it is urgent and strategically needed to address all remaining energy dependencies mentioned in the REPowerEU Roadmap.

• (2) Multiple examples of unannounced and unjustified supply reductions and interruptions already before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as the weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation since then, demonstrate that the Russian Federation has systematically exploited existing dependencies on Russian gas supplies as a political weapon to harm the Union’s economy. This has led to serious negative effects on Member States and the Union’s economic security, on the stability of the single market, on the Union’s consumers and on competitiveness in general. The Union can therefore no longer consider the Russian Federation and its energy companies reliable energy trading partners.

• (3) In January 2006, the Russian Federation stopped its natural gas supplies to some countries in South East and Central Europe in the middle of a cold spell, driving up prices and causing or threatening harm to citizens. On 6 January 2009, the Russian Federation again fully cut off gas in transit through Ukraine, affecting 18 Member States, in particular those in Central and Eastern Europe. This supply disruption led to serious disturbances to gas markets in the region and in the whole of the Union. Some Member States had zero natural gas flows for nearly 14 days, forcing sustained shutdowns of heating in schools and factories, which required them to declare a state of emergency. In 2014, the Russian Federation invaded and illegally annexed Crimea, seized Ukrainian gas production assets in Crimea and reduced gas supplies to several Member States which had announced that they would supply Ukraine with gas, which in turn led to market disturbances and price increases and harmed economic security. The Russian Federation’s State-controlled monopoly exporter Gazprom was the subject of several Commission investigations for a possible breach of Union competition rules and has subsequently changed its conduct on the market in order to address the Commission’s competition concerns. In several cases, the competition issues at stake concerned so-called ‘territorial restrictions’ in Gazprom’s gas supply contracts, prohibiting the resale of gas outside the destination country, as well as evidence that Gazprom was engaged in unfair pricing practices and made energy supplies dependent on political concessions, such as the participation in Russian pipeline projects or acquiring control over Union energy assets.

• (4) The Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since February 2022 and subsequent weaponised reductions of gas supplies in conjunction with the manipulation of the markets through intentional disruptions of gas flows have laid bare vulnerabilities and dependencies in the Union and its Member States, with the obvious potential of a direct and serious impact on the functioning of the Union gas market, the Union’s economy and its essential security interests, as well as the potential of direct harm to Union citizens because energy supply disruptions can harm citizens’ health or life. Evidence shows that the state-controlled company Gazprom intentionally manipulated the Union’s energy markets in order to drive up energy prices. Large underground storages in the Union controlled by Gazprom were left at unprecedentedly low levels, and Russian companies reduced sales at Union gas hubs and fully discontinued the use of their own sales platform before the invasion, which affected short-term markets and aggravated the already tight supply situation after the Russian Federation’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine. As of March 2022, the Russian Federation systematically halted or reduced deliveries of natural gas to Member States, leading to significant disturbances to the Union gas market. This affected in particular supplies to the Union via the Yamal pipeline, supplies to Finland as well as the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, where Gazprom first reduced flows and eventually shut down supplies via the pipeline entirely.

• (5) The Russian Federation’s weaponisation of gas supply and market manipulation through intentional disruptions of gas flows led to a sudden and sharp increase in energy prices in the Union, causing unprecedented price levels in 2022, up to eight times the average of previous years. The resulting need to find alternative gas supply sources, to change supply routes, to fill storages for the winter, and to find solutions for congestion problems in the Union’s gas infrastructure further contributed to high price volatility and the unprecedented price hikes in 2022.

• (6) The exceptionally high gas prices resulted in high electricity prices and price increases for other energy products, leading to sustained high inflation. A deep economic crisis with negative growth rates in many Member States, caused by the high energy prices and volatility, endangered the economy of the Union, undermined consumer purchasing power and raised the cost of manufacturing, leading to risks to social cohesion and stability, and even to human life or health. The supply interruptions also led to very serious problems concerning the security of energy supply in the Union and forced 11 Member States to declare an energy crisis level under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr3-L_202600261EN.000101-E0003]. Benefitting from the Union’s dependency during that crisis, the Russian Federation’s manipulations of the market allowed it to achieve record-high profits from the remaining energy trade with Europe, with revenues from gas imports still accounting for EUR 15 billion in 2024. Those revenues could be used to finance further economic attacks against the Union undermining economic security. They could also be used to finance the war of aggression against Ukraine which constitutes a major threat to political and economic stability in Europe.

• (7) The recent crisis provided evidence that trustful trade relations with partners supplying energy products are crucial to preserving market stability and protecting human life and health as well as the essential security interests of the Union, in particular because the Union depends to a large extent on energy imports from third countries. Maintaining energy supplies from the Russian Federation would expose the Union to continued economic and security risks; it would therefore decrease, rather than increase, its security of energy supply. Even dependencies on smaller import volumes of Russian gas can, if abused by the Russian Federation, significantly distort the price dynamic, even if only temporarily, and disrupt energy markets, in particular in those regions which are still significantly reliant on imports from the Russian Federation. In view of the long standing and consistent pattern of market manipulations and supply disruptions, as well as the fact that the government of the Russian Federation has consistently used gas trade as a weapon to achieve policy goals rather than trade goals, it is appropriate to take legally binding measures to eliminate all remaining vulnerabilities of the Union resulting from dependence on natural gas imports from the Russian Federation, both via pipelines (‘pipeline gas’) and liquified natural gas (LNG).

• (8) The restrictions on international transactions provided for in this Regulation are consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as required by Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The relations between the Union and the Russian Federation have greatly deteriorated in recent years and in particular since 2022. That deterioration of relations is due to the Russian Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in response to the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukraine. The Union is allowed, by virtue of the exceptions that apply under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and in particular Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (security exceptions) and analogous exceptions under the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Russian Federation, to not accord to goods imported from the Russian Federation the advantages granted to like products imported from other countries (most-favoured-nation treatment). Therefore, the Union is not prevented from imposing prohibitions or restrictions on the import of goods from the Russian Federation, if the Union considers such measures, taken at the time of the ongoing emergency in international relations between the Union and the Russian Federation, to be necessary for the protection of the Union’s essential security interests.

• (9) Diversifying LNG imports is essential for strengthening and maintaining energy security within the Union. In order to prevent the risk of long-term reservations of LNG terminal capacity held by Russian companies being used to obstruct imports from alternative sources through capacity hoarding practices, such as practices to book liquification or storage capacities without actually using them or with the purpose of preventing competitors from using the infrastructure, regulatory authorities and competition authorities are to make full use of the robust legal instruments which are available under Union and national energy and competition law, where appropriate. Where customs authorities identify risks to safety or security resulting from Russian gas before entering the customs territory of the Union, they should make use of the provisions concerning risk management in the Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the ‘Union Customs Code’) [^ntr4-L_202600261EN.000101-E0004] to avoid such risks.

• (10) The Commission has carefully assessed the impact on the Union and on its Member States of a possible prohibition on natural gas imports from the Russian Federation. In fact, preparatory work and several detailed analyses of the consequences of a total phase-out of Russian gas have been conducted and published since 2022, and the Commission could also draw upon a multitude of consultations with stakeholders, external experts and agencies, and studies on the effects of the phase-out of Russian gas. The Commission’s analysis showed that a phase-out of Russian natural gas imports, if introduced in a stepwise, coordinated and well-prepared manner and in a spirit of solidarity, is likely to have limited impact on energy prices in the Union, and that it will enhance and not endanger the security of the Union’s energy supply, due to the exit of an unreliable trading partner from the Union markets. As set out in the REPowerEU Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already reduced the Union’s dependencies on supplies from the Russian Federation, for instance by introducing measures to reduce gas demand or to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources, as well as by actively supporting the diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the bargaining power of the Union via joint gas purchasing. The Assessment of Impacts also showed that upfront coordination of diversification policies can avoid harmful effects on prices or supplies.

• (11) This Regulation is fully compatible with the Union’s strategy to reduce its reliance on fossil fuel imports by enhancing decarbonisation and rapidly expanding domestically produced clean energy. As set out in the REPowerEU Roadmap, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already resulted in a substantial reduction of more than 60 billion cubic metres annually in gas imports between 2022 and 2024, allowing the Union to reduce its dependence on supplies from the Russian Federation. A further reduction of dependence could be achieved by measures to reduce gas demand, to increase energy efficiency, or to accelerate the green transition by an accelerated deployment of wind and solar generation capacity, which would significantly increase the share of renewables in the energy mix, as well as by actively supporting diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the bargaining power of the Union via joint gas purchasing. Moreover, the full implementation of the energy transition, the recent Action Plan for Affordable Energy and other measures, in particular investments in the production of low-carbon alternatives for energy intensive products, such as fertilisers, are expected to replace up to 100 billion cubic metres of natural gas by 2030. These combined efforts will strengthen the Union’s resilience, competitiveness, and open strategic autonomy, support European industries, SMEs and citizens and facilitate the phase-out of gas imports from the Russian Federation.

• (12) In line with the Versailles Declaration and the REPowerEU Communication, a large number of gas importers have already terminated or significantly reduced their gas supplies from the Russian Federation. As set out in the Assessment of Impacts, the remaining gas volumes under existing supply contracts can be phased out without significant economic impact or risks for the security of supply, due to the availability of sufficient alternative suppliers on the world gas market, a well-interconnected Union gas market and the availability of sufficient import infrastructure. The related measures need to be in line with the current energy framework of the Union.

• (13) In some cases, LNG cargoes carry gas produced in different countries and mixed together. The prohibition on natural gas imports from the Russian Federation should therefore also apply to the amounts of gas in such cargoes that are produced in the Russian Federation. Where importers can unambiguously document the relevant shares of LNG produced outside the Russian Federation, it should be possible to import the non-Russian LNG amounts contained in an LNG cargo.

• (14) Short-term supply contracts concern smaller volumes than the large long-term supply contracts importers hold with Russian companies and existing short-term supply contracts will in any event be close to expiration by the time this Regulation enters into force. Accordingly, the risk to economic security resulting from existing short-term supply contracts appears to be low. It is therefore appropriate to exempt existing short-term supply contracts from the immediate application of the import prohibition allowing for a transition period until 25 April 2026 for LNG imports, taking into account Article 3ra of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 [^ntr5-L_202600261EN.000101-E0005], and until 17 June 2026 for pipeline gas.

• (15) Importers holding long-term supply contracts will likely need more time to find alternative supply routes and sources than short-term contract holders because long-term supply contracts usually concern significantly larger volumes over time than short-term supply contracts. A transition period regarding the prohibition on gas imports for existing long-term supply contracts should therefore be introduced to give holders of long-term supply contracts sufficient time to diversify their supplies in an orderly manner. While LNG can be sourced world-wide and LNG customers usually face no physical barriers in switching to alternative suppliers on the LNG world-market, diversification for pipeline gas customers, notably in countries without LNG infrastructure, may be more complex. A longer transition period should therefore be granted for gas supplies under existing long-term pipeline supply contracts.

• (16) Specific situations have occurred where a country which is currently still being supplied under existing long-term supply contracts for Russian pipeline gas is specifically affected by recent changes of supply routes from the Russian Federation, removing the possibility to import gas via these supply routes, due to limited or no alternative routes for the transport of the contracted gas. In order to remedy the situation, suppliers from other Member States are currently ensuring the delivery of pipeline gas under short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation via uncongested interconnection points. Due to this very specific situation and in order to give them sufficient time to find new suppliers, a longer transition period should also apply to those short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation which are used to supply landlocked countries affected by changes of supply routes for Russian gas.

• (17) While it appears justified to exempt existing ‘legacy’ supply contracts from the immediate application of the prohibition on imports of Russian gas, not all contracts concluded before the entry into force of this Regulation should benefit from such a temporary exemption. Indeed, a temporary exemption for all existing supply contracts from the prohibition might have created an incentive for Russian suppliers to use the time between the publication of the Commission proposal for this Regulation and the entry into force of the prohibition to increase current supplies by concluding new contracts or increasing volumes by changing existing supply contracts or using flexibilities under such contracts. In order to ensure that imports from the Russian Federation decrease, rather than increase, as a result of the prohibition, this Regulation should not reward companies for having concluded new Russian gas import contracts in the time between the publication of the Commission proposal for this Regulation and the entry into force of the prohibition by also granting them a transition period. Indeed, the commitment from Heads of State or Government to phase out Russian gas supplies was already made in March 2022 and the Commission built on this commitment by proposing the REPowerEU Strategy, the REPowerEU Plan and the REPowerEU Roadmap. At the latest from the publication of the proposal for this Regulation, it was no longer appropriate to consider contracts concluded after that date as ‘legacy’ contracts. Contracts concluded after 17 June 2025 should therefore not benefit from the exceptional transition provisions for existing short-term and long-term supply contracts.

• (18) In order to avoid import volumes provided for in existing supply contracts from being increased, amendments to existing supply contracts should be considered new contracts for the purposes of this Regulation, and increases of import volumes by using contractual flexibilities should not benefit from the transition period. Exceptions should be provided for certain cases of necessary amendments to existing supply contracts, provided they do not increase contracted quantities or the timing of delivery. Price variations resulting from price indexation already provided for in existing supply contracts do not constitute an amendment to existing supply contracts.

• (19) This Regulation creates a clear legal prohibition on the import of Russian natural gas, constituting a sovereign act of the Union beyond the control of gas importers and rendering the performance of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation unlawful, with direct legal effect and without any discretion for Member States concerning its application.

• (20) Unlike other goods, natural gas is a homogeneous commodity which is traded in large volumes and often resold multiple times between traders at wholesale level. Taking into account the particular complexity of tracing the origin of natural gas, and bearing in mind that Russian suppliers might seek to circumvent this Regulation, for example by sales via intermediaries, via transshipments or via transport through other countries, this Regulation should provide for an effective framework to avoid circumvention of the prohibition. Relevant authorities should therefore be enabled to take the necessary actions to identify whether natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation are brought into the customs territory of the Union through schemes created for circumventing this Regulation. When determining whether natural gas is released for free circulation in the Union, customs authorities should not only depend on information provided in the customs declaration, but be allowed, on the basis of other relevant information, to assess, where they deem relevant, whether a good brought into the Union is actually intended to be released into free circulation. This Regulation should also require the establishment of the country of production and the supply chain of natural gas imported into the Union.

• (21) Importers of natural gas should be obliged to provide authorities with all information necessary to establish the country of production of natural gas imported into the Union and to determine whether the imported gas is subject to the general prohibition or one of its exceptions. The concept of ‘origin’ under Union customs law may not always allow for the identification of the country of production of the imported gas, for example if the gas was processed (e.g. liquified or regasified) after leaving the Russian Federation. This Regulation should therefore also cover cases where the country of ‘origin’ under Union customs law differs from the country of production of the gas and provide for a mechanism to verify whether the natural gas was extracted or liquified in the Russian Federation. Any gas which, before its import into the Union, was exported from the Russian Federation, either via direct export from Russia to the Union or via indirect export through a third country, should, except in case of transit, be subject to the prohibition.

• (22) Due to the specific characteristics of pipeline gas and LNG, and in order to allow for a smooth verification process of the country of production and the conditions for possible temporary exemptions before the gas enters the customs territory of the Union, a prior authorisation procedure should be introduced. Imports should be refused in the absence of an authorisation. Authorising authorities and, where applicable, customs authorities should be informed in advance about intended imports into the Union, and they should be provided with the information necessary to verify the country of production and to determine whether the conditions for a temporary exemption under this Regulation are met. While authorising authorities should strive to issue an authorisation within the period between submission of information by the importer and the planned entry into the customs territory of the Union in order to facilitate imports of gas into the Union, they should also be able to decide at a later stage, in particular where there are doubts concerning the information provided. The prior authorisation should be without prejudice to existing enforcement powers of customs authorities. Imports of natural gas from gas producing countries should be exempted from that obligation if the Union has imported significant volumes from these countries in the past and if those countries either have shown that they do not want to support the Russian gas sector by a prohibition on the import of Russian gas or by restrictive measures targeting Russian gas infrastructure, Russian gas companies or persons managing such companies, or if those countries do not dispose of the necessary infrastructure to import natural gas via pipelines or LNG. The Commission should establish a list of such countries and update it accordingly.

• (23) Authorising authorities and, where applicable, customs authorities should be able to request all information necessary to assess the legality of imports. They should also be able to rely on information from other sources. As the contractual conditions determining the elements relevant for the assessment are often complex, the authorities should be empowered to ask importers for detailed contract information, including entire supply contracts, where that is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other contractual provisions. This Regulation should include rules to ensure an effective protection of business secrets of concerned undertakings.

• (24) When exercising their powers, authorising authorities and customs authorities should focus of the enforcement on interconnection points, LNG facilities or transit pipelines where the risk of circumvention is high. Practices of using so-called ‘shadow fleets’ for the circumvention of the restrictive measure have been observed in oil transport and could also pose risks for LNG imports, thus undermining the objectives of this Regulation. In close cooperation with each other, authorities should, where necessary, adapt their enforcement priorities to address potential circumvention practices identified during the implementation of this Regulation. The Commission should also constantly monitor the flows of Russian natural gas in transit through third countries.

• (25) Some parts of the Russian gas transmission infrastructure are directly connected to the Union, and some transit pipelines connecting the Russian Federation with the Union run through third countries without currently having any entry points between the Russian Federation and the Union. It should therefore be presumed that natural gas imported into the Union via borders, interconnectors, or interconnection points between the Russian Federation and the Union, Belarus and the Union as well as natural gas arriving via pipelines such as TurkStream at the interconnection point Strandzha 2 / Malkoclar originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation. Where it is claimed that natural gas arriving at these borders, interconnectors, or interconnection points is under a ‘transit’ procedure through the Russian Federation, strict controls should apply. The Russian Federation is a major gas exporter and has not played any significant role as a gas transit country in the past, due to several factors, such as the lack of regasification infrastructure, the organisation of gas trade in the Russian Federation via a pipeline export monopoly, business models of Russian gas companies which are not based on organising transits, and the Russian Federation’s geographical location. Therefore, and taking into account incentives of Russian suppliers to circumvent the import prohibition, customs authorities should refuse the import of volumes of natural gas allegedly in transit unless unambiguous evidence can be provided which establishes that the relevant gas has been in transit through the Russian Federation and that its country of production is not the Russian Federation. That evidence should be provided to the authorising authorities sufficiently in advance to allow for the traceability of the imported gas up to the place of production and no later than one month before the entry into the customs territory of the Union.

• (26) The interconnection point Strandzha 1 connects the Union to a pipeline system which transports not only gas from the Republic of Azerbaijan or the Republic of Türkiye, but also significant volumes of gas from the Russian Federation. It should therefore be required to provide unambiguous evidence establishing that the country of production is not the Russian Federation, and sufficient verification time should be granted to authorities to ensure that gas imported via the interconnection point Strandzha 1 does not originate in or is not exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation. Should other interconnection points be linked, in the future, to pipeline systems transporting significant volumes of Russian gas, the same standard of control should apply.

• (27) Furthermore, significant volumes of natural gas could also enter the Union under a ‘transit’ procedure. Since the strict monitoring rules for gas imports such as the prior authorisation do not apply to gas crossing the Union under a ‘transit’ procedure or being stored under customs warehousing rules, it is appropriate to provide for specific safeguards in the form of a transit monitoring regime, which enables customs authorities to monitor gas flows under a ‘transit’ procedure in order to ensure that natural gas which crosses the Union under a ‘transit’ procedure is not ultimately entering into free circulation in the Union. Where operators store gas in temporary storage or under a ‘transit’ or customs warehousing procedure under the Union Customs Code, Member States should have appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure that the use of Union storage by third countries does not pose any risk to national or regional security of supply and the fulfilment of storage obligations, and provide relevant information to the Commission.

• (28) In line with the principle of sincere cooperation, authorising authorities, customs authorities, regulatory authorities, competent authorities, the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the Commission should cooperate to implement the provisions of this Regulation and exchange relevant information, in particular regarding the assessment of temporary exemptions allowing imports of Russian natural gas after the entry into force of this Regulation. Customs authorities, regulatory authorities, competent authorities and ACER should have the necessary tools and databases in place to ensure that relevant information can be exchanged between national authorities and authorities in different Member States where necessary. ACER should contribute its expertise to the process of monitoring the implementation of this Regulation. To facilitate the creation of the necessary interoperable joint information systems, the Commission and Member States should be able to explore the possibilities of making use of the budget available under the Internal Security Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1149 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr6-L_202600261EN.000101-E0006]. Customs authorities should update regulatory authorities, the competent authorities and the Commission on a monthly basis on the key elements concerning the developments on imports of Russian gas, such as quantities imported under long-term or short-term supply contracts, entry points, or contract partners. The Commission should include that information, where relevant, in the report on the implementation of this Regulation. The Commission should also assess the effectiveness of the exchange of information and cooperation among the relevant authorities, and, where appropriate, include recommendations for the improvement of such exchange of information and cooperation in that report.

• (29) The experience with the phase-out of Russian gas supplies via Ukraine has shown that good preparation and coordination in a spirit of solidarity can avoid market disruptions or security of supply problems potentially resulting from changing gas suppliers. To prepare for the full phase-out of Russian gas in a coordinated manner, and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk to the security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, Member States should prepare national diversification plans for natural gas and submit them to the Commission by 1 March 2026. Those plans should be subject to the rules of professional secrecy and not be disclosed without the agreement of the relevant Member State. They should describe measures planned at national or regional level in order to reduce demand, foster renewable energy production and ensure alternative supplies, as well as identify possible technical, contractual or regulatory barriers which may complicate the diversification process. Since the diversification process may require coordination of measures at national, regional or Union level, the Commission should assess the national diversification plans for natural gas, with the possibility to issue recommendations suggesting adaptations where necessary.

• (30) During the preparation of the national diversification plans, the Commission should, in a coordinated manner and in spirit of solidarity, work with Member States, in particular in Central and South-Eastern Europe, to identify alternative deliveries of natural gas. In addition to improving the security of supply, new supplies could also compensate for lost revenues by utilising the existing infrastructure that has been previously used for transporting Russian gas.

• (31) In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of State or Government committed not only to phase out natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation, but also other energy supplies, in particular oil supplies. The Russian Federation has applied practices similar to those in the field of gas, where it has a history of using gas as a means of exerting coercion and manipulation, when trading oil with the Union, which has been evidenced, for example, by past interruptions of oil supplies. Existing oil supply relations with the Russian Federation create dependencies and security risks in the Union. In order to prevent the Russian Federation from using its oil exports to the Union as a tool for coercion, it is essential to prepare a timely phase-out also of oil imports from the Russian Federation. While restrictive measures to ensure the phase-out of oil imports from the Russian Federation are already in place and oil imports have decreased significantly, a further phase-out of Russian oil may require specific preparatory steps and coordination with neighbours.

• (32) Member States should therefore also prepare national diversification plans for crude oil and petroleum products which should include measures in place and planned at national level to ensure transparency and traceability of oil imports from the Russian Federation. The Commission should provide recommendations on those plans. They should be subject to the rules of professional secrecy and not be disclosed without the agreement of the relevant Member State. The Commission should continue to address the problem of the use of so-called ‘shadow fleets’ to circumvent Union restrictive measures on oil, in particular by pursuing the actions set out in REPowerEU Roadmap.

• (33) The experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 showed that comprehensive information on the supply situation and possible supply dependencies is crucial for monitoring gas supply in the Union. Therefore, importers of Russian gas making use of the transition periods laid down in this Regulation should submit to the Commission all information necessary to evaluate possible risks for gas trade. That information should include key parameters, or even text parts in full, of the relevant gas supply contracts, excluding price information, where that is necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other provisions in the contract. When monitoring gas supply in the Union, the Commission should also take into account information on imports provided by customs authorities and information included in national diversification plans. The Commission should regularly inform the Gas Coordination Group established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 about the phase-out process at Union level and submit an annual report on the Russian gas phase-out, which may be accompanied by specific Union recommendations and actions to accelerate the phase-out process.

• (34) Member States and the Union should cooperate closely on the implementation of this Regulation, including with regard to possible dispute settlement procedures. Where applicable, Regulations (EU) No 1219/2012 [^ntr7-L_202600261EN.000101-E0007] and (EU) No 912/2014 [^ntr8-L_202600261EN.000101-E0008] of the European Parliament and of the Council set out further details on cooperation and allocation of financial responsibilities between the Member States and the Union concerning possible investor-to-state dispute settlement resolution cases related to this Regulation.

• (35) In view of the recent practice of the Russian Federation to unilaterally change and impede agreed court and arbitration procedures, neither affected persons nor the Union and Member States can be held liable for any judgments, arbitral awards, or other judicial decisions adopted under illegal procedures against which no remedies are accessible under the relevant jurisdiction.

• (36) The Union has created a robust legal framework to ensure the security of gas supply at all times, and to deal with possible supply crises in a coordinated manner, including obligations for Member States to provide for effective and operational solidarity to neighbours in need of gas. The Commission should constantly monitor the development of market risks for gas supply resulting from gas trade with the Russian Federation at Union, regional and Member State level. In case of sudden and significant developments, which seriously threaten the security of supply of one or more Member States, and after an emergency in accordance with Article 11 or 12 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 has been declared, it is appropriate to empower the Commission to take the necessary emergency measures by adopting a decision regarding the import prohibitions on natural gas or LNG set out in this Regulation in one or more Member States. In such a situation, the Commission should also be able to suspend the requirement of prior authorisation for the entry of gas imports into the customs territory of the Union, in order to facilitate additional imports on short notice. Any such suspension by the Commission should be limited in time and not be granted for more than 4 weeks at a time, and should only be renewed if the conditions for the emergency pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 continue to apply. The Commission implementing decision should impose the additional conditions necessary to ensure that any such suspension is strictly limited to addressing the threat and should only allow short-term contracts. The Commission should inform the Gas Coordination Group and submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council justifying the suspension and any extension thereof, and should closely monitor the application of any such temporary suspension.

• (37) In order to avoid forum shopping with regard to penalties and to ensure consistent application of this Regulation, Member States should lay down harmonised rules on penalties for infringements of this Regulation. However, since infringements of this Regulation could also infringe other Union legislation closely linked to the prohibitions and obligations in this Regulation, such as customs legislation, restrictive measures or Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, the imposition of penalties should not lead to a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem, in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the relevant jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This Regulation is without prejudice to the imposition of criminal penalties under national law.

• (38) The measures introduced by this Regulation fully reflect the principle of energy solidarity. Indeed, the level of exposure to Russian gas imports differs between Member States, and many Member States have already taken measures to phase out Russian gas. This Regulation will ensure a Union-wide harmonised approach to the phase-out of Russian gas, preserving solidarity between Member States.

• (39) Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States in a coordinated manner and without risk of market fragmentation, but can rather be better and more efficiently achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

• (40) In view of the importance for the Union to phase out further economic dependence of the Union on gas imports from the Russian Federation without delay, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Market participants have had significant time to adapt their supply portfolio after the Versailles Declaration of March 2022 and the adoption of the proposal for this Regulation on 17 June 2025. Nevertheless, it appears appropriate to provide for a transition period to allow gas suppliers which have not yet adapted their supply strategies to make the necessary arrangements to comply with this Regulation. The prohibition to import gas from the Russian Federation should therefore only apply as of 18 March 2026. In order to allow importers with existing supply contracts and importers concluding new contracts to obtain the necessary prior authorisation in a timely manner and without disruptions for planned gas imports, the different authorisation procedures provided for in this Regulation should apply before the prohibition on imports of gas from the Russian Federation becomes applicable,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Subject matter

This Regulation provides a framework for eliminating the Union’s remaining exposure to the significant risks for trade and security of supply resulting from trade in natural gas with the Russian Federation and for preparing the effective and timely phase-out of oil imports from the Russian Federation by laying down:

• (a) a stepwise prohibition on imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation;

• (b) rules to implement and monitor that prohibition as well as the phase-out of oil imports from the Russian Federation; and

• (c) provisions to better assess the security of energy supplies in the Union.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

• (1) ‘natural gas’ means gas as referred to in Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes 2711 11 00 and 2711 21 00;

• (2) ‘LNG’ means liquefied natural gas as referred to in CN code 2711 11 00;

• (3) ‘natural gas in gaseous state’ means natural gas as referred to in CN code 2711 21 00;

• (4) ‘mixtures’ means mixtures of LNG volumes from different countries of origin;

• (5) ‘long-term supply contract’ means a contract for the supply of natural gas, excluding natural gas derivatives, the term of which exceeds one year;

• (6) ‘short-term supply contract’ means a contract for the supply of natural gas, excluding natural gas derivatives, the term of which does not exceed one year;

• (7) ‘landlocked country’ means a country that is entirely surrounded by land and has no direct access to the sea;

• (8) ‘import’ means the placing of goods under release for free circulation, within the meaning of Article 201 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr9-L_202600261EN.000101-E0009] (the ‘Union Customs Code’);

• (9) ‘importer’ means the natural or legal person that is the declarant as defined in Article 5, point (15), of the Union Customs Code in the relevant customs declaration, or a natural or legal person, including affiliated undertakings, that brings goods into the customs territory of the Union or otherwise places goods on the Union market;

• (10) ‘affiliated undertakings’ mean affiliated undertakings as defined in Article 2, point (12), of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr10-L_202600261EN.000101-E0010];

• (11) ‘customs authority’ means customs authorities as defined in Article 5, point (1), of the Union Customs Code;

• (12) ‘authorising authority’ means the authority which is competent to examine the authorisation requests made pursuant to Article 5;

• (13) ‘competent authority’ means a competent authority as defined in Article 2, point (7), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938;

• (14) ‘regulatory authority’ means a regulatory authority designated pursuant to Article 76(1) of Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr11-L_202600261EN.000101-E0011];

• (15) ‘control’ means control as defined in Article 2, point (55), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

• (16) ‘interconnection point’ means an interconnection point as defined in Article 2, point (63), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

• (17) ‘interconnector’ means an interconnector as defined in Article 2, point (39), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

• (18) ‘entry point’ means an entry point as defined in Article 2, point (61), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

• (19) ‘exit point’ means an exit point as defined in Article 2, point (62), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

• (20) ‘delivery point’ means the physical or virtual location specified in a gas supply contract at which natural gas is to be delivered by a seller and received by a buyer;

• (21) ‘contracted quantities’ means the quantities of natural gas that a buyer is obligated to purchase and a seller is obligated to provide, as specified in the original supply contract, but excluding quantities arising from contractual provisions providing for quantity changes to baseline quantities, such as round-up quantities, fractional quantities, upward quantities or other volumetric modifications under the terms of the contract except for paid make-up quantities paid before 17 June 2025;

• (22) ‘round-up quantities’ means quantities of natural gas added to the annual contracted quantity in a given year in order to provide for the last cargo to be rounded-up to a whole cargo;

• (23) ‘fractional quantities’ means quantities of natural gas carried forward to subsequent contract years where the quantity delivered during a year is either more or less than the adjusted annual contracted quantity after adjustments; such quantities can be either positive or negative;

• (24) ‘upward quantities’ means quantities of natural gas to be added optionally to the annual contracted quantity based on supply contracts, at the discretion of a party to a supply contract;

• (25) ‘paid make-up quantities’ means the quantities of natural gas which a buyer is entitled or obligated to take delivery of and pay for in subsequent periods, in compliance with minimum take-or-pay requirements and in order to compensate for any shortfall in the quantities contracted but not taken in prior periods, as provided for in a long-term supply contract;

• (26) ‘delivery schedule’ means the timetable or plan agreed between the parties to a gas supply contract, specifying the quantities of natural gas to be delivered by a seller and received by a buyer over defined time intervals, including the timing, location and conditions of delivery, as set out in a supply contract or any related operational procedures;

• (27) ‘nomination’ means a nomination as defined in Article 2, point (8), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr12-L_202600261EN.000101-E0012];

• (28) ‘oil’ means crude oil, natural gas condensates, refinery feedstocks, additives and oxygenates, and other hydrocarbons and oil products falling under CN codes 2709 and 2710;

• (29) ‘country of production’ means the country where the natural gas is extracted, regardless of whether that natural gas has been subsequently liquified or regasified in another country; where natural gas extracted in countries other than the Russian Federation is liquified or regasified in the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation shall be considered to be the country of production.

CHAPTER II STEPWISE PROHIBITION ON THE IMPORT OF NATURAL GAS FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Article 3

Prohibition on the import of natural gas from the Russian Federation

Article 4

Temporary exemption for existing supply contracts

Where the Commission identifies a risk that a Member State might not meet the filling target for 2027 for underground storage pursuant to Article 6a of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, taking into account the circumstances of the risk of missing the target, it shall confirm that risk by way of an implementing decision no later than 15 September 2027.

Where the Commission adopts an implementing decision pursuant to the second subparagraph of this paragraph, the prohibition pursuant to Article 3(1) of this Regulation shall apply only as of 1 November 2027 in that Member State, where it can be demonstrated to the authorising authorities that the relevant imports are carried out under a long-term supply contract as referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the Gas Coordination Group established by Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of its implementing decision without delay.

• (a) that the relevant imports are carried out under a short-term supply contract with delivery to a landlocked country which is necessary to fulfil the long-term supply contract under point (b); and

• (b) that a long-term supply contract with delivery to a landlocked country for the import of pipeline gas exists:

• (i) which was concluded before 17 June 2025 and not amended thereafter, unless the amendment is covered by paragraph 5 of this Article;

• (ii) which concerns gas supplies that originate in or are exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation; and

• (iii) for which the delivery at the original delivery point at a border between the Union and a third country can no longer be carried out.

• (a) lowering contracted quantities;

• (b) lowering prices and fees;

• (c) amending confidentiality clauses;

• (d) amending operational procedures, such as communication procedures;

• (e) changes of addresses of contract parties;

• (f) transfers of contractual obligations between affiliated undertakings;

• (g) changes required by judicial or arbitration procedures; or

• (h) for landlocked countries, changes of national delivery points.

CHAPTER III PRIOR AUTHORISATION OF IMPORTS AND SUBMISSION AND EXCHANGE OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

Article 5

Prior authorisation of imports and submission of relevant information

• (a) the date of the conclusion of the gas supply contract;

• (b) the duration of the gas supply contract;

• (c) the contracted quantities, including all upward or downward flexibility rights;

• (d) the identity of the parties to the gas supply contract, including, for parties registered in the Union, the Economic Operator Registration and Identification (EORI) number;

• (e) for LNG imports, the place of liquefaction and the port of first loading;

• (f) in the case of mixtures, documentation proving the quantities of natural gas that originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation and the quantities of natural gas from other countries of origin contained in the mixture and information establishing the mixing process;

• (g) the delivery points, including possible flexibilities concerning delivery points; and

• (h) any amendment of the gas supply contract, indicating the content and the date of the amendment, with the exception of amendments which relate solely to the gas price.

Where a temporary exemption under Article 4 is requested and the price of the natural gas was amended on 17 June 2025 or later, the information referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall include information on the price amendment.

The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be submitted to the authorising authority no later than one month before the entry of the natural gas into the customs territory of the Union. The same deadline shall apply to mixtures containing natural gas that originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation.

• (a) has prohibited the import of natural gas that originates in or is exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation or is applying other restrictive measures concerning such gas; or

• (b) has no gas infrastructure in place which allows it to import LNG or pipeline gas.

No later than 5 working days after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall, by means of an implementing decision, draw up the list of countries that fulfil the conditions set out in the first subparagraph.

The Commission shall monitor whether the conditions set out in the first subparagraph of this paragraph continue to be fulfilled, and shall update the list accordingly and without undue delay on the basis of the information provided by authorising authorities or, where applicable, customs authorities and by Union bodies pursuant to Article 7(2).

The Commission may, by means of an implementing decision, revoke the exemption from prior authorisation set out in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, where authorising authorities or, where applicable, customs authorities identify one or more cases of circumvention of the prohibitions set out in Article 3 by exporters from a country as referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph or where the Commission has reasons to assume that authorities from exporting countries do not appropriately intervene against practices of circumvention.

Where the information provided is not conclusive, the customs authorities shall refuse the release for free circulation of the relevant goods.

The Commission shall, in close cooperation with authorising authorities and, where applicable, customs authorities, publish guidance on further details concerning the prior authorisation procedure and adequate types of documents and evidence to be submitted.

• (a) the country of production of the natural gas to be transported under a transit procedure, unless such information is not available;

• (b) the planned or actual nomination schedules specifying volume, timing, and entry and exit points of the gas in transit, with daily granularity where applicable;

• (c) volumes and delivery points in the gas supply contracts; and

• (d) the contract between the seller or buyer or any intermediary entity and the relevant Transmission System Operators in the Union, where applicable.

Authorising authorities shall verify the consistency of the data and, where applicable, share the information received with customs authorities without delay.

Article 6

Effective monitoring and reporting

Article 7

Cooperation and exchange of information

Article 8

Penalties

• (a) 3,5 % of the undertaking’s total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year,

• (b) EUR 40 million, or

• (c) 300 % of the estimated transaction turnover, which shall be calculated on the basis of the volume of the natural gas involved and the ‘day-ahead’ contract prices on the TTF market.

The maximum penalty for natural persons shall be at least EUR 2,5 million.